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ABSTRACT 
Divestiture activity within the restaurant industry has increased in the last twenty years, 
however there is a dearth of research investigating the subsequent effects of the phenomenon. In 
particular none of the studies in the literature, have specifically examined the effects of 
restaurant firms’ brand diversification strategies and systematic risk on shareholder wealth when 
controlling for divestiture completions. This research extends the knowledge from previous work 
on corporate unbundling and brand diversification strategies to the unique restaurant industry. 
Drawing on agency theory, the long- and short-term effects of the resulting brand diversification 
levels on firm shareholder wealth following a divestiture is examined. In addition, the effect of 
systematic risk on shareholder wealth following a divestiture is investigated.  
The study is applied to one of the leading U.S. restaurant firms, Brinker International, 
Inc., since the company has completed a number of divestitures that have resulted in a reduction 
of its brand diversification. Time series data from 1994 to 2013 is used in the study. The 
Wharton Research Data Services database and Brinker International, Inc.’s Securities and 
Exchange Commission annual and quarterly filings are utilized in acquiring the data for the 
study. Data analysis for the study consists of a cointegration error correction model. Specifically, 
the study’s methodology includes unit root tests, cointegration, vector error correction, and 
causality tests for the proposed hypotheses. The results indicate that there is a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk. 
In addition, a short-term positive relationship exists between Brinker’s level of systematic risk 
and divestiture completion. In addition, a negative short-term relationship is found between 
Brinker’s brand diversification and shareholder wealth with divestiture completion. However, no 
iv 
statistically significant relationships are found between brand diversification, systematic risk, and 
shareholder wealth for Brinker in the short term. Overall, the study’s model for the short-term 
explains 23.63% of the variance in Brinker’s shareholder wealth. This study provides various 
theoretical and managerial implications for the restaurant literature, as well as, provides a 
catalyst for future studies to expand on the relationships between brand diversification, 
systematic risk, and shareholder wealth for restaurant firms when considering divestitures.   
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I want to thank Dr. Robertico Croes, Dr. Ji-Eun Lee, Dr. Tadayuki Hara, and Dr. Paul 
Beaumont for all of their assistance and support throughout my Ph.D. endeavor. In particular I 
greatly appreciate their constant trust, encouragement, and guidance while completing my 
dissertation. I have immensely benefited from each of my committee members and would not 
have been able to complete this process if it were not for your constant positive influences.  
I am extremely grateful for my family and friends for their unwavering support and 
devotion throughout my educational endeavors. I am truly fortunate to have such a warm, caring, 
and truly loving family. My mom, dad, sisters, and brother have sacrificed countless times for 
my benefit. I am forever indebted to each of you!  
 
  
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
Background ................................................................................................................................. 2 
Agency Theory ........................................................................................................................... 5 
Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................................ 8 
Purpose of the Study ................................................................................................................. 15 
Research Questions ................................................................................................................... 18 
Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 19 
Case Study ................................................................................................................................ 21 
Significance of the Study .......................................................................................................... 26 
Limitations of the Study ........................................................................................................... 27 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................... 28 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 28 
Brand Diversification ................................................................................................................ 28 
Systematic Risk ......................................................................................................................... 30 
Shareholder Wealth ................................................................................................................... 31 
Divestitures ............................................................................................................................... 33 
Brand Diversification and Shareholder Wealth ........................................................................ 35 
Brand Diversification and Systematic Risk .............................................................................. 39 
vii 
Systematic Risk and Shareholder Wealth ................................................................................. 44 
Impact of Divestitures ............................................................................................................... 47 
Shareholder Wealth ............................................................................................................... 47 
Brand Diversification ............................................................................................................ 51 
Systematic Risk ..................................................................................................................... 54 
Research Hypotheses Development .......................................................................................... 56 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 63 
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 64 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 64 
Research Design ....................................................................................................................... 64 
Case Study ................................................................................................................................ 66 
Analytical Framework .............................................................................................................. 71 
Data Collection ......................................................................................................................... 75 
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 77 
Unit Root Tests ..................................................................................................................... 80 
Engle and Granger Two Step Procedure and Error Correction ............................................ 84 
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS .................................................................................................... 88 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 88 
Data Description ....................................................................................................................... 88 
Unit Root Tests ......................................................................................................................... 93 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller..................................................................................................... 93 
Phillips-Perron ...................................................................................................................... 96 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin .................................................................................... 99 
viii 
Lag Order and Diagnostic Tests ............................................................................................. 101 
Cointegration .......................................................................................................................... 104 
Granger Causality ................................................................................................................... 107 
OLS Regression ...................................................................................................................... 109 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION............................................................................................. 114 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 114 
Overview of the Study ............................................................................................................ 114 
Objective One: Brand Diversification and Shareholder Wealth ............................................. 116 
Objective Two: Brand Diversification and Systematic Risk .................................................. 119 
Objective Three: Systematic Risk and Shareholder Wealth ................................................... 122 
Objective Four: Divestiture Completions ............................................................................... 124 
Overall Model ......................................................................................................................... 128 
Theoretical Implications ......................................................................................................... 132 
Managerial Implications ......................................................................................................... 133 
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 134 
Future Research ...................................................................................................................... 135 
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 137 
 
 
 
  
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Research Model ............................................................................................................. 18 
Figure 2. Research Model ............................................................................................................. 75 
Figure 3. Outline of Data Analysis (adapted from Cromwell, Hannan, Labys, & Terraza [1994])
........................................................................................................................................... 79 
Figure 4. Unit Root Process (adapted from Pfaff [2008]) ............................................................ 81 
Figure 5. Variable Series before Transformation ......................................................................... 92 
Figure 6. Variable Series after Transformation (First Difference) ............................................... 92 
Figure 7. OLS-CUSUM Graphical Results for VAR(1) Model ................................................. 104 
 
  
x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Study Measures ............................................................................................................... 20 
Table 2. Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 57 
Table 3. Proposed Research Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses ...................................... 62 
Table 4. Study Measures ............................................................................................................... 76 
Table 5. Summary Statistics ......................................................................................................... 91 
Table 6. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results ......................................................... 95 
Table 7. Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results ........................................................................... 97 
Table 8. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin Unit Root Test Results ......................................... 99 
Table 9. Unit Root Test Results Comparison ............................................................................. 100 
Table 10. Lag Length Selection Criteria Results ........................................................................ 101 
Table 11. Non-Linearity Results ................................................................................................. 102 
Table 12. Lag Model Diagnostic Test Results ............................................................................ 102 
Table 13. Cointegration Rank Order Results .............................................................................. 105 
Table 14. Cointegration Relation Matrix for VAR(1) ................................................................ 106 
Table 15. Granger and Instantaneous Causality Tests Results ................................................... 107 
Table 16. OLS Regression Results for Systematic Risk as Dependent ...................................... 109 
Table 17. OLS Regression Results for Brand Diversification as Dependent ............................. 110 
Table 18. OLS Regression Results for Shareholder Wealth as Dependent ................................ 111 
Table 19. Hypotheses and Findings ............................................................................................ 113 
1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationships of brand diversification and 
systematic risk on shareholder’s wealth subsequent to a divestiture completion. There are 
conflicting results in the literature on whether greater diversification benefits or harms a firm and 
its shareholders (Martin & Sayrak, 2003). For example, within the restaurant industry corporate 
executives have publicly justified corporate divestitures with the view that greater diversification 
is a disadvantage for the firm and shareholders. However, studies have shown that firm 
acquisitions that result in increased diversification create value for the firm and shareholders 
(Markides & Ittner, 1994). In addition, greater diversification is seen to reduce risk for firms 
through the diversification effect, however this effect has not been found to hold for shareholders 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981). The questions of inquiry are then (1) what impact do divestitures have 
on a restaurant firm’s brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth and (2) do 
the resulting brand diversification and systematic risk levels positively or negatively affect 
shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture completion within the restaurant industry? 
There are substantially few theoretical works about divestitures within the hospitality industry 
and none that have evaluated whether divestitures that result in less brand diversification benefit 
shareholders.  
This chapter will provide a broad overview of the causes and consequences of corporate 
divestitures, brand diversification strategies, and systematic risk on shareholder wealth. Agency 
theory provides a theoretical perspective for this investigation and guides the problem statement 
and purpose of the study. In addition, the study’s research questions and the proposed research 
2 
model are provided. Next, a brief overview of the methods to be utilized in the study is discussed 
and the rationale for the sample employed is presented. This chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the significance and limitations of the study.  
Background 
Within the corporate realm there is a pervasiveness in the utilization of various 
diversification strategies, including within the restaurant industry. In general, firms may choose 
to adopt a multitude of diversification strategies simultaneously. For instance, many firms 
operate under a range of brands or provide a multitude of products within various markets in 
order to gain greater market share (Barwise & Robertson, 1992). Specifically, brand 
diversification refers to the magnitude to which a firm serves markets or operates businesses 
under different brands (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, & Srivastava, 2008).  The utilization of 
diversification strategies have been found to have varying effects on firm financial performance, 
risk, and shareholder wealth (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Choi, Kang, Lee, & Lee, 2011; Kang & 
Lee, 2014; Thompson, 1984). However, a survey of the literature confirms a lack of empirical or 
theoretical consensus in regards to the effects of diversification strategies (Martin & Sayrak, 
2003). Instead, research has developed in waves of conflicting results with some studies showing 
negative consequences of diversification for the firm and shareholders, including trading with a 
diversification discount whereas specialized companies trade at a premium (Martin & Sayrak, 
2003). While other studies have found support for beneficial outcomes from diversification, 
including creating barriers of entry and enabling economies of scale or scope (Bordley, 2003; 
Martin & Sayrak, 2003; Park, Jaworski, & Maclnnis, 1986). The sparse research conducted 
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within the hospitality industry, including the restaurant industry, has found the effects of the 
different types of diversification to vary by segment (Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2014).  
In addition, corporate diversification strategies have been found to have an influential 
effect on a firm’s systematic risk (Manrai, Rameshwar, & Nangia, 2014). A security’s total risk 
can be differentiated into two parts, systematic and unsystematic risk, where systematic risk 
refers to a stock’s volatility due to the market (Barber, Ghiselli, & Kim, 2008). In other words, 
systematic risk is defined as the sensitivity or volatility of a firm’s returns to market risks and is 
denoted as beta (β) (Kim, Ryan, & Ceschini, 2007). Systematic risk cannot be reduced or voided 
through diversification and affects all stocks (Kim et al, 2007). A basic tenet within finance is 
that higher risk is associated with higher shareholder returns, however mismanaged risk can lead 
to a reduction in shareholder wealth (Barber et al, 2008). Moreover, Montgomery and Singh 
(1984) found that diversification strategies involving related lines of business reduce firm 
systematic risk and increase return. However, it has also been suggested that while increased 
diversification has the effect of reducing operating risk and systematic risk for firms, it also is 
simultaneously associated with increasing leverage which has the opposite effect of increasing 
systematic risk (Manrai et al, 2014).  Krapl (2015) suggests that whether the relationship 
between diversification and systematic risk is positive or negative depends on which effect is 
dominant. Moreover, the impacts of brand diversification and systematic risk on shareholder 
wealth may vary following a divestiture. 
Divestitures are a parent company’s disposal or sale of product lines, subsidiaries, 
divisions, or business units (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). There are various modes of divestitures, 
including sell-offs, spin-offs, spin-outs, and carve-outs, performed for diverse reasons and in 
pursuit of varying objectives (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995). A sell-off is a business unit, division, 
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or subsidiary of a company that is purchased by another firm (Woo, Willard, & Daellenbach, 
1992). In a spin-off the divested unit becomes an independent company and its shares are 
distributed to the shareholders of the parent company, therefore retaining control of the new 
company (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). Spin-outs involve an entrepreneurial employee from the 
parent firm departing and forming a competing independent company that operates within the 
same industry (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). Carve-outs consist of the creation of an independent 
company through the detachment of a business unit and the sale of its shares in a public offering 
with, in general, the parent retaining ownership of a substantial fraction of the shares (Moschieri 
& Mair, 2005). Carve-outs are usually seen as a temporary form of restructuring that allows the 
parent to raise funds in the capital market; therefore the parent will tend to reacquire the carved-
out company (Moschieri & Mair, 2005).  
The assortment of underline causes or triggers behind corporate divestitures that have 
been proposed, include legal, strategic, and market motivations (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). 
Regulatory difficulties are a typical legal motivation for divestitures (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). 
Market motivations include the proposition that divestitures are an efficient response to 
economic cycles or industry shocks (Mulherin & Boone, 2000).  Strategic motivations include 
employing divestitures as a reaction to management and owner inconsistencies in corporate 
strategy under agency theory (Lee, Nor & Alias, 2013) or as a correction to managerial mistakes 
(Markides & Singh, 1997). However, despite the underlying motivation for the divestiture, 
studies in the finance and strategic management fields have generally shown that the 
announcement of a divestiture has a positive effect on the divesting firm’s stock price on the 
announcement date and sometimes before and after the date (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995; 
Moschieri & Mair, 2005; Owen & Yawson, 2008). The post-divestment operating performance 
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of divesting firms has also been found to statistically and economically improve (Gadad, Stark, 
& Thomas, 2009). However the literature has also claimed that divestitures have neutral or 
negative outcomes (Woo et al, 1992).  
Research has also indicated that the positive returns or wealth effects from divestitures 
seem to depend on certain characteristics (Moschieri & Mair, 2008), including industry 
characteristics (Powell & Yawson, 2005) and firm qualities (Cao, Owen & Yawson, 2008). 
Within the corporate finance and management literature, some studies’ samples have included 
publicly traded hospitality firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the London Stock 
Exchange (Cao et al, 2008; Moschieri & Mair, 2012; Powell & Yawson, 2005), however there is 
a lack of comprehensive research specifically concentrating on the effects of completed 
divestiture activities on brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth particularly 
within the restaurant industry. Within the financial and economics literature, shareholder wealth 
is seen to be the present value of the expected future returns for shareholders and is represented 
by the market value of a firm’s common stock (Brigham & Daves, 2010). Specifically, the gap in 
the hospitality literature is an understanding of the effect of a firm’s resulting brand 
diversification levels and systematic risk on shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture 
completion.  
Agency Theory 
Agency theory’s origins are rooted in the context of the Anglo-American development of 
modern corporations and the economics literature covering risk sharing (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & 
Dalton, 2007). Berle and Means’ (1932) provided the basic proposition underlying agency theory 
that the separation of ownership and control in corporations results in the potential for mischief 
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(Berle & Means, 1991; Dalton et al, 2007). Agency theory addresses two main concerns that 
emanate from the separation of ownership and control, where the agents are delegated some 
decision making authority on behalf of the principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The first 
concern involves the issue of conflicting goals between the principal and agent, where oversight 
of the agent’s actions by the principal is too difficult or expensive (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
second concern addressed by agency theory is the differentiation of risk preferences between 
principals and agents, where each party may be inclined to take different actions (Eisenhardt, 
1989). In other words, under agency theory the interests of managers and shareholders are 
considered to be misaligned (Boyd, Haynes, & Zona, 2011).  Information asymmetry, different 
risk preferences, and agents’ inability to diversify their risk are seen as fostering self-interested 
actions of agents or managerial opportunism (Boyd et al, 2011).   
Under agency theory, the separation of ownership and control and the lack of oversight 
that are characteristic of the modern corporation are seen to result in an increased likelihood that 
managers will participate in managerial opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In participating 
in managerial opportunism, managers may undertake diversification measures to entrench their 
positions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) or diversify their employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). It 
has been proposed under agency theory that increased diversification benefits managers at the 
expense of shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Therefore, under 
agency theory corporate divestitures are seen as mechanisms that realign manager and 
shareholder interests by reducing diversification (Markides, 1992; Moschieri, 2011). 
Specifically, the misalignment of interests between managers, owners, and board of directors is 
seen to cause divestitures to be undertaken as a means to correct prior inefficient growth and 
diversification strategies pursued by managers, such as over-diversification and unprofitable 
7 
capital investments (Jensen, 1989; Markides & Singh, 1997; Moschieri & Mair, 2008). In other 
words, divestitures are seen as a proactive strategic option to re-adjust the company’s business 
focus in order to increase competitiveness (Moschieri & Mair, 2008), or as a last resort 
correction to honest managerial mistakes that were discovered ex-post facto to create sub-
optimal performance (Markides & Singh, 1997).  
Moreover, studies have shown that agency problems are more prominent with higher 
levels of diversification due to the higher discretionary power as a result of less oversight 
(Farooqi, Harris, & Ngo, 2014). Therefore, a strategic motive for divestitures includes reducing 
excessive diversification (Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Markides, 1992; Moschieri & 
Mair, 2005) and refocusing on core businesses (Markides, 1992; Moschieri & Mair, 2005). This 
is one of the most common reasons espoused for the value creation effects of divestitures, 
resulting in the conservation of the parent or divesting firm’s management resources and more 
efficient allocation of the resources to focus on the company’s core operations (Afshar et al, 
1992; John & Ofek, 1995; Moschieri, 2011; Moschieri & Mair, 2005). The divested unit is seen 
as having a better fit and worth more to the buyer’s organization than the divesting parent’s, 
allowing for greater organizational focus (John & Ofek, 1995). These leaner companies, as 
compared to the traditional conglomerates that operated in diverse businesses, are perceived as 
superior in creating stockholder wealth due to their higher efficiency in the core business 
operations (John & Ofek, 1995; Markides & Berg, 1992).  
Therefore, agency theory has become a prominent theory utilized in studies examining 
corporate restructuring, including divestitures. Overall, agency theory views excessive 
diversification within a company as value reducing and companies are forced to divest units to 
return to a more profitable and manageable structure through divestitures (Cao et al, 2008). 
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Demirer and Yuan (2013) indicate that service industries, including the restaurant industry, are 
not immune to the issues suggested by agency theory. Furthermore, the central tenets of agency 
theory have been shown to be applicable to various aspects of hospitality firm governance 
(Demirer & Yuan, 2013; Kim & Gu, 2005) and development (Dimou, Archer, & Chen, 
2003).Consequently, this study utilizes agency theory to examine the effects of brand 
diversification and systematic risk levels on shareholder wealth following a divestiture.   
Statement of the Problem 
Many studies have attributed a firms’ diversification strategies as an attempt to overcome 
unique industry characteristics and accomplish increased competitiveness and financial stability 
(Montgomery, 1994; Rugman, 1976; Sundaram & Black, 1992). The restaurant industry is no 
exception to the employment of extensive diversification strategies, including brand 
diversification, in order to diversify business. Instead, brand diversification strategies are 
commonly utilized in the restaurant industry and entail firms serving markets with a variety of 
brands (Bahadir et al, 2008). For example, as of May 31, 2015, Darden Restaurants, Inc. 
operated seven brands within the fifty U.S. states, District of Columbia, and the Canadian market 
(Darden Restaurants, Inc., 2015).  In 2002, AFC Enterprises, Inc., had operations under the 
brands Popeyes®, Church’s®, Cinnabon®, Seattle’s Best Coffee®, and Torrefazione Italia 
Coffee® (AFC Enterprises, Inc., 2002). In addition, over the years McDonald’s Corporation 
completed a number of brand acquisitions or majority ownership positions in order to diversify 
its operations, including Boston Market® and Chipotle® (Farzad, 2013; Hernandez, 1999). 
However, a widely debated topic in the finance and strategic management literature, is 
the effect of diversification strategies on firm performance, risk, and shareholder wealth (Bettis 
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& Mahajan, 1985; Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2014; Thompson, 1984). The empirical 
findings and viewpoints reported in the vast literature over the effects of diversification strategies 
are varied and inconclusive. For instance, diversification has been found to provide various 
benefits to firms from a variety of sources, including facilitating demand interaction (Siggelkow, 
2003). However, diversification has also been found to simultaneously result in disadvantages 
for firms. The literature has proposed numerous disadvantages to firms from diversification 
including, increased coordination and control costs (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988), as well as, the 
exacerbation of managerial agency problems (Martin & Sayrak, 2003). According to agency 
theory, firms with a higher degree of diversification are more prone to agency problems that 
conflict with shareholders’ interests (Farooqi et al, 2014).  Therefore under agency theory, 
diversification strategies pursued by managers are associated with unprofitable capital 
investments that are not in the interests of shareholders (Jensen, 1989; Markides & Singh, 1997; 
Moschieri & Mair, 2008). 
More specifically, the literature concerning brand diversification’s effect on the firm and 
shareholders is inconclusive. Some studies have proclaimed that brand diversification has 
positive effects due to the construction of a market entry barrier and greater market share 
(Bordley, 2003; Kekre & Srinivasan, 1990). In addition, Madden, Fehle, Fournier (2006) report 
that firms with strong brand equity create value for shareholders by yielding returns that are 
greater than the market benchmark. However other research has concluded that brand 
diversification has negative effects from lower consumer brand loyalty and higher switching 
behavior through increased competition (Quelch & Kenny, 1994). In addition, in terms of 
restaurant firm financial performance, Choi et al (2011) report a significant and negative effect 
from the degree of brand diversification.  
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Furthermore, research has found that highly diversified firms perform more poorly than 
their focused counterparts whether measured as accounting returns, shareholder returns, market 
share, or survival rates (Franko, 2004). Research has shown that the share price of firms that are 
more diversified sell at a “diversification discount” and therefore destroy shareholder wealth 
(Franko, 2004; Martin & Sayrak, 2003). The effect of mergers and acquisitions that result in 
greater diversification and less corporate focus have also been linked to a reduction in 
shareholder wealth (Morgan, Nail, & Megginson, 2000). Within the lodging industry, Tang and 
Jang (2010) found that on average diversification is associated with a valuation discount. 
However, the notion of a “diversification discount” has also been criticized in the literature as a 
result of methodological or data issues (Villalonga, 2004) or a lack of consideration in other 
attributable factors besides firm diversification, such as the endogeneity of a firm’s 
diversification decision (Campa & Kedia, 2002). Thus, there is a lack of consensus in regards to 
the effect of diversification on shareholder wealth. Due to the extensive utilization of brand 
diversification strategies and the proliferation of divestitures in the restaurant industry a deeper 
examination and assessment is warranted.  
Through the years various corporate restructuring activities, including acquisitions and 
divestitures, have become very useful and popular. Moschieri and Mair (2012) indicated that 
between 1998 and 2005, 15 percent of the Fortune 500 companies engaged in more than one 
divestiture. Divestitures within the restaurant industry have been particularly frequent including 
Yum! Brands, Inc.’s 2011 divestiture of Long John Silver’s® and A&W All-American 
Restaurants® (Zacks.com, 2013). McDonalds Corporation announced its divestiture of Donato’s 
Pizza® in 2003 (Chicago Tribune, 2003), divested Chipotle Mexican Grill® in 2006 through an 
initial public offering (Farzad, 2013), and announced its divestiture of Boston Market® in 2007 
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(Burritt, 2007). In 2011, The Wendy’s Company divested all of its holdings in the Arby’s® 
Restaurant Group subsidiary (The Wendy’s Company, 2012). In addition, Popeye’s Louisiana 
Kitchen, Inc., formerly AFC Enterprises, Inc., divested its Cinnabon® subsidiary to Focus 
Brands, Inc. in November 2004 (AFC Enterprises, Inc., 2004).  Furthermore, Brinker 
International, Inc. has also undertaken a number of brand divestitures over the years.   
Moreover, the perspective that diversification negatively impacts the firm has been 
popularly utilized by restaurant industry corporate executives and analysts in rationalizing 
divestiture activities. For example, recently the divestiture of Red Lobster® has been attributed 
to the belief that the Darden Restaurants, Inc. conglomerate has too many brands to efficiently 
manage and that the Red Lobster® brand was hindering the parent firm’s competitive 
responsiveness (Chen, 2013). In addition, the divestitures of Chipotle and Boston Market were 
described as a means for McDonald’s Corporation to focus its management and financial 
resources on the core  brand, as management predicted opportunities for growth remained 
significant (McDonald’s Corp., 2007). Moreover, AFC Enterprises, Inc., announced the sale of 
the Cinnabon® brand as a continued effort to sharpen the company’s strategic focus and 
maximize shareholder value (AFC Enterprises, Inc., 2004).   
Furthermore, divestitures are not a novel concept within the corporate finance and 
strategic management literature (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). Instead, divestitures have been 
extensively examined and have been found to be prevalent in industries that demonstrate certain 
characteristics, including rapidly changing and highly competitive markets, as well as, in 
industries with multiple market segments, information and start-up advantages, and transferable 
technologies and where the parent has a vast market share (Garvin, 1983; Markides, 1992; 
Moschieri & Mair, 2008). The restaurant industry exhibits many of these characteristics. The 
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restaurant industry also displays several unique attributes including strong seasonality and is 
subject to cyclical patterns that arise from changes in political, social, and economic conditions 
(Hua, Xiao & Yost, 2013). The industry has been classified as a “monopolistic competition” 
industry, in which a significant number of large firms operate with differentiated products and 
low barriers to entry and exit (Hua et al, 2013). Due to these industry characteristics and the 
competitive nature of the industry, restaurant firms must develop strategies that enhance their 
competitiveness and financial success while increasing their ability to adapt to the dynamic 
environment (Hua et al, 2013).  
Additionally, the role of systematic risk or non-diversifiable risk, which has been linked 
to reduced shareholder wealth (Barber et al, 2008), has not been studied in terms of brand 
diversification and shareholder wealth following restaurant divestitures. The restaurant industry 
is subject to many unique operating and financial risks.  For instance, some of the risks the 
restaurant industry confronts include, changes in consumer tastes and spending patterns, cost of 
food products, and governmental regulations (Barber et al, 2008). These industry characteristic 
risks may influence a firm’s systematic risk (Barber et al, 2008). In addition, the literature has 
found inconclusive results on whether diversification strategies have risk reducing or risk 
increasing effects on firms (Krapl, 2015). Moreover, the break-up of conglomerates or 
divestiture of subsidiaries has been found to result in an improvement in returns but with an 
increase in risk (Desai & Savickas, 2010). Since the restaurant industry is inherently subject to 
certain financial and operating risks an examination of the effect of systematic risk and the level 
of brand diversification on shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture warrants greater 
attention.  
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For divestitures, unlike acquisitions, it is more difficult to determine performance 
consequences since there is greater ambiguity in the source of value creation and lack of 
transparency in the financial aspects that underline corporate strategy (Brauer & Wiersema, 
2012). The total economic effect of divestitures is considered to be captured by changes in stock 
market prices and operative profit for the company (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). Within the 
literature it has been found that the stock market on average regards the announcement of 
voluntary divestitures favorably and rewards divesting companies with higher stock prices 
(Boone & Mulherin, 2001; Markides & Berg, 1992; Peel, 1995). However, Boone and Mulherin 
(2001) found that although positive price reactions to the initial announcement of a divestiture 
are observed, upon the announcement of the completion of the divestiture there was no 
observable wealth changes. This result is however attributed to the sample design in defining the 
completion date as the end of the process (Boone & Mulherin, 2001). Whereas, Afshar et al 
(1992) report that divestiture completion results in higher significant event day abnormal returns 
than the announcement of an intent to divest. The inconclusive empirical findings in regards to 
the effect of divestiture completions on shareholder wealth warrants a more comprehensive 
examination of its influence on the relationships between brand diversification, systematic risk, 
and shareholder wealth. 
In addition, empirical research on divestitures have indicated that typically a divestiture 
has a positive impact on the parent company’s share price on the date of announcement and 
sometimes before or after the announcement (Montgomery, Thomas, & Kamath, 1984; 
Moschieri & Mair, 2008; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). Nevertheless the effect of a firm’s 
subsequent diversification and systematic risk on shareholder wealth as a consequence of a 
divestiture completion has not been empirically addressed in the literature. In addition, 
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divestiture studies have typically pooled data containing firms from a variety of industries (Cao, 
Owen & Yawson, 2008; Moschieri & Mair, 2012; Powell & Yawson, 2005), instead of 
considering the unique nature of each specific industry. Considering the frequent occurrence of 
divestitures and the unique characteristics of the restaurant industry an examination of the 
relationships between brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth controlling 
for a divestiture completion specifically within the industry is a meaningful research problem.  
The sparse literature concerning the relationship between brand diversification and 
shareholder wealth has mainly focused on a uni-directional relationship. One of the main goals 
of corporate executives is to consider the business-wide implications, including shareholder 
repercussions, of corporate brand management (Petromilli, Morrison, & Million, 2002). Morgan 
and Rego (2009) found that brand portfolios that include greater diversification result in an 
increased relative stock value for firms. However, shareholders have also been seen to consider 
the circumstance that larger brand portfolios can be more complex and costly to manage (Wiles, 
Morgan & Rego, 2012). Therefore, it is important to consider the effect shareholder wealth may 
have on a firm’s diversification level through a bi-directional relationship.  
Similarly, the literature has suggested that the value of brands is related to their ability to 
reduce consumers’ and firms’ risk (Aaker & Keller, 1990; Rego, Billett, & Morgan, 2009). 
However, the bi-directional relationship between systematic risk and brand diversification is 
non-existent in the literature. Rego et al (2009) found that consumer based brand equity has a 
stronger role in predicting unsystematic risk versus systematic risk. Furthermore, studies have 
mostly examined the uni-directional relationship between the market-related or systematic risk of 
a firm and its corporate behavior or financial performance, which may ultimately impact 
shareholder wealth (Barber et al, 2008).  
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Additionally, within the finance and strategic management literature the studies that have 
been conducted in regards to divestitures and shareholder wealth have focused on uni-directional 
relationships. However, since many divestitures are undertaken to correct inconsistencies 
between managers and owners (Lee et al, 2013), there may be a bi-directional effect between 
shareholder wealth and divestitures. The positive effect of divestitures that is advocated in the 
literature and corporate realm (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995) may be an incitement for management 
and shareholders to initiate a divestiture. Therefore, this study will examine the potential non-
linear or bi-directional relationships between the variables. 
Purpose of the Study 
Motivated by the inconclusive empirical findings in the literature and the idiosyncratic 
elements of the restaurant industry, this study has three main objectives. Drawing on agency 
theory, the first objective of this study is to examine the short- and long-term effect of brand 
diversification levels on systematic risk and shareholders’ wealth following a divestiture. A 
review of the literature reveals a gap in regards to the completion of restaurant divestitures and 
the effect of the resulting level of brand diversification on systematic risk and shareholder 
wealth. In addition, although the literature has shown that the level of diversification has an 
effect on a firm’s systematic risk and shareholder wealth, whether the effect is positive or 
negative is inconclusive in the literature (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 
2014; Thompson, 1984). Consequentially, there is a demand for a more in-depth examination of 
the short- and long-term effects on shareholder wealth and systematic risk from restaurant firms’ 
brand diversification strategies through the examination of completed divestiture activities.  
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Moreover, previous studies that have investigated the effect of diversification have 
mainly focused on firm financial performance and have utilized a variety of theories and 
frameworks, including internalization theory (Kogut, 1985) and transaction cost theory (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994). However the focus or unit of analysis for this study is on the 
shareholders of the firm. Therefore, this study draws on the theoretical perspective of agency 
theory in regards to the misalignment of owner and agent interests.  
The second objective of the study is to investigate the short- and long-term effect of 
systematic risk on shareholder wealth subsequent to a divestiture completion. Barber et al (2008) 
have indicated that a firm’s mismanaged risk can lead to a reduction in shareholder returns, in 
contravention of the financial notion that higher risk is associated with higher shareholder 
returns. In addition, various studies within the literature have examined the various financial and 
operating determinants of a firm’s systematic risk (Barber et al, 2008). However, there is a lack 
of understanding in terms of the effect of a restaurant firm’s systematic risk on shareholder 
wealth subsequent to a divestiture. Due to the unique nature of the restaurant industry and the 
proliferation of divestitures, a greater discernment of the effects from systematic risk levels on 
shareholder wealth subsequent to a divestiture will be beneficial to a firm’s ability to render 
better informed decisions in regards to corporate strategy.  
The third objective of the study is to investigate the short- and long-term impacts of a 
restaurant firm’s divestiture completion on the firms’ level of brand diversification, systematic 
risk, and shareholder wealth. There has been extensive studies conducted within the literature in 
regards to divestitures, however none of the studies have specifically focused on the effects of 
divestiture completions within the distinctive restaurant industry. As previously mentioned, 
publicly traded hospitality firms, including restaurant firms, have been included in some research 
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studies (Cao, Owen & Yawson, 2008; Moschieri & Mair, 2012; Powell & Yawson, 2005); 
however due to the unique characteristics exhibited by the industry this study focuses solely on 
the restaurant industry.  
This study focuses on the restaurant industry for many reasons. For instance, brand 
diversification is a unique dimension to the restaurant industry, which has experienced a 
prevalent growth in brand utilization with dynamic changes to brand portfolios (Kang & Lee, 
2015). Firms within the restaurant industry focus on brand diversification, versus product 
diversification, to maximize firm value by serving multiple markets with diverse brands (Muller, 
1998). Moreover, various unique aspects of restaurant firms have been found to impact 
systematic risk (Barber et al, 2008). In addition, there has been a proliferation of divestitures 
among firms in the restaurant industry. A firm’s divestiture includes the implementation of many 
modifications to the firm’s operational and financial structure (Moncarz, 1986). These 
transformations to restaurant firms raises the concern of the effects on shareholders, which has 
not been specifically addressed in the literature.  
The study focuses on divestiture completion since initial divestiture announcements have 
been found to underestimate the full wealth effects of divestitures (Boone & Mulherin, 2001). 
Specifically, Boone and Mulherin (2001) indicate that not all divestitures that are initially 
announced are actually completed, resulting in an initial announcement effect that does not 
represent the full effect of the divestiture. Furthermore, Afshar, Taffler, and Sudarsanam (1992) 
found in their study that the announcement of a divestiture completion resulted in higher 
significant event day abnormal returns than the announcement of an intent to divest.   
Overall, the purpose of this study is to contribute to future hospitality research efforts and 
acquire an in-depth understanding on the effects of brand diversification and systematic risk on 
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shareholder wealth when controlling for divestiture completion within the restaurant industry, as 
shown in the research model in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
 
Research Questions 
Based on the existing literature and drawing on agency theory this study aims to address 
the following research questions:  
Q1: What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and shareholder wealth when controlling for divestitures in the short- and 
long-term? 
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Q2: What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and systematic risk when controlling for divestitures in the short- and 
long-term? 
Q3: What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s systematic 
risk and shareholder wealth when controlling for divestitures in the short- and long-term? 
Q4: What impact do divestiture completions have on a restaurant firm’s shareholder 
wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk in the short- and long-term? 
Methodology 
In order to examine the above research questions this study draws on agency theory and 
performs a cointegration analysis. Since the primary purpose of the study is to develop a deeper 
understanding of the purposed relationships, the research questions will be tested using Brinker 
International, Inc. as a case study. The scenarios in which case study research design are 
considered appropriate include when little is known about a phenomenon or current perspectives 
seem inadequate or conflicting (Eisenhardt, 1989). In terms of the relationships under 
investigation the current literature, as previously mentioned, is inconclusive. Moreover, case 
study research designs provide a valuable tool for researchers to expand knowledge over new 
topic areas, test theory, or generate novel theory in areas of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). Easton 
(2010) suggests that by developing an overall comprehensive perception of the phenomenon 
through case studies, researchers will become more adapted to developing theories in regards to 
the various aspects of the phenomenon. Therefore, a case study approach is appropriate for this 
study since it will allow for a focalization on discerning the dynamics present within a single 
setting, Brinker International, Inc., in terms of the effects of brand diversification and systematic 
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risk on shareholder wealth following a divestiture.  In addition, the proposed short- and long-
term relationships will be estimated with quarterly and annually time series data, respectively, 
for all the variables from 1994 to 2013.  
The variable measures were chosen following an extensive literature and are shown in 
Table 1. The Berry-Herfindahl index has been popularly utilized in the literature to measure 
diversification, including brand diversification (Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2014; Kang & 
Lee, 2015) and was chosen for this study. The Berry-Herfindahl index is calculated as (1 −
∑𝑆𝑖
2), where Si is the number of properties a firm has within each brand it operates divided by 
the total properties for the firm (Kang & Lee, 2015). A rolling window beta estimation, as 
commonly utilized in the literature, was applied in this study to compute systematic risk (Fama 
& MacBeth, 1973). In this study shareholder wealth was measured through the computation of 
the natural log of the Brinker stock price for the sample time period.  
Table 1. Study Measures 
Variable Measure 
Brand Diversification Berry-Herfindahl Index 
Systematic Risk Rolling Window Beta  
Shareholder Wealth Natural Log 
 
This study utilizes a cointegration analysis and therefore the first phase in the analysis 
involves the examination of the time series data properties. In order to detect any trend or non-
stationary variables in the data the following diagnostic tests are utilized: Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (“ADF”) test, the Phillips-Perron (“PP”) test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(“KPSS”) (Pfaff, 2008). In the case of non-stationarity, the resolution is first differencing or 
second differencing (Pfaff, 2008). The two-stage approach developed by Engle and Granger 
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(1987) is utilized in the study. First, cointegration is tested for and then an error correction model 
is estimated, as proposed by Mukherjee, White, and Wuyts (1998), which is useful in estimating 
the short- and long-term effects of explanatory variables in time series data. The Granger (1969) 
test is utilized to validate the direction of causality between the variables. However, based on the 
literature the study hypotheses the bidirectional model shown in Figure 1.  
Case Study 
Incorporated in 1983 and headquartered in Dallas, Texas, Brinker International, Inc. 
(“Brinker”) is a leading casual dining restaurant corporation (Brinker International, n.d.). Brinker 
is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “EAT” and as of 
March 2, 2016 had a market capitalization of approximately $2.8 billion (YahooFinance, n.d.). 
Brinker’s roots can be traced to the first Chili’s® Grill & Bar restaurant opened by Mr. Larry 
Lavine in Dallas, Texas on March 13, 1975 (Brinker International, n.d.). In 1983, Mr. Norman 
Brinker acquired the Chili’s brand of restaurants, which consisted of twenty-three restaurants 
scattered across six states (Brinker International, n.d.). The initial public offering of Chili’s, Inc. 
was completed in 1983 and due to a growing restaurant portfolio the company’s name was 
changed to Brinker International, Inc. in 1991 (Brinker International, n.d.).   
Over the years Brinker’s restaurant brand portfolio has transformed significantly. Today, 
Brinker only operates and franchises the Chili’s® Grill & Bar (“Chili’s) and Maggiano’s® Little 
Italy (“Maggiano’s”) restaurant brands (Brinker International, Inc., 2015). The Chili’s® brand 
has been in operation for over 40 years and is a leader in the casual dining segment of the 
restaurant industry (Brinker International, Inc., 2015). The Chili’s® all-day menu features a 
variety of cuisine, including the signature items of baby back ribs and hand-crafted big mouth 
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burgers (Brinker International, Inc., 2015). As of June 24, 2015, there were 1,580 Chili’s® 
locations throughout the United States and in 30 countries, including Canada, Ecuador, 
Germany, Japan, Lebanon, and Singapore (Brinker International, Inc., 2015).  
Brinker’s acquired the Maggiano’s® brand in August 1995 and as of June 24, 2015, there 
were 49 Maggiano’s® locations in 21 states (Brinker International, Inc., 2015). Maggiano’s® is 
a full-service casual dining Italian restaurant with an interior that reflects classic Italian-
American restaurants of New York’s Little Italy from the 1940s (Brinker International, Inc., 
2015). Maggiano’s restaurants have a full lunch and dinner menu that offer a variety of pasta, 
chicken, seafood, and prime steaks in individual and family-style (Brinker International, Inc., 
2015).  
In February 1989, Brinker completed the acquisition of Grady’s® American Grill 
(“Grady’s”) (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). Grady’s® was a casual, upscale dinner house 
restaurant that featured “made  from scratch” recipes and a broad menu of seafood, prime rib, 
chicken and pasta entrees (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). The target customer for Grady’s® 
was a slightly more sophisticated customer (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). In addition, 
Spageddies® Italian Kitchen (“Spageddies”) was acquired by Brinker in June 1993 (Brinker 
International, Inc., 1994). The Spageddies® line of restaurants were casual, full-service, family 
oriented Italian restaurants that featured a variety of rotisserie chicken, steak, pizza, and pasta 
entrees (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). In addition, the Spageddies® restaurants also featured 
exhibition kitchens with wood-burning pizza ovens (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). However, 
the Grady’s® and Spageddies® restaurant brands were divested by Brinker in the second quarter 
of its 1996 fiscal year (Brinker International, Inc., 1997). Brinker rationalized the divestitures of 
the brands under its strategic plan targeted to support long-term growth objectives and an 
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emphasis on the continued development of the restaurant concepts with the greatest return 
potential (Brinker International, Inc., 1997).   
Romano’s® Macaroni Grill (“Romano’s”) was acquired by Brinker in November 1989 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1994). The Romano’s® brand is an upscale Italian theme restaurant 
that specializes in family-style recipes with a menu offering a variety of seafood, chicken, and 
pasta entrees (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). Romano’s® restaurants feature exhibition 
cooking with wood-burning ovens and rotisseries for an enthusiastic and exciting environment 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1994). In December 2008, Brinker divested its majority interest in 
the Romano’s® brand to Mac Acquisition LLC (Brinker International, Inc., 2008).  
Moreover, the On The Border® Café (“On the Border”) brand of restaurants was 
acquired by Brinker in May 1994 (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). The On the Border® brand 
consists of full-service, casual Tex-Mex theme restaurants that feature southwest mesquite-
grilled specialties, traditional Tex-Mex entrees, and “Texas-sized” non-alcoholic beverages 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1994). The restaurants under the brand are characterized by outdoor 
patios, booth and table seating, and brick and wood walls that showcase southwest décor 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1994). At the end of fiscal year 2010, Brinker completed the 
divestment of the On the Border® brand to OTB Acquisition LLC, an affiliate of Golden Gate 
Capital (Brinker International, Inc., 2010).  
Brinker acquired the Cozymel’s® Coastal Mexican Grill (“Cozymel’s”) restaurant brand 
in July 1995 (Brinker International, Inc., 1995). The Cozymel’s® brand consists of casual, 
upscale, authentic Yucatan restaurants that offer a variety of fish, chicken, beef, and pork entrees 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1995). The Cozymel’s® restaurants provide an authentic “Yucatan 
vacation” atmosphere including a souvenir shop and outdoor patio area (Brinker International, 
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Inc., 1995). During the second quarter of fiscal year 2004, Brinker divested the Cozymel® brand 
and recorded a $2 million loss (Brinker International, Inc., 2004).  
The acquisition of the Corner Bakery® brand was completed by Brinker in August 1995 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1996). The Corner Bakery® concept is designed as a retail bakery in 
the traditional, old world bread bakery style and offers homemade hearth-cooked menu items 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1996). The food items offered at the Corner Bakery® include, 
loaves, rolls, muffins, brownies, baguettes, and other specialty breads, as well as, pizzas, 
sandwiches, soups and salads (Brinker International, Inc., 1996). In February 2006, Brinker’s 
completed the sale of the Corner Bakery® brand for $72.5 million (Brinker International, Inc., 
2005b).  
In 1996, Brinker introduced the Eatzi’s® Market and Bakery concept into its brand 
portfolio (Brinker International, Inc., 1996). The Eatzi’s® brand is a home meal replacement 
retail store where customers can purchase a wide range of meal items, including fresh produce, 
raw meats, seafood, “made from scratch” breads and pastries, and chef-prepared meals-to-go 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1996). The food items are openly presented in distinctive areas 
replicating an energetic European marketplace with an exhibition kitchen and bakery (Brinker 
International, Inc., 1996). In November 2002, Brinker completed the divestiture of Eatzi’s® for 
$11 million in cash and $4 million in a promissory note (Brinker International, Inc., 2002). 
Additionally, Brinker introduced the Big Bowl® and Wildfire® restaurant brand 
concepts into its portfolio in 1998 (Brinker International, Inc., 1998). The Big Bowl® brand 
features contemporary Asian cuisine with fresh ingredients that are served in a casual, vibrant 
atmosphere (Brinker International, Inc., 1998). The brand is distinguished by the authentic, full-
flavored menu featuring five kinds of fresh noodles, chicken pot stickers and dumplings, hand-
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rolled summer rolls, seasonal stir-fry dishes with local produce, and wok-seared fish (Brinker 
Internatioal, Inc., 1998). Big Bowl® restaurants feature an interactive stir-fry bar that allows 
guests to help themselves to an array of vegetables to be wok-cooked with their choice of sauces, 
meats, noodles, and rice (Brinker International, Inc., 1998). In the third quarter of fiscal year 
2005, Brinker divested the Big Bowl® brand and received proceeds totaling $6 million (Brinker 
International, Inc., 2005).  
The Wildfire® brand of restaurants were casual, full-service, authentic 1940’s style steak 
houses with an open kitchen consisting of a hardwood burning oven and rotisserie (Brinker 
International, Inc., 1998). The Wildfire® restaurants offered broiled steaks, seafood, barbecued 
ribs, pizza, spit-roasted chicken, and a full line of cocktails (Brinker International, Inc., 1998). 
On February 1, 2001, Brinker sold its interest in the Wildfire® restaurant concept for $5 million 
(Brinker International, Inc., 2001).  
Finally, in July 2001, Brinker acquired a 40 percent interest in the legal entities owning 
and developing the Rockfish® Seafood Grill (“Rockfish”) (Brinker International, Inc., 2001). 
The Rockfish® brand of restaurants offer fresh, flavorful seafood dishes that are served in a 
lively atmosphere reminiscent of a fly-fishing camp with wood tables and river rock fireplaces 
(Brinker International, Inc., 2001). A range of seafood entrees are served at the Rockfish® 
restaurants including, salmon, trout, catfish, shrimp, and crab (Brinker International, Inc., 2001). 
Brinker completed its divestment of its interest in the Rockfish® brand in the third quarter of 
fiscal year 2006 (Brinker International, Inc., 2006).  
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Significance of the Study 
Due to the magnitude of brand diversification strategies utilized in the restaurant industry 
it is critical to determine the effect of the resulting levels of diversification strategies on 
shareholder wealth following a divestiture. This dissertation provides in-depth insights and 
contributes to the theoretical body of knowledge in the hospitality field in several aspects.  First, 
this study’s analytical framework provides a greater understanding of the consequences to 
shareholders in terms of the effects of the resulting brand diversification and systematic risk 
levels subsequent to divestiture completion. Divestiture activity and its effect on the relationships 
between restaurant firm brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth is an 
important consideration, given the extent and strategic importance of this type of corporate 
phenomena. Additionally, this study aims to determine whether within the restaurant industry 
divestitures operate as a tool to realign agent and owner interests, as recognized under agency 
theory. 
Second, this study simultaneously examines the effect of brand diversification and 
systematic risk following a divestiture from the shareholders perspective. There are mixed 
viewpoints within the literature on the effect of diversification in terms of shareholder wealth. 
The current studies in the literature addressing hospitality industry diversification have not 
examined the effects of brand diversification and systematic risk concurrently. Furthermore, the 
studies that have been conducted in the hospitality industry regarding diversification have 
focused on the effects towards firm financial performance and not shareholder wealth (Kang & 
Lee, 2014; Kang et al, 2011).  
Third, this study recognizes the idiosyncratic characteristics of the restaurant industry and 
the inadequate current state of research. The use of a single restaurant firm that has completed 
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numerous divestitures over the years provides for greater in-depth analysis. Furthermore, a 
greater understanding of the effects from divestitures within the restaurant industry will be 
beneficial to a firm’s ability to strategically decide on whether to divest, based on the subsequent 
effects of brand diversification and systematic risk on shareholder wealth. Overall, this study will 
contribute important building blocks and is expected to be a catalyst for future theoretical and 
empirical research on hospitality industry divestitures. 
Limitations of the Study 
Although this study will provide useful insights into the effects of the resulting brand 
diversification and systematic risk levels on shareholder wealth following a divestiture 
completion within the restaurant industry, there are certain limitations that should be addressed 
in future research. For instance, the utilization of an individual case study allows for an in-depth 
analysis, however the results cannot be generalized to other firms. In addition, the effects of the 
resulting brand diversification and systematic risk levels on a firms’ shareholder wealth 
following a divestiture may vary based on the unique characteristics of the economies in 
different countries. Moreover, the utilization of time series data in this study also presents some 
limitations, including the lack of mutually independent observations since a future data point 
may be impacted by a previous data point.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Chapter two provides a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical foundation and the 
proposed relationships between the constructs within the research model under the agency theory 
perspective. An in-depth literature review of previous empirical studies is provided to present the 
conceptual framework supporting the proposed research model provided in the first chapter. 
First, each of the variables within the research model are explained and defined as acknowledged 
in the contemporary finance and strategic management literature. The variable definitions are 
followed with a discussion of the current empirical research status and important gaps that will 
be addressed through this study in regards to each of the relationships proposed in the research 
model. Diversification, specifically brand diversification, is delineated and the effects of brand 
diversification on systematic risk and shareholder wealth are examined. Next, systematic risk is 
demarcated and the impact of systematic risk on shareholder wealth is developed. Then, a 
depiction of divestitures within the corporate realm is provided and the previous empirical 
findings of the impacts of divestitures on shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and 
systematic risk are discussed. Finally, the hypotheses proposed in this study are outlined. 
Brand Diversification 
Brands have been defined by some researchers as “consisting of the visual and verbal 
representations associated with firms and their services” (Stern, 2006, p. 216).  Brands are a 
powerful tool for firms that provide a competitive advantage (Aaker, 1996). Brands are seen to 
streamline consumer decision making by providing a sense of security or consistency and carry a 
symbolic meaning or social value (Barwise & Robertson, 1992). Within the literature, it is 
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widely accepted that brands are essential intangible assets that can considerably influence a 
firm’s performance through the support of premium prices and the propensity towards consumer 
long-term brand loyalty (Ailawadi, Lehmann, & Neslin, 2001; Barwise & Robertson, 1992). 
Well managed brands are seen to be powerful in positioning a firm to outperform its peers by 
impacting whether consumers will purchase the brand products through increased familiarity and 
favorability (Tenet Partners, 2015). Moreover, strong or high-quality brands have been found to 
produce stock returns for a firm’s shareholders that are greater in magnitude than a relevant 
benchmark and do so with less risk (Madden et al, 2006). In particular, within the hospitality 
industry, brands especially perform a crucial role as core assets and a leading driver for firm 
growth due to their substantial power in identifying and influencing customers’ perceptions 
(Jiang et al, 2002; Kim & Kim, 2005).  
Considering the importance of brands, corporate marketers have increasingly focused on 
branding strategies or brand-building efforts for the organization (Bhat & Burg, 2011). One of 
these corporate level strategic decisions is to develop a brand portfolio whereby the firm markets 
more than one brand (Morgan & Rego, 2009). Therefore, a key dimension to a firm’s brand 
portfolio strategy is the level of brand diversification or the number of brands the firm owns and 
markets (Morgan & Rego, 2009). Within the literature, numerous taxonomies have been 
proposed for classifying the distinctive types of brand portfolio strategies. One of the more 
prominent taxonomies is Laforet and Saunders’ (1994) three-category taxonomy scheme – 
corporate branding, house of brands, and mixed branding (Rao, Agarwal, & Dahlhoff, 2004). 
Under the corporate branding strategy the firm’s corporate name is dominant and is endorsed in 
all or part of the firm’s products or service brands (Rao et al, 2004). The house of brands strategy 
consists of the firm utilizing individual brand names to market its products or services instead of 
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the corporate name (Rao et al, 2004). In a mixed branding strategy the corporate name in 
addition to the individual brand names are utilized (Rao et al, 204). For service firms a popularly 
utilized corporate strategy is to employ higher levels of brand diversification, which entails the 
firm employing separate brands to serve its markets (Bahadir et al, 2008). 
  The service industry, specifically, is seen to require extensive customization for target 
markets owing to the intangible nature of services (Knight, 1999). In particular, the restaurant 
industry over the past couple of decades has experienced an influx of brand proliferation due to 
persistent growth (Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2015). As Choi et al (2011) point out brand 
diversification within the restaurant industry is a unique mixture between related diversification 
into different segments and a strategy of brand proliferation to market various brands for similar 
products. Within the restaurant industry, in order to gain competitive advantage, firms focus on 
developing an optimal operation of their brand portfolio (Muller, 1998; Choi et al, 2011). 
However, since the restaurant industry can be characterized as a saturated, low-profit margin 
industry (Kang & Lee, 2015), the levels of brand diversification may have an alternative impact 
on firms’ levels of systematic risk and shareholders wealth than other industries.  
Systematic Risk 
A firm’s risk can be characterized as the uncertainty of its prospects for success or the 
vulnerability of future cash flows and can vary due to various idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
firm (Borde, 1998). Corporate executives are concerned with “providing shareholders with the 
greatest return for a given amount of risk” (Montgomery & Singh, 1984). Specifically a firm’s 
systematic risk is derived from a common source of factors that affect most firms in the 
economy, such as inflation, recessions, or interest rates, and cannot be eliminated through 
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diversification (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2009). Systematic risk is seen to be inherent in the 
overall market (CFA Institute, 2012). In other words, systematic risk is a firm’s stock volatility 
that is due to changes in market-level economic factors or its covariance with the market’s 
oscillations (Barber et al, 2008).  
Systematic risk has been designated as a stock’s beta, measured as the sensitivity of a 
firm’s stock price to the market (Kim, Ryan, & Ceschini, 2007). In other words, the systematic 
risk of a firm is understood to be the result of “investors’ expectations about the future volatility 
of a firm’s total return relative to that of the market as a whole” (Barton, 1988, p. 167).  A 
stock’s beta measures its sensitivity to the market and captures its level of systematic risk (CFA 
Institute, 2012). A positive beta indicates the stock’s returns follow the market, whereas a 
negative beta denotes the stock’s returns are opposite to the market (CFA Institute). Betas that 
are greater than one denote the stock will move in the same trend as the market but with a greater 
magnitude, thereby demonstrating greater sensitivity to systematic risk (Bodie et al, 2009). In 
addition, the risk measure corporate executives are most concerned with when aiming to 
maximize firm value is beta (Kinney, 1972). Therefore, showing that the systematic risk levels of 
a firm are an important consideration to a firm’s cash flows and financial well-being. Hence, a 
firm’s level of systematic risk can be linked to its shareholders wealth. 
Shareholder Wealth 
Shareholder wealth for a firm reflects the discounted value of the expected future cash 
flows for shareholders and is represented by the market value of a firm’s common stock 
(Brigham & Daves, 2010). In other words, the worth of a company’s stock to a shareholder is 
determined by the degree and certainty of the cash flow the stock will generate for the 
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shareholder in the future (Brigham & Daves, 2010). For example, a firm with cash flows that are 
viewed to be less risky and more reliable will be seen to be more valuable and generate greater 
wealth for a shareholder. Therefore, the market value of a firm’s stock or the price the stock can 
be purchased at is seen to be reflective of the market’s perspective of the firm’s ability to reliably 
generate cash flows. This assessment is developed within the finance and economics fields 
through the efficient market hypothesis.   
The efficient market hypothesis states that in an efficient market asset prices, including 
firm share prices, reflect all past and present information (CFA Institute, 2011). In other words, 
under the efficient market hypothesis stock prices consistently reflect all current knowledge and 
therefore only change in response to new unpredictable information (Bodie et al, 2009). Under 
this reasoning, stock prices follow a random walk that is unpredictable since prices only change 
to unpredictable information (Bodie et al, 2009). Under the efficient market hypothesis, it is 
suggested that higher shareholder wealth or value is seen to represent that a firm’s capital is 
allocated in a way that generates more value (Morck, 2014). In other words, shareholders’ 
valuation of a firm’s stock reflect the underlying value per share of the firm’s usage of its capital 
(Morck, 2014). Considering this notion, a firm’s stock price will increase when its usage of 
capital is seen to be more valuable. Support for the efficient market hypothesis has been shown 
through event studies that show changes in stock returns due to the dissemination of information 
concerning certain events that ought to impact firms (MacKinlay, 1997). One type of event that 
has been investigated in the literature as impacting share prices and shareholder wealth is firm 
divestitures.  
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Divestitures 
A divestiture is a form of corporate restructuring and is defined as the disposal by a 
parent company of a product line, subsidiary, division, or business unit (Moschieri & Mair, 
2008). Divestitures result in a parent firm’s adjustment of its ownership and business portfolio 
organization (Brauer, 2006). Due to the nature of divestitures they are seen to “affect the long-
term evolution of the firm” (Moschieri & Mair, 2008, p. 2). An assortment of causes for 
corporate divestitures have been proposed, including legal, strategic, and market motivations 
(Moschieri & Mair, 2005). Within the rich stream of literature analyzing divestitures various 
determinants have been proposed, including industry and firm characteristics (Brauer, 2006). 
Overall, divestitures have been found to be relevant for all firms regardless of the firm’s size, 
scope, age, or industry (Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992). However, there are several different forms 
of divestitures, including sell-offs, spin-offs, and carve-outs, each having distinct consequences 
for the parent and divested firms (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995). 
A sell-off is a form of divestiture that consists of a business unit, division, or subsidiary 
of a parent company being sold to a separate third-party firm (Woo et al, 1992). Rose and Ito 
(2005) suggested that parent firms will opt to commence a sell-off when they do not intend to 
maintain a trading relationship with the divested unit. In a spin-off, another form of divestiture, 
the divested unit becomes an independent company, however the parent company maintains 
control of the divested unit since its shares are distributed to the shareholders of the parent 
company (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). A spin-off, regardless of the corporate motivation, entails 
the formation of a new brand (Bhat & Burg, 2011). Spin-offs are seen to be undertaken in order 
to stimulate corporate innovativeness in the divested subsidiary or to eliminate negative 
synergies in the corporate structure (Garvin, 1983). Rose and Ito (2005) suggest that parent firms 
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perform a spin-off when the resources or competencies of the divested unit are valuable but the 
management of these resources or competencies is more effective under less than full ownership.  
Furthermore, spin-offs are commonly undertaken by parent firms that operate in a rapidly 
changing and competitive setting (Ito, 1995).  
A carve-out form of divestiture will result in the creation of an independent company 
through the detachment of a business unit and the sale of its shares in an initial public offering 
(Moschieri & Mair, 2005). In general, the parent company in a carve-out will retain a majority 
ownership of the divested unit’s shares (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). Allen and McConnell (1998) 
proposed that carve-outs are typically pursued when the parent company has poor operating 
performance, high leverage, and constrained capital. However, carve-outs are usually seen as a 
temporary form of restructuring aimed at allowing the parent firm to raise funds in the capital 
market (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). Therefore, it is suggested that parent firms undertake a carve-
out in order to retain operating synergies with the intention of re-acquiring the divested unit’s 
public shares (Schipper & Smith, 1986). The various forms of divestitures have been popularly 
utilized in many industries, including the restaurant industry.  
Many firms within the restaurant industry have undertaken divestitures through the 
different forms. For instance, in 2003 McDonalds Corporation completed a sell-off of its 
Donato’s Pizza® brand to an undisclosed third-party (McDonald’s Corporation, 2003). In 
addition, Popeye’s Louisiana Kitchen, Inc., performed a sell-off of its Cinnabon® subsidiary to 
Focus Brands, Inc. in November 2004 (AFC Enterprises, Inc., 2004).  Similarly, in January 2011, 
The Wendy’s Company completed a sell-off where it sold 100 percent of its interest in the 
Arby’s® Restaurant Group subsidiary to ARG IH Corporation (The Wendy’s Company, 2012). 
In 2012, Carrols Restaurant Group, Inc. completed a spin-off of its Fiesta Restaurant Group 
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through the distribution of common stock to its shareholders (Carrols Restaurant Group, Inc, 
2012). In addition, McDonalds Corporation divested Chipotle Mexican Grill® in 2006 through a 
carve-out form of divestiture (McDonalds Corporation, 2006).  The reshaping of restaurant firms 
through the corporate transformation tool of divestitures may impact the relationships between 
the firms’ level of brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth.  
Brand Diversification and Shareholder Wealth 
Shareholder wealth is seen to be affected by market-based marketing investments, such 
as brands, that particularly have an influence on a firm’s cash flows (Gruca & Rego, 2005). In 
particular, brands are associated with increasing a firm’s cash flows (Srivastava, Shervani, & 
Fahey, 1998). It has been suggested that shareholders recognize brands as assets with value and 
reflect changes to a firm’s brand portfolio strategy in the firm’s stock price, which can make 
brands a critical mechanism to generate shareholder value (Rego, Billett, & Morgan, 2009). The 
burgeoning effect of brands can be seen through the Tenet Partners’ (2015) report of the ‘Top 
100 Most Powerful Brands’, which indicated that the firms with the Top 10 brands stock 
performance grew twice the rate of the market since 2009. The strategic planning in terms of 
corporate brand portfolio architecture and the critical evaluation of the contribution that brands 
offer in the creation of shareholder value has proliferated due to changing market dynamics 
(Petromilli, et al, 2002). It is advocated that corporate brand management take a strategic role 
that considers business-wide implications of brand oriented decisions and focuses on the 
optimization of business performance (Petromilli et al, 2002). However, within the literature the 
focus has been mainly on the effects of brand diversification in terms of firm financial 
performance instead of on shareholder wealth.  
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It has been suggested that a multi-brand portfolio allows firms to achieve broad market 
coverage by addressing multiple market segments or heterogeneous consumer needs (Lancaster, 
1990). Greater brand diversification has also been linked to potential economies of scale and 
scope in distribution, sales, advertising, and merchandising (Barwise & Robertson, 1992). 
Furthermore, greater brand diversification tends to be associated with higher revenues due to 
better targeting and positioning (Bahadir et al, 2008). Lower competition and price premiums 
from the construction of entry barriers are also associated with greater brand diversification 
(Bordley, 2003). Brand portfolios that are more diversified are also associated with enabling a 
firm to achieve specialized management capabilities and synergy creation (Aaker, 2004). 
Furthermore, larger brand portfolios have been found to result in reduced cash flow variability 
and increased relative stock value for firms (Morgan & Rego, 2009).   
Within the hospitality literature there have been no studies examining the effects of brand 
diversification on shareholder wealth. However, brand diversification has been found to have a 
negative effect on restaurant firms’ financial performance through the Tobin q’s measure (Choi 
et al, 2011). In addition, Kang and Lee (2015) also found that brand diversification negatively 
impacts a restaurant firms’ financial performance. It was suggested that the negative effect was a 
result of the adverse impacts of increased brand diversification outweighing the benefits, as well 
as, the relatively small size of the restaurant firms limiting their ability to exploit the benefits to 
diversification (Kang & Lee, 2015). However these studies focused on firm performance, while 
this study seeks to determine the role of brand diversification on shareholder wealth within the 
restaurant industry, which has not been addressed in the literature.  
In terms of other forms of diversification (i.e. corporate or market diversification), 
research has evolved in waves of conflicting results in terms of the impact of diversification 
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levels on shareholder wealth (Martin & Sayrak, 2003). Traditionally, studies have shown that the 
share price of firms that are more diversified sell at a discount and therefore equate 
diversification to the destruction of shareholder wealth (Franko, 2004; Martin & Sayrak, 2003). 
For instance, Megginson, Morgan & Nail (2000) found that mergers resulting in increased 
corporate diversification caused a relative loss in shareholder wealth. However, other studies in 
the literature have countered the traditional viewpoint and have found that acquisitions resulting 
in greater diversification caused the acquiring firm to realize a positive abnormal stock return or 
a diversification premium (Matsusaka, 1993; Villalonga, 2004b). Moreover, a number of studies 
in the literature have challenged that the stock discount associated with more diversified firms is 
attributable to other factors instead of diversification, such as the pre-diversification 
characteristics of the firm (Graham, Lemmon, & Wolf, 1999; Lang & Stulz, 1994). 
In terms of the direct effects of brand portfolios on shareholder wealth, empirical studies 
within the literature is scarce. A rare study, conducted by Wiles, Morgan and Rego (2012) found 
that following an acquisition of multiple brands the acquiring firm’s abnormal stock returns were 
lower, which was attributed to shareholders negatively viewing the increased brand portfolio 
complexity.  Similarly, it was found that firms disposing or divesting of multiple and larger 
brands experienced greater positive abnormal returns, indicating investors’ preference for a more 
focused brand portfolio (Wiles et al, 2012). However, a notable point to emphasize in regards to 
Wiles et al’s (2012) study is the lack of concentration on the industries the sample firms operate 
within, instead the study utilized a pooled sample of 322 firms operating in 31 business-to-
consumer industries. Due to the idiosyncratic prominence of brands and the unique 
characteristics of the restaurant industry that may confound the findings of Wiles et al’s (2012) 
study, a deeper examination of the effects of brand diversification on shareholder wealth 
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specifically within the restaurant industry is warranted. In addition, the Wiles et al (2012) study 
focused on the short-term effect of brand disposal announcements instead of completions and 
only considered the number of brands disposed (i.e. binary variable) (Wiles et al, 2012). 
Whereas, this study focuses on the short- and long-term effect of a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification on shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture.  
The negative influence of increased brand diversification on the financial performance of 
a restaurant firm (Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2015) and the positive effect of disposing 
multiple brands on a firm’s stock returns (Wiles et al, 2012) that have been recorded in the 
literature, seem to support the viewpoint that greater brand diversification results in a 
diversification discount (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). However, as previously mentioned, 
the diversification discount finding could be a result of methodological or data issues present in 
the prior studies (Villalonga, 2004). In addition, as outlined above, numerous studies have found 
positive influences from increased diversification. Moreover, studies in the literature have 
focused on examining the effects of brand equity (De Mortanges & Van Riel, 2003) or brand 
value (Kerin & Sethuraman, 1998) on shareholder wealth, instead of the level of brand 
diversification. Furthermore, bidirectional relationships between brand diversification and 
shareholder wealth have not been examined. As previously mentioned, brands are seen to 
influence a firm’s cash flows and shareholder wealth is greater for firms with a more reliable 
cash flow. Therefore, it is argued that the level of brand diversification may be impacted by 
shareholder wealth. Also, due to the seasonality, cyclical, and highly competitive nature of the 
restaurant industry the relationship between brand diversification and shareholder wealth may 
vary in the short- and long-term. Furthermore, the lack of consensus in the literature may be also 
be a result from a non-linear relationship between diversification and shareholder wealth. In 
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other words, as the level of brand diversification varies the effects on shareholder wealth may 
also change. Thus, the lack of consensus in the literature and differentiation between industry 
characteristics in regards to the effect of brand diversification on shareholder wealth demands a 
deeper examination and assessment. This study aims to examine the potential relationship 
between a restaurant firm’s level of brand diversification post-divestiture on the firm’s 
shareholder wealth, including the functional form of the relationship (i.e. unidirectional, bi-
directional, linear, or non-linear). Thus, the following research questions will be examined:  
Q1: What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and shareholder wealth when controlling for divestitures in the short- and 
long-term? 
Brand Diversification and Systematic Risk 
Within the literature, various studies have been conducted with the aim of examining the 
effects of diversification strategies, such as market or corporate diversification, on the market 
value of firms (Barton, 1988). Some studies have shown that a firm’s systematic risk is impacted 
by the level of the firm’s diversification (Manrai, Rameshwar, & Nangia, 2014).  There is a 
general understanding within the financial economics literature that increased diversification into 
unrelated lines of business leads to better performing firms (Michel & Shaked, 1984). The 
reasoning behind the pursuit of greater diversification or conglomeration as a means of risk 
reduction is that the result is the pooling of imperfectly correlated income streams (Thompson, 
1984).  
Early research has indicated that firms with a higher degree of diversification have lower 
risk (Hughes, Logue, & Sweeney, 1975). In particular, it has been suggested that higher 
40 
diversification into unrelated lines of business reduces a firm’s operating risk and consequently 
systematic risk (Manrai et al, 2014). In addition, international diversification for multinational 
firms has been found to offer risk reduction advantages (Rugman, 1976). Furthermore, manager 
controlled firms have been found to engage in mergers and acquisitions that increase a firm’s 
diversification in order to decrease the manager’s employment risk, which is reinforced by 
agency theory (Amihud & Lev, 1981). However, in regards to shareholders, low systematic risk 
for a firm is valuable only when not accompanied by a corresponding low return (Lubatkin & 
Rogers, 1989).  
There is an argument within the literature that suggests the type of diversification strategy 
a firm utilizes may affect shareholders’ perceptions of the firm’s systematic or market risk 
(Barton, 1988). Historically a widely acknowledged belief in the strategic management field is 
that a firm can best achieve a competitive advantage and facilitate its performance with related 
diversification (Rumelt, 1974). In support of this assessment, Lubatkin and Rogers (1989) found 
that only firms with constrained diversification or firms with business units linked by core 
technologies, exhibited lower levels of systematic risk and as a result higher levels of 
shareholder wealth. Moreover, it was found that firms with an unrelated diversification strategy 
exhibited the highest levels of systematic risk (Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989).  
Montgomery and Singh (1984) also found that single business or related diversifiers betas 
did not differ significantly and were lower than the unrelated diversifiers. It was argued that the 
unrelated diversifiers or conglomerates had higher than average systematic risk levels due to 
their characteristically higher debt levels, lower market power, and lower capital intensity 
(Montgomery & Singh, 1984). Furthermore, in their study Bettis and Mahajan (1985) found that 
unrelated diversification has a negative correlation with corporate performance. Similarly, 
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Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1994) advocated that firms could minimize risk through the 
diversification into similar, not identical, lines of business. Therefore, a firm that diversifies into 
unrelated businesses is seen to demonstrate fundamentally higher levels of systematic risk 
(Barton, 1988). It has been suggested that these findings support the notion that constrained or 
related diversification can assist firms in managing away a portion of their systematic risk, which 
cannot be achieved by shareholders on their own (Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989). However, 
according to Bettis and Mahajan (1985), a firm’s related diversification does not guarantee a 
favorable risk or return performance for the firm.  
Other studies in the literature have shown a risk-increasing effect of greater 
diversification or conglomeration from the exposure to complex and costly operating 
environments (Michel & Shaked, 1986; Reeb, Kwok, & Baek, 1998). Greater diversification for 
firms has been associated with an increase in firm leverage and as a result an escalation in the 
firm’s systematic risk (Manrai et al, 2014). Conglomerate mergers and acquisitions have been 
found to result in greater market variability or systematic risk for firms (Joehnk & Nielsen, 
1974).  In addition, Krapl (2015) found that market diversification increases a firm’s systematic 
risk. Moreover, in regards to the banking industry, it has been found that as a consequence of 
mergers, acquiring firms’ common stock experience higher systematic risk with greater co-
movement with the market (Bozos, Koutmos, & Song, 2013). Thereby creating greater exposure 
for shareholders to market shocks instead of diversifying their risk (Bozos et al, 2013). The post-
merger firms are seen to be too large, consequently making their operating cash flows less 
resilient against shocks, resulting in greater risk, and intensifying vulnerability for shareholders 
to unfavorable movements in the aggregate market (Bozos et al, 2013). Empirical studies have 
42 
found the risk increasing effect of diversification to apply when using accounting and market 
based data (Thompson, 1984).  
The empirical examination of the direct effect of a firm’s level of brand diversification on 
its systematic risk is non-existent within the literature. Instead, the literature is full of studies 
examining the impact of the various branding strategies or the characteristics of brands on firm 
value (Bahadir et al, 2008). One such study, concluded that firms utilizing a branded house or a 
unifying corporate brand diversification strategy experienced the highest values of Tobin’s q 
(Rao et al, 2004). The lack of value attributed to the house of brands diversification strategy was 
rationalized as investors underappreciating the distribution of risk to a multitude of brands (Rao 
et al, 2004). Within the marketing literature, it has been suggested that the value of brands is 
related to their ability to reduce consumers’ risks, where high quality brands are seen to provide 
the greatest risk reduction value (Aaker & Keller, 1990). Unanticipated changes in a brand’s 
quality have been found to have a positive association with a firm’s systematic risk, thus any 
increase in the brand quality that shareholders did not anticipate may cause the firm’s stock to be 
more sensitive to market movements (Bharadwaj, Tuli, & Bonfrer, 2011). Therefore, the 
unanticipated changes in brand quality may allow for the diminishment of shareholder wealth 
(Bharadwaj et al, 2011). 
Theoretically, it has been suggested that superior brands enable a firm to increase returns 
while simultaneously decrease risk associated with the returns, thereby adding to the firm’s value 
(Fornell, Mithas, Morgenson, & Krishnan, 2006). In their study Rego, Billett, and Morgan 
(2009) found that consumer-based brand equity significantly reduces a firm’s systematic risk. 
This effect is considered to be a result from a brand’s ability to increase consumer loyalty 
thereby decreasing the firm’s cash flow sensitivity to market-level shocks and consequently 
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lowering its systematic risk (Rego et al, 2009). Conversely, it has been suggested that brands, 
especially high-quality brands, are associated with higher prices which can increase a firm’s 
sensitivity to market changes, particularly in economic downturns when consumers are more 
price conscious (Bharadwaj et al, 2011). However, Madden et al’s (2006) research findings 
showed that a stock portfolio consisting of companies with high value brands experienced less 
systematic risk than a portfolio of similar companies with no high value brands. Although the 
marketing and strategic management literature has produced various studies with the aim of 
examining the effects of diversification strategies on systematic risk, there are still gaps in the 
literature. 
For instance, a gap in the literature, specifically the hospitality literature, is the 
examination of the impact of a firm’s level of brand diversification on systematic risk controlling 
for a divestiture. The distinctive risk characteristics of the restaurant industry including the 
competitive and cyclical nature of the industry, the proliferation of brand diversification, and the 
frequency of divestitures demand a greater discernment of the effects from resulting brand 
diversification levels on systematic risk. In addition, the form of the relationship between brand 
diversification and systematic risk is an important issue that has yet to be examined. As 
discussed above, studies have shown that a firm’s diversification impacts its systematic risk, 
however the level of systematic risk may also affect the firm’s brand diversification. A 
bidirectional relationship may be a solution to the inconsistent findings in the literature in regards 
to whether greater brand diversification has a systematic risk increasing or decreasing effect. In 
addition, the conflicting results as to diversification’s risk increasing or decreasing effect may be 
due to a non-linear relationship. In other words, the extent and type of effect brand 
diversification has on systematic risk may alter as the levels of diversification change. Due to the 
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competitive and seasonal nature of the restaurant industry the relationship between brand 
diversification and systematic risk may also alter in the short- and long-term. Thus, this study 
aims to examine the short- and long-term relationships between a restaurant firm’s level of brand 
diversification post-divestiture on the firm’s systematic risk, including the functional form of the 
relationship (i.e. unidirectional, bi-directional, linear, or non-linear). Therefore, the following 
research question will be examined:  
Q2: What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and systematic risk when controlling for divestitures in the short- and 
long-term? 
Systematic Risk and Shareholder Wealth 
A critical business performance metric within the finance literature is firm risk (Rego et 
al, 2009). The ultimate impact of mismanaged risk on a firm is seen to be a greater chance of 
financial distress or even insolvency (Borde, 1998). For instance, higher firm risk has been found 
to increase a firm’s cost of raising capital from the stock market (Srinivasan & Hanssens, 2009). 
In addition, higher firm risk has been associated with corporate defaults on debt (Triantis, 2000) 
or low dividends for shareholders (Durnev, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003). A firm’s strategic 
acquisitions and divestitures have also been found to be inhibited by higher risk due to a higher 
degree of uncertainty of future cash flows (Clayton, Hartzell, & Joshua, 2005). In addition, 
shareholders will require higher rates of return as compensation for holding stock that is deemed 
to have lower predictability or high risk (Gruca & Rego, 2005). Consequently, due to the 
potential effects on a firm’s cost of capital, market value, and investment opportunities corporate 
executives must monitor the risk levels for the firm (Barber et al, 2008; Borde, 1998). 
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The restaurant industry is consistently exposed to numerous external risks that impact a 
firms’ operations and financial stability, including alterations in discretionary spending patterns, 
health epidemics, variations in the economic environment, and governmental regulations (Barber 
et al, 2008). Within the literature, researchers have extensively investigated the relationships 
between a firm’s stock beta or systematic risk and various financial characteristics of the firms 
and industries (Kim et al, 2007). This rich stream of literature has shown that various finance, 
accounting, and marketing characteristics of firms explain the variation of systematic risk levels 
across firms (Kim et al, 2013). In particular, within the hospitality segments various firm 
characteristics have been found to influence the firm’s level of systematic risk, including 
liquidity, leverage, dividend-payout ratio, return on assets, firm size, and growth in earnings 
before interest and taxes (Borde, 1998). Within the restaurant industry specifically, a firm’s 
systematic risk has been found to be negatively correlated with its asset turnover, profitability, 
and liquidity (Barber et al, 2008; Gu & Kim, 2002; Kim et al, 2007).  In addition, systematic risk 
for a restaurant firm has been found to be positively related to its leverage (Kim et al, 2007). 
Therefore, many external and internal influences affect restaurant firms’ level of systematic risk.  
Since the maximization of shareholder wealth is a fundamental objective for firms, 
corporate executives execute policies and strategies to reduce firm risk in order to maximize 
returns and shareholder wealth (Brenner & Smidt, 1978). For instance, within the economics 
literature it has been suggested that firms achieve a competitive advantage or market power in 
their markets in order to lower their systematic risk (Moyer & Chatfield, 1983; Lubatkin & 
Rogers, 1989). Each corporate decision in regards to operations, investments, and financing has a 
multitude of risk and return properties that must be considered due to their impact on a firm’s 
systematic risk and eventually share price (Barber et al, 2008; Gu & Kim, 2002). This is 
46 
particularly important since an increase in a firm’s systematic risk will result in a decrease in 
firm value (Gu & Kim, 2002). In other words, a firm’s market value is seen to be a function of its 
financial return considering the level of its systematic risk (Fruhan, 1979).  
However, under agency theory, the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders is seen to lead to managerial risk-taking that will increase the firm’s risk (Kim & 
Mathur, 2008). In addition, a rudimentary tenet in the finance field is that in order for 
shareholders to hold a stock perceived to be more risky they must be enticed with the expectation 
of higher returns to offset bearing the risk (Brigham & Daves, 2010). Therefore, the higher 
systematic risk for a firm’s stock the greater return a shareholder will expect to receive. Within 
the hospitality literature, the level of systematic risk has been linked to restaurant firm’s financial 
performance and ultimately shareholder wealth (Barber et al, 2008). However, in their study, 
Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986) observed that a firm’s beta or systematic risk did not explain the 
cross-sectional variation in stock returns for smaller firms.  
Although modern financial theory posits that greater risk equates to greater returns, a 
firm’s mismanaged risk is seen to lead to a reduction in shareholder returns (Barber et al, 2008). 
Moreover, agency theory postulates that information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders results in increased managerial risk-taking (Kim & Mathur, 2008). In terms of the 
restaurant industry, there is an absence of discernment in terms of the effect of a firm’s 
systematic risk on shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture. In particular, the form 
of the relationship has not been addressed. A bidirectional relationship can be rationalized since 
shareholders demand a higher stock return for higher levels of systematic risk, however higher 
risks for the firm result in a greater chance of financial distress or even insolvency. In other 
words, a bidirectional relationship could exist between systematic risk and shareholder wealth. In 
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addition, a non-linear relationship between a restaurant firm’s systematic risk and shareholder 
wealth should be explored, since risk levels may increase shareholder wealth up to a certain 
point. The distinctive internal and external risk characteristics, including leverage levels, 
discretionary spending patterns, health epidemics, variations in the economic environment, and 
governmental regulations, of the restaurant industry and the abundance of divestitures demand a 
greater discernment of the effects from divestitures and the resulting systematic risk levels on 
shareholder wealth. The unique characteristics of the industry may also alter the relationship 
between systematic risk and shareholder wealth in the short- and long-term differently. Thus, this 
study aims to examine the relationship between a restaurant firm’s systematic risk post-
divestiture on the firm’s shareholder wealth, including the functional form of the relationship 
(i.e. unidirectional or bi-directional). 
Q3: What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s systematic 
risk and shareholder wealth when controlling for divestitures in the short- and long-term? 
Impact of Divestitures 
Shareholder Wealth 
As an unpredictable event to the market at large, divestiture announcements have been 
found to have a positive effect on the divesting firm’s stock price on the announcement date and 
sometimes before and after the date (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995; Moschieri & Mair, 2005; Owen 
& Yawson, 2008). Research indicates that a divestiture can have positive wealth effects on the 
divesting parent firm’s shareholder wealth in the short-term (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). For 
instance, Cao et al (2008) indicate that divestiture announcements effect shareholder’s wealth 
positively and significantly greater than zero. However, Afshar et al (1992) report that divestiture 
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completion results in higher significant event day abnormal returns than the initial announcement 
of an intent to divest.  
Nonetheless within the literature divestitures have also been found to have neutral or no 
significant improvement in performance outcomes (Woo et al, 1992). However, Woo et al (1992) 
utilized a sample that did not consider any restaurant divestitures. This is significant since the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the restaurant industry may impact the market reactions to 
divestiture completions. Moreover, negative reactions to a divestiture at the market level are 
suggested to be explained by the “information conveyed with the divestiture’s announcement and 
its credibility” (Moschieri & Mair, 2008, p. 6). In addition, the neutral results to a divestiture 
announcement have been rationalized under the notion that shareholders anticipated the 
divestiture and the firm’s stock prices already reflect the divestiture (Bowman & Singh, 1993). 
Furthermore, studies analyzing the long-term value creation effect of divestitures have been 
found to be lacking in the literature (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). In a rare study, Desai and Jain 
(1999) found in the long-run a positive but insignificant impact of divestitures on the divesting 
firm’s stock. However, Desai and Jain’s (1999) study utilized buy-hold abnormal returns, 
considered spin-offs only, and did not consider the distinctive characteristics of separate 
industries. Overall, when analyzing the impact of divestitures scholars have predominantly built 
on the frameworks of transaction cost economics, the resource based view, and agency theory 
(Moschieri & Mair, 2008). 
The transaction cost economics framework suggests that firms continue to expand 
through acquisitions so long as the benefits gained from the new business are greater than the 
marginal cost of managing the new business (Bergh & Lawless, 1998). In other words, the 
benefits from acquisitions, including shared resources or reduced governance costs, must 
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outweigh the transaction costs of market exchanges between the parent and acquired firm (Bergh 
& Lawless, 1998). Therefore, under the transaction cost economics perspective divestitures are 
seen to result in wealth gains by allowing parent firms to reduce the cost of internal 
administrative exchanges and differing governance schemes, thereby generating growth through 
a focus on the parent’s core competencies (Ito, 1995). Under the resource based view firms are 
seen to maintain a variety of resources through which it can achieve economic benefits (Bergh, 
1995). In other words, the resource based view suggests that a firm’s competitive advantage is a 
result of its assets and resources. Therefore divestitures result in wealth gains due to the 
elimination of redundant assets and the redeployment of core resources more efficiently (Capron, 
Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 2001). In terms of the present study, major flaws in the predictions of 
the transaction cost economics and the resource based view include the focus on the firm and the 
assumption of a consistent interest between corporate executives and shareholders. In other 
words, the transaction cost economics and resource based view theories provide predictions 
under the supposition that a divestiture positive for both executives and shareholders, which is 
supported through the assumption that both parties share the same interests. Instead, empirical 
evidence suggests that there is an inconsistency between the interests of corporate executives and 
shareholders (Jensen, 1989; Markides & Singh, 1997; Moschieri & Mair, 2008). Therefore, the 
results from divestitures may have a negative impact on executives or shareholders. One 
framework that is more suitable in explaining this inconsistency in interests, and is therefore 
utilized in this study, is agency theory.  
Under agency theory the explanation for the value creation effects of divestitures is that 
of a decrease in the diversification of the parent firm (Afshar et al, 1992; John & Ofek, 1995; 
Moschieri, 2011; Moschieri & Mair, 2005) and the realignment of agent and owners interests 
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(Moschieri, 2011). The value creation from divestitures is therefore seen to be a result of the 
disposal of a loss generating operation that has created negative synergy, and therefore the 
divestiture eliminates the source of share value diminution (Afshar et al, 1992). In addition, 
researchers have proposed under agency theory that the value creation from divestitures result 
from the parent firms’ readjustment of the business focus, resulting in an increase in economic 
value and competitive position (Khoroshilov, 2002).  
Overall, agency theorists posit that the motivation for divestitures involves a 
misalignment in interests between corporate executives and shareholders (Moschieri & Mair, 
2008). Executives’ personal wealth is seen to be linked to a firm’s size and bankruptcy risks, and 
are therefore incentivized to increase the firm’s diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1981). However, 
executives are portrayed as participating in managerial opportunism by seeking exaggerated 
diversification in order to accomplish a variety of self-interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1989).Therefore, in regards to the interests of shareholders’ greater diversification or 
conglomeration are perceived to impel firms to undertake divestitures as a correction to its 
strategic choices (Moschieri & Mair, 2008).  
Thus, the inconclusive results in the literature and lack of consideration in regards to the 
idiosyncratic restaurant industry characteristics, including a rapidly changing and highly 
competitive market with multiple market segments, strong seasonality, and cyclical patterns, on 
the effect of divestitures and shareholder wealth demands a deeper examination and assessment. 
This is an important research gap, which has not been addressed. Instead studies within the 
hospitality field have focused on providing an overview of the causes or motivations of 
divestitures with a focus on the firm and increases in firm value (Moncarz, 1986) or on specific 
cases of divestitures within the lodging industry (Canina & Klein, 1998; Muller, 1990; Parrino, 
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1997). A deeper examination is worthy since the industry’s characteristics may impact the short- 
and long-term value creation of divestitures in terms of shareholder wealth differently.  
In addition, under agency theory it is posited that corporate executives may undertake a 
divestiture to correct previous managerial decisions and realign to the interests of shareholders. 
However, executives typically do not decide to undertake a divestiture until they anticipate a 
threat of an acquisition or are compelled by shareholders of the firm to divest (Bethel & 
Liebeskind, 1993). Conversely, executives may perform a divestiture despite the admonitions of 
shareholders. For instance, in the wake of the Red Lobster® divestment announcement, 
Starboard Value, LP a 6.2 percent shareholder of Darden Restaurants, Inc. publicly criticized the 
company’s divestment plan as inadequate for investors, undervaluing Red Lobster’s® assets, and 
resulting in an underperforming stock that would deprive the company of approximately half of 
its real estate (Jinks, 2014). Under this perspective a unidirectional impact of divestitures on 
shareholder wealth may not provide a complete understanding. Instead, the level of shareholder 
wealth may also cause executives to undertake a divestiture, thereby supporting a bi-directional 
relationship. In addition, the conflicting findings in the literature could be a result from a non-
linear impact of divestitures on shareholder wealth. In other words, the effect of divestitures may 
alter over time. Furthermore, divestitures may impact a firm’s level of brand diversification.  
Brand Diversification 
Under agency theory, as a consequence of greater diversification corporate executives or 
managers are endowed with large cash flows and higher discretionary powers, which may result 
in inefficient overinvestment to the detriment of shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Kang & 
Lee, 2015; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). Corporate executives are seen to participate in managerial 
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opportunism by seeking greater diversification in order to accomplish a variety of self-interests, 
including to secure their positions with the firm by making investments that require their 
particular skills (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).Therefore, under agency theory the reduction of 
diversification through divestitures is suggested to realign the interests of executives and 
shareholders (Markides, 1992; Moschieri, 2011).  
Research has shown that the streamline of corporate brand portfolios through the 
elimination of weak or non-strategic brands can be beneficial by providing an opportunity for 
increased efficient allocation of resources, including financial and infrastructure (Varadarajan, 
DeFanti, & Busch, 2006). In a similar vein, divestitures must be accompanied with a corporate 
long-term performance plan that utilizes the divestiture as a means to achieve the goal of value 
creation in order to be successful in increasing shareholder value (Markides & Berg, 1992). It 
has been suggested that a small percentage of brands within a firm’s multi-brand portfolio have a 
“disproportionately large favorable impact on the firm’s image and reputation” and therefore, 
firms should be strategically mindful of brand additions and deletions (Varadarajan et al, 2006, p 
203). However, following a divestiture or brand deletion a company’s profit may undergo a 
contraction from which it may take several years to recover (Pandey, Dahiya, Kumar, 2010). 
Nevertheless, Pandey et al (2010) indicate that a firm can boost profits in the long-term through 
the deletion of loss making brands as a result of the reduction of hidden costs and diseconomies 
of scale, even though short-term revenues may fall in the process.  
In addition, Rao et al’s (2004) study found that firms with less brand diversification, 
synonymous to the corporate branding strategy, experienced a higher positive effect on their 
financial performance than firms following a house-of-brands strategy with greater brand 
diversification. Moreover, firms with more diverse brand portfolios have been seen to suffer 
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from redundancy due to the overlap of brands targeting consumer segments within the same 
industry, which is seen to result in the cannibalization of sales and cash flows (Bahadir et al, 
2008). Greater brand diversification within similar customer segments may limit economies of 
scope (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000). Furthermore, greater brand diversification within 
portfolios has been suggested to result in lower brand loyalty by stimulating consumers’ brand 
switching behavior, as well as, increase price competition (Bawa, Landwehr, & Krishna, 1989; 
Quelch & Kenny, 1994). Organizational complexities that result in higher transaction costs have 
also been associated with greater brand diversification, and are seen to be less for firms with 
fewer brands (Schwandt, 2009). Portfolios with fewer brands are also negatively associated with 
market share and higher relative advertising costs (Morgan & Rego, 2009). 
However, the strategic decision of completing a brand divestiture can have multiple 
implications, including the risk of losing market share and revenues from the divested brand 
(Dung, 2012). Tenet Partners (2015) indicate that some of the fastest-rising brands in the Top 
100 list were a result of strategic acquisitions, resulting in increased brand diversification. As 
Barwise and Roberston (1992) indicate some brands may be more valuable as part of a larger 
portfolio of brands instead of stand-alone brands. Bahadir et al (2008) specify that acquirers may 
leverage a target brand successfully by “better withstanding the competitive pressures from other 
brands, leading to a lower volatility/vulnerability of expected cash flow and thus lower discount 
rates” (p. 51). In addition, Morgan and Rego’s (2009) study found that greater brand 
diversification or a larger brand portfolio size has a positive relationship with a firm’s financial 
performance, consumer loyalty performance, and lower contemporaneous cash flow variability. 
Thus, the inconclusive results in the literature and lack of consideration in regards to the 
idiosyncratic restaurant industry characteristics, including a highly competitive market with 
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multiple market segments, on the effect of divestitures and brand diversification demands a 
deeper examination and assessment. In particular, a deeper examination is worthy since the 
industry’s characteristics may differently impact the short- and long-term influence of 
divestitures on brand diversification. In addition, a bi-directional relationship between the 
variables should be investigated since the perceived positive or negative impact of greater brand 
diversification could also arguably provoke the completion of divestitures. A non-linear 
relationship is also a possibility that should be examined since the streamline of brand 
diversification through divestitures could have an effect up to a certain point. Furthermore, a 
nexus can be found between divestitures and a firm’s level of systematic risk.  
Systematic Risk 
Within the literature, it has been found that the likelihood of divestitures increases during 
times associated with high levels of environmental uncertainty and turbulence (Chatterjee, 
Harrison, & Bergh, 2003). However, research investigating the direct relationship between 
divestitures and risk is scarce in the finance and strategic management literature and non-existent 
in the hospitality management literature. In a singular study, Madura and Murdock (2012) found 
that, in general, following a divestiture the divesting parent firm experienced an increase in its 
shareholder risk. However, the amount of risk increase is conditioned on not only the type of 
divestiture performed but also on the proxy utilized to measure risk (Madura & Murdock, 2012). 
Within the study the authors examined the impact of different types of divestitures on the 
divesting parent firm’s systematic risk, which was broken down into the proxies of equity beta 
and asset beta (Madura & Murdock, 2012). For instance, following a spin-off it was found that 
the parent firm’s systematic risk measured as equity beta had no statistically significant change, 
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however the asset beta measure of systematic risk showed a statistically significant increase 
(Madura & Murdock, 2012). In addition, following a carve-out type of divestiture the change in 
the parent firm’s equity and asset beta measures of systematic risk were positive and significant 
(Madura & Murdock, 2012). Furthermore, it was found that the divesting parent firm’s risk 
increased more when the divestiture involved the elimination of assets related to the firm’s core 
business versus unrelated assets (Madura & Murdock, 2012). These findings on the effects to a 
divesting parent firm’s level of risk are rationalized under the perception that divestitures affect 
the corporate strategies that executives implement and consequently also the scope of operations 
(Madura & Murdock, 2012). 
Moreover, prior research has shown that increased diversification leads to a reduction in a 
firm’s cash flow volatility and subsequently the risk of the firm’s stock (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
In addition, Amit and Livnat (1988) found in their study that firms experience a trade-off 
between lower operating risk and higher financial leverage associated with greater diversification 
and therefore systematic risk is not affected. Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987) suggest that risk 
reduction is a valid rationale for firms to undertake a merger and acquisition, thereby increasing 
the firm’s diversification. Specifically, it was found that mergers with firms related to the 
acquiring parent’s core business resulted in the parent firm experiencing a decline in its levels of 
systematic risk. These studies seem to support the findings of Madura & Murdock (2012) that 
lowering diversification through a divestiture would subsequently increase the firm’s systematic 
risk.  
There is an absence of understanding of the effect of a firm’s divestiture on its systematic 
risk within the restaurant industry. The distinctive characteristics of the restaurant industry, 
including a rapidly changing and highly competitive market with multiple market segments, 
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strong seasonality, cyclical patterns, and the abundance of divestitures, demand a greater 
discernment of the effects from divestitures and systematic risk levels. For instance, the literature 
discussed above does not consider a bidirectional relationship between divestitures and 
systematic risk. This is an important gap, since increased diversification has been associated with 
increased firm leverage and therefore heightened systematic risk for firms (Manrai et al, 2014). 
In particular, within the hospitality industry various firm characteristics have been found to 
influence the firm’s level of risk, including leverage (Borde, 1998). Therefore, restaurant firm 
divestitures may be undertaken due to the systematic risk levels of the firm. Also a non-linear 
impact may exist between divestitures and systematic risk, where systematic risk may be 
impacted positively by divestitures up to a certain point. In addition, the industry characteristics 
may impact the relationship differently in the short- and long-term. Thus, this study aims to 
examine the relationship between a restaurant firm’s completion of a divestiture and the firm’s 
systematic risk levels, including the functional form of the relationship (i.e. unidirectional or bi-
directional). This study seeks to address the following research question: 
Q4: What impact do restaurant divestiture completions have on a restaurant firm’s 
shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk in the short- and long-term?  
Research Hypotheses Development 
Overall, the main purpose for this study is to examine the relationships between a 
restaurant firm’s brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth when controlling 
for a divestiture completion. In addition, the individual impact divestiture completions have on a 
restaurant firm’s brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth will be 
investigated. These research objectives will assist in determining whether there is a relationship 
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between brand diversification, systematic risk, divestiture completions, and gains in shareholder 
wealth within the restaurant industry. The relevancy of this research pursuit is justified due to the 
noticeably increased utilization of divestitures in the industry, as well as, a continued high failure 
rate. In other words, this study aims at ascertaining whether there is a connection between a 
restaurant firm’s brand diversification and systematic risk and the resulting interpretation of the 
market on the firm’s shareholder wealth, after the managerial choice to complete a divestiture. 
As elaborated above, a firm’s level of brand diversification and systematic risk have been found 
to have conflicting effects on shareholder wealth. In addition, a bidirectional or non-linear 
relationships between the variables can be rationalized but have not been investigated. Therefore, 
based on the existing literature and drawing on agency theory this study aims to address the 
research questions presented below in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Research Questions 
Q1 
What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and shareholder wealth when controlling for divestitures in the short- and 
long-term? 
Q2 
What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and systematic risk when controlling for divestitures in the short- and 
long-term? 
Q3 What relationship and in what form is there between a restaurant firm’s systematic risk 
and shareholder wealth when controlling for divestitures in the short- and long-term? 
Q4 What impact do divestiture completions have on a restaurant firm’s shareholder wealth, 
brand diversification, and systematic risk in the short- and long-term? 
 
The finance and strategic management literature suggests a nexus between brand 
diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth. In analyzing the impact of divestitures 
on shareholder wealth, various theoretical frameworks have been utilized, including the 
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transaction cost economics and the resource based view frameworks. In regards to the present 
study, major flaws in the predictions of the transaction cost economics and the resource based 
view include the focus on the firm and the assumption of a harmonious pursuit of interests 
between corporate executives and shareholders. Instead, due to the empirical evidence of the 
inconsistency between the interests of corporate executives and shareholders (Jensen, 1989; 
Markides & Singh, 1997; Moschieri & Mair, 2008), the framework that is more suitable for this 
study is the agency theory. Therefore, the analysis of this study is grounded in the agency theory 
framework, which suggests that the separation of ownership and control in firms results in an 
increased likelihood that managers will participate in managerial opportunism (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In participating in managerial opportunism, managers may undertake increased 
diversification that benefits their own positions at the expense of shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 
1981; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
H1: Brand diversification has a negative bi-directional relationship with shareholder 
wealth when controlling for divestiture completions in the short- and long-term.  
In addition, the propositions of agency theory suggest that executives engage in mergers 
and acquisitions to increase a firm’s diversification in order to decrease their employment risk, 
thereby conflicting with shareholders’ interests (Amihud & Lev, 1981). As mentioned above, 
studies in the literature have shown a risk-increasing effect of greater diversification due to the 
exposure to costly operating environments (Michel & Shaked, 1986; Reeb, Kwok, & Baek, 
1998). As a consequence of mergers, acquiring firms’ common stock have been found to 
experience higher systematic risk with greater co-movement with the market (Bozos, Koutmos, 
& Song, 2013). Therefore, greater diversification is suggested to result in firms with operating 
cash flows that are less resilient, thereby intensifying shareholders’ vulnerability to unfavorable 
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movements in the market (Bozos et al, 2013). Furthermore, Rao et al (2004) concluded that firms 
with less brand diversification experienced the highest values of Tobin’s q (Rao et al, 2004). 
Therefore, this study hypothesizes the following:   
H2: Brand diversification has a positive bi-directional relationship with systematic risk 
when controlling for divestiture completions in the short- and long-term.  
Moreover, under agency theory the information asymmetry between executives and 
shareholders results in increased managerial risk-taking (Kim & Mathur, 2008). The impact of 
mismanaged risk is seen to be a greater chance of financial distress for firms (Borde, 1998). The 
restaurant industry is uniquely exposed to numerous external risks that impact a firms’ 
operations and financial stability, including alterations in discretionary spending patterns and 
governmental regulations (Barber et al, 2008). According to modern financial theory greater risk 
equates to greater returns, however a firm’s mismanaged risk is seen to lead to a reduction in 
shareholder returns (Barber et al, 2008). Furthermore, corporate executives are advised to 
execute strategies to reduce firm risk in order to maximize shareholder wealth (Brenner & Smidt, 
1978). Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
H3: Systematic risk has a negative bi-directional relationship with shareholder wealth 
when controlling for divestiture completions in the short- and long-term.  
Agency theorists also posit that the motivation for divestitures is to correct the 
misalignment in interests between corporate executives and shareholders (Moschieri & Mair, 
2008). Within the finance and strategic management literature, divestiture announcements have 
been found to have a positive wealth effects on the divesting parent firm’s shareholder wealth in 
the short-term (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). However, executives are seen to delay divestitures 
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until they are compelled by shareholders of the firm to divest, thereby suggesting a bi-directional 
relationship (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). Therefore, the following is hypothesized:  
H4: Divestiture completion has a positive bi-directional relationship with shareholder 
wealth in the short- and long-term.  
As a consequence of the conflict of interests between executives and shareholders agency 
theory views greater diversification within firms as endowing corporate executives with large 
cash flows and higher discretionary powers, resulting in inefficient overinvestment to the 
detriment of shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Kang & Lee, 2015; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). 
Therefore, corporate divestitures are considered to realign manager and shareholder interests by 
reducing diversification (Markides, 1992; Moschieri, 2011). The elimination of brands from 
brand portfolios can be beneficial by providing an opportunity for increased efficient allocation 
of resources (Varadarajan, DeFanti, & Busch, 2006). Moreover, firms with more diverse brand 
portfolios have been seen to suffer from redundancy resulting from the overlap of brands 
targeting consumer segments within the same industry (Bahadir et al, 2008). Therefore, the 
following is hypothesized:  
H5:  Divestiture completion has a negative bi-directional relationship with brand 
diversification in the short- and long-term. 
Furthermore, Madura and Murdock (2012) found that a divesting parent firm experienced 
an increase in its shareholder risk after a divestiture. The findings are rationalized under the 
perception that divestitures affect the corporate strategies that executives implement and 
consequently also the scope of operations (Madura & Murdock, 2012). For a spin-off it was 
found that the parent firm’s systematic risk asset beta measure showed a statistically significant 
increase (Madura & Murdock, 2012). In addition, for a carve-out the parent firm’s measures of 
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systematic risk were positive and significant (Madura & Murdock, 2012).  This seems to suggest 
that a divestiture would subsequently increase the firm’s systematic risk. Therefore, the 
following is hypothesized: 
H6: Divestiture completion has a positive bi-directional relationship with systematic risk 
in the short- and long-term. 
However, it is also arguable that the relationships between brand diversification, 
systematic risk and shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture are non-linear. In other 
words, the impact of brand diversification on systematic risk or shareholder wealth can vary 
based on the level of diversification. The restaurant industry in particular requires extensive 
brand customization for target markets and has experienced an increase in brand proliferation 
(Choi et al, 2011). The conflicting results that has been indicated in the literature may be a result 
of a non-linear relationship, where different levels of brand diversification have varying impacts 
on systematic risk and shareholder wealth. Similarly, a restaurant firm’s systematic risk may 
impact its shareholder wealth but up to a certain point, thereby suggesting a non-linear 
relationship.  The individual impact that divestitures has on brand diversification, systematic 
risk, and shareholder wealth may also vary in a non-linear fashion. Therefore the following 
hypotheses are proposed:  
H7: Brand diversification has a non-linear relationship with shareholder wealth. 
H8: Brand diversification has a non-linear relationship with systematic risk. 
H9: Systematic risk has a non-linear relationship with shareholder wealth. 
H10: Divestiture completion has a non-linear relationship with brand diversification, 
systematic risk, and shareholder wealth. 
In Table 3 below the corresponding research questions and hypotheses are provided.  
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Table 3. Proposed Research Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses 
Q1 
What relationship and in what form is 
there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and shareholder wealth 
when controlling for divestitures in the 
short- and long-term? 
H1 
Brand diversification has a negative 
bi-directional relationship with 
shareholder wealth when controlling 
for divestiture completions in the 
short- and long-term. 
H7 
Brand diversification has a non-linear 
relationship with shareholder wealth. 
Q2 
What relationship and in what form is 
there between a restaurant firm’s brand 
diversification and systematic risk when 
controlling for divestitures in the short- 
and long-term? 
H2 
Brand diversification has a positive bi-
directional relationship with 
systematic risk when controlling for 
divestiture completions in the short- 
and long-term. 
H8 
Brand diversification has a non-linear 
relationship with systematic risk 
Q3 
What relationship and in what form is 
there between a restaurant firm’s 
systematic risk and shareholder wealth 
when controlling for divestitures in the 
short- and long-term? 
H3 
Systematic risk has a negative bi-
directional relationship with 
shareholder wealth when controlling 
for divestiture completions in the 
short- and long-term. 
H9 
Systematic risk has a non-linear 
relationship with shareholder wealth. 
Q4 
What impact do divestiture completions 
have on a restaurant firm’s shareholder 
wealth, brand diversification, and 
systematic risk in the short- and long-
term? 
H4 Divestiture completion has a positive 
bi-directional relationship with 
shareholder wealth in the short- and 
long-term. 
H5 Divestiture completion has a negative 
bi-directional relationship with brand 
diversification in the short- and long-
term. 
H6 Divestiture completion has a positive 
bi-directional relationship with 
systematic risk in the short- and long-
term. 
H10 Divestiture completion has a non-
linear relationship with brand 
diversification, systematic risk, and 
shareholder wealth. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter provided a comprehensive investigation of the previous theoretical work in 
regards to brand diversification, systematic risk, shareholder wealth, and divestitures and the 
proposed relationships between the constructs. In particular, an examination of the literature 
under the agency theory perspective was elaborated on. First, the constructs were defined as 
conceptualized in the contemporary finance and strategic management literature. Then current 
empirical research findings over each of the proposed construct relationships was specified.  In 
addition, the conflicting results over the effects of a firm’s level of brand diversification and 
systematic risk on shareholder wealth and important gaps that will be addressed through this 
study were divulged. Specifically, brand diversification is delineated and the effects of brand 
diversification on systematic risk and shareholder wealth were examined. Systematic risk and its 
impact on shareholder wealth was developed. The discussion drew attention to the noticeably 
increased utilization of divestitures in the restaurant industry and the lack of empirical studies 
investigating the connection between a restaurant firm’s brand diversification, systematic risk, 
and shareholder wealth, after the managerial choice to complete a divestiture. Finally, the 
research questions and corresponding hypotheses were developed.  
In the following chapter, the methodology that will be utilized in the study will be 
specified. In particular, the research design, appropriateness of a case study, and data analysis 
technique are elaborated. In addition, the analytical framework, data collection and construct 
measures are provided.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The methodology that is utilized to examine the relationships between a firm’s level of 
brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture 
is outlined in this chapter. The chapter begins with specifying in detail the research design and 
providing the arguments for the appropriateness of the design. The motivation for utilizing a case 
study sample and a description of the firm utilized in the study is elaborated on. In addition, the 
analytical framework for the study is explained and the method for data collection is specified. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the data analysis employed in the study.  
Research Design 
In order to examine the proposed relationships in this study a quantitative causal 
cointegration research design is utilized. Quantitative research methods tend to be more 
structured, entail empirical observation and measurement, examine relationships among numeric 
data, objectively test theory through narrow hypotheses, and utilize statistical interpretation 
(Gliner, Morgan, & Leech, 2009). Quantitative research supports a deductive form of inquiry 
that builds upon theory and strives to be replicated (Creswell, 2009). In addition, casual 
relationships can be credibly discovered with many quantitative research methods. Quantitative 
research methods seek a parsimonious reduction of complex problems to a limited number of 
variables (Creswell, 2009). Validity and reliability scores on instruments utilized in quantitative 
research methods allow for meaningful interpretation of the data (Creswell, 2009). Also, the 
findings from quantitative research methods can be replicated for verification. 
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A quantitative research design is appropriate for this study due to the causal relationships 
that have been proposed and will be examined between brand diversification, systematic risk and 
shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture.  In addition, the utilization of quantifiable 
secondary time series data from 1994 to 2013 renders a quantitative research design more 
appropriate for this study. Specifically, this study utilizes a cointegration analysis that 
investigates the casual relationships based on correlations between the variables. This method is 
appropriate due to nature of the short- and long-term multivariate time series financial data and 
casual relationships under examination.  
The primary purpose of the study is to develop a more profound understanding of the 
purposed relationships. In order to accomplish this purpose, the research design includes 
applying a case study approach with Brinker International, Inc. as the sample firm. Case studies 
are commonly employed in business research (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2013). Case 
study research designs are appropriate when current perspectives of a phenomenon seem 
inadequate or conflicting (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, case study research designs allow 
researchers to magnify their understanding over new research areas (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the comprehensive discernment of the various aspects of 
phenomenon provided through case studies allow researchers to develop theories in regards to 
the phenomenon (Easton, 2010).  
Consequently, a case study approach is appropriate for this study since it will allow for an 
in-depth and real-life understanding of the proposed relationships, due to the highly focused 
setting under examination.  Specifically, Brinker International, Inc., a leading restaurant firm, 
was purposively selected as the sample restaurant firm for the study due to the number of 
divestitures the firm has completed in its history and the range of brands it operates under. In 
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addition, as previously outlined in chapter two the current finance and strategic management 
literature is inconclusive in terms of the relationships under investigation in the study. 
Furthermore, the proposed relationships have not been examined in the restaurant industry. Due 
to the conflicting results highlighted in chapter two and the unique characteristics of the 
restaurant industry, including a highly competitive environment with multiple market segments, 
seasonality, and cyclicality, a case study will assist in providing a greater discernment of the 
relationships within the industry.   
Case Study 
Due to the structure of a case study research design the complexity of a single case is 
fully explored and represented (Stake, 1995). Case study research designs are noted as allowing 
for more insights into a phenomenon that may not be achieved with other approaches (Rowley, 
2002). Therefore, the rationalization for undertaking a case study research is the “desire to derive 
a close or otherwise in-depth understanding of a single or small number of cases, set in their real-
world contexts” (Yin, 2012). Through the limited sample focus and the examination of the 
context or conditions related to the case being studied, a deeper and insightful understanding of a 
phenomenon in the real-world is acquired (Yin, 2012).  In other words, through a case study 
analysis the objective is to uncover the essence of the phenomenon under study (Baxter & Jack, 
2008).  
According to Yin (2003) case studies should be utilized to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions of inquiry since it supports a deeper and more detailed investigation. Yin (2003) 
classifies the types of case studies as explanatory, exploratory, or descriptive. Explanatory case 
studies are utilized when the researcher seeks to explain the presumed casual links in real-life 
67 
phenomenon that are too complex for other strategies (Yin, 2003). Whereas exploratory case 
studies are used to explore situations in which the phenomenon under investigation has no clear 
outcome (Yin, 2003). When seeking to describe a phenomenon in its real-life context researchers 
utilized a descriptive type of case study (Yin, 2003). 
A popularly cited virtue for case study research designs is theoretical generation (Feagin, 
Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991). As Eisenhardt (1989) indicated, case study research can provide for 
novel and empirically valid theories for novel research topic areas. The reasoning behind case 
study research lending itself to theoretical generation is the careful analysis of a case that allows 
researchers to view new relationships and question the theoretical views in the current literature 
(Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). In addition, the theory that is generated through the deep insights 
acquired via case study analysis is considered to be more accurate due to the researcher’s 
consideration of the intricacies of the particular case context (Van Maanen, 1979).   
Due to the inconclusive findings in the finance and strategic management literature and 
the lack of research within the hospitality literature, this study utilizes a case study approach to 
develop a holistic understanding of the proposed relationships between the study’s constructs. 
The case study approach will allow for a multifaceted investigation that will assist in theoretical 
generation in regards to the study’s proposed relationships and constructs. The case study 
approach is appropriate for this study since it is a new research topic of inquiry within the 
hospitality literature, specifically the literature aimed at the restaurant industry. The focus of 
analysis for the study is the restaurant industry due to the numerous distinctive characteristics of 
the industry and upsurge of divestitures.   
Sales within the restaurant industry are anticipated to reach $782.7 billion in 2016, which 
is projected to be equivalent to approximately 4 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product 
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(National Restaurant Association, 2016). In addition, the restaurant industry employment for 
2016 is projected to be approximately 14.4 million and reach 16.1 million by the year 2026 
(National Restaurant Association, 2016). These projections demonstrate the economic 
importance of the restaurant industry. In addition, brand diversification is a unique element to the 
restaurant industry, which has experienced an influx over the past few decades due to persistent 
growth (Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2015). Moreover, the restaurant industry is exposed to 
many external risks that impact the operations and financial stability of firms, including 
discretionary spending patterns, volatile commodity costs, health epidemics, the economic 
environment, and governmental regulations (Barber et al, 2008). Furthermore, the restaurant 
industry exhibits many of the industry characteristics that have been found to facilitate 
divestitures, including a rapidly changing and highly competitive market with multiple market 
segments (Garvin, 1983; Markides, 1992; Moschieri & Mair, 2008). However, the proliferation 
of divestitures among firms in the restaurant industry and the relationships between brand 
diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth have not been assessed in the hospitality 
literature. Therefore, this study focuses on the restaurant industry in examining the relationships 
between brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth when controlling for a 
divestiture. In particular, this study focuses on the casual dining segment of the restaurant 
industry.  
The casual dining segment of the restaurant industry consists of national and regional 
chains, franchises, and independent operators that provide food services in a casual environment 
to patrons who are seated and served by wait staff and pay after eating (Hoovers, n.d.). The 
competitive landscape for the casual dining restaurant segment is driven by personal income, 
consumer tastes, and demographics (Hoovers, n.d.). The major U.S. competitors within the 
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casual dining segment are Bloomin Brands, Inc., Darden Restaurants, Inc., and Brinker 
International, Inc. (“Brinker”). The specific sample firm for this study is the leading casual 
dining restaurant firm Brinker, a Delaware corporation. Headquartered in Dallas, Texas, Brinker 
is a multinational restaurant firm that is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange under 
the ticker symbol “EAT” (Brinker International, n.d.). As of April 25, 2016, Brinker had a 
market capitalization of approximately $2.57 billion (YahooFinance, n.d.). In addition, Brinker’s 
corporate debt is rated investment grade by the three major rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s 
Financial Services, LLC, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., and Fitch Ratings, Inc. As of June 24, 
2015, Brinker had total revenues of $3.0 billion and a net income of $196 million (Brinker 
International, Inc., 2015). In addition, as of June 24, 2015, Brinker had approximately 53,000 
employees worldwide (Brinker International, Inc., 2015).  
Over the years Brinker’s restaurant brand portfolio has transformed organically and 
through strategic mergers and acquisitions. Today, Brinker operates and franchises the Chili’s® 
Grill & Bar (“Chili’s) restaurant brand globally and the Maggiano’s® Little Italy (“Maggiano’s”) 
restaurant brand nationally (Brinker International, Inc., 2015). As of June 24, 2015, there were a 
total of 1,580 Chili’s® locations throughout the United States and in 30 countries, including 
Canada, Ecuador, Germany, Japan, Lebanon, and Singapore (Brinker International, Inc., 2015). 
The Maggiano’s® brand was acquired by Brinker in August 1995 and as of June 24, 2015, there 
were 49 locations in 21 states (Brinker International, Inc., 2015).  
Brinker completed the acquisition of Grady’s® American Grill (“Grady’s”) in February 
1989 (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). In addition, in 1993 Brinker acquired the Spageddies® 
Italian Kitchen (“Spageddies”) restaurant brand (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). However, the 
Grady’s® and Spageddies® brands were divested by Brinker in the second quarter of its 1996 
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fiscal year (Brinker International, Inc., 1997). The divestitures were rationalized by Brinker as 
being a part of its strategic plan to support long-term growth objectives and emphasize on the 
continued development of the restaurant concepts with the greatest return potential (Brinker 
International, Inc., 1997).   
Brinker’s diversification strategy continued with the acquisition of Romano’s® Macaroni 
Grill (“Romano’s”) November 1989 (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). However, in December 
2008, Brinker divested the Romano’s® brand to Mac Acquisition LLC (Brinker International, 
Inc., 2008). Moreover, in May of 1994 the On The Border® Café (“On the Border”) brand of 
restaurants was acquired by Brinker (Brinker International, Inc., 1994). Though by the end of 
fiscal year 2010, Brinker divested the On the Border® brand to OTB Acquisition LLC (Brinker 
International, Inc., 2010). The Cozymel’s® Coastal Mexican Grill (“Cozymel’s”) restaurant 
brand was subsequently acquired by Brinker in July 1995 and then divested in fiscal year 2004 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1995; Brinker International, Inc., 2004).  
The Brinker acquisition of the Corner Bakery® restaurant brand was in August 1995 
(Brinker International, Inc., 1996). Subsequently, in February 2006, Brinker completed the sale 
of the Corner Bakery® brand (Brinker International, Inc., 2005b). Then in 1996, Brinker 
introduced the Eatzi’s® Market and Bakery concept, however the concept was divested in 
November 2002 (Brinker International, Inc., 1996; Brinker International, Inc., 2002). 
Additionally, the Big Bowl® and Wildfire® restaurant concepts were introduced by Brinker in 
1998 (Brinker International, Inc., 1998). However in the third quarter of 2005, the Big Bowl® 
brand was divested (Brinker International, Inc., 2005). The Wildfire® brand was sold by Brinker 
on February 1, 2001(Brinker International, Inc., 2001). Finally, in July 2001, Brinker acquired 
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the Rockfish® Seafood Grill (“Rockfish”) restaurant brand, which was then divested in 2006 
(Brinker International, Inc., 2001; Brinker International, Inc., 2006).  
Analytical Framework 
The proposed analytical framework, as shown in Figure 2, was conceptualized through 
the specification of the research objectives and an extensive literature review. While drawing on 
agency theory, the objectives of this study include the examination of the short- and long-term 
relationships between restaurant firm brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder 
wealth when controlling for a divestiture completion. In addition, the short- and long-term 
impact of divestiture completions on these variables individually will be investigated. Although 
it has been shown that the level of diversification has an effect on a firm’s systematic risk and 
shareholder wealth, whether the effect is positive or negative is inconclusive in the literature 
(Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2014; Thompson, 1984). It has been 
found that firms divesting of multiple brands experience greater positive abnormal returns, which 
is attributed to investors’ preference for a more focused brand portfolio (Wiles et al, 2012). In 
addition, a negative influence of increased brand diversification on restaurant firm financial 
performance has been recorded (Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2015). These findings seem to 
support the viewpoint that greater brand diversification results in a diversification discount, 
however the diversification discount could be a result of methodological or data issues present 
(Villalonga, 2004). In addition, brands influence a firm’s cash flows which subsequently 
manipulates shareholder wealth. Therefore, due to the idiosyncratic prominence of brands and 
the unique characteristics of the restaurant industry a bidirectional relationship between brand 
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diversification and shareholder wealth is suggested in this study which may vary in the short- 
and long-term. 
In addition, the risk characteristics of the restaurant industry, the proliferation of brand 
diversification, and the frequency of divestitures demand a greater discernment of the effects 
from brand diversification levels on systematic risk, including the form of the relationship. 
Studies have shown that a firm’s diversification impacts its systematic risk, however the level of 
systematic risk may also affect the firm’s brand diversification. Therefore, a bidirectional 
relationship may be a solution to the inconsistent findings in the literature in regards to whether 
greater brand diversification has a systematic risk increasing or decreasing effect, which may 
vary in the short- and long-term. 
Furthermore, the study investigates the effect of systematic risk on shareholder wealth 
when controlling for a divestiture completion. Under, agency theory information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders is seen to cause increased managerial risk-taking (Kim & 
Mathur, 2008). In terms of the restaurant industry, a bidirectional relationship can be rationalized 
between systematic risk and shareholder wealth, since shareholders demand a higher stock return 
for higher levels of systematic risk. However higher risks for the firm result in a greater chance 
of financial distress or even insolvency. In addition, the distinctive internal and external risk 
characteristics, including leverage levels, discretionary spending patterns, health epidemics, 
variations in the economic environment, and governmental regulations, of the restaurant industry 
and the abundance of divestitures may also alter the relationship between systematic risk and 
shareholder wealth in the short- and long-term differently. 
Within the finance and strategic management literature, it has been found that a 
divestiture can have positive wealth effects on the divesting parent firm’s shareholder wealth in 
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the short-term (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). Though, it has been noted that there is a lack of studies 
analyzing the long-term value creation effect of divestitures (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). In 
addition, under agency theory the motivation for divestitures is to realign the interests between 
corporate executives and shareholders (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). However, it has been noted 
that executives usually do not decide to perform a divestiture until they are compelled by 
shareholders of the firm to divest (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). This perspective suggests a 
bidirectional relationship between divestitures and shareholder wealth.  
Moreover, under agency theory divestitures are seen to realign manager and shareholder 
interests by reducing diversification (Markides, 1992; Moschieri, 2011). However, the 
inconclusive results in the literature and lack of consideration in regards to the idiosyncratic 
restaurant industry characteristics, including multiple market segments, on the relationship 
between divestitures and brand diversification demands a deeper examination and assessment. 
Research has suggested that the elimination of brands from brand portfolios can be beneficial by 
providing an opportunity for increased efficient allocation of resources (Varadarajan, DeFanti, & 
Busch, 2006). However, the industry’s characteristics may impact the short- and long-term 
influence of divestitures on brand diversification and a bi-directional relationship between the 
variables 
In regards to divestitures and systematic risk, research investigating the direct 
relationship between the two variables is scarce in the finance and strategic management 
literature and non-existent in the hospitality management literature. Madura and Murdock (2012) 
found that following a divestiture the divesting parent firm experienced an increase in its 
shareholder risk. However, the literature has not considered a bidirectional relationship between 
divestitures and systematic risk. This is an important gap, since greater diversification has been 
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connected to increased firm leverage and consequently greater systematic risk for firms (Manrai 
et al, 2014). Within the hospitality industry leverage has been found to influence the firm’s level 
of risk (Borde, 1998). Therefore, the potential for a bidirectional relationship should be 
examined. In addition, the unique characteristics of the restaurant may impact the any 
relationship between divestitures and systematic risk differently in the short- and long-term. 
Furthermore, non-linear relationships between brand diversification, systematic risk, and 
shareholder wealth are arguable and should be examined to provide a deeper understanding of 
the relationships. There is also reasoning for a non-linear impact of divestitures on the study’s 
constructs. Non-linear relationships between the constructs may resolve the inconclusive 
findings in the literature. For instance, the findings of negative and positive impacts of 
diversification on shareholder wealth may be explained as a variance due to the level of 
diversification. Brand diversification levels may also result in varying effects on a restaurant 
firm’s systematic risk, such that diversification may have a positive impact on risk up to a certain 
level. In addition, the systematic risk levels may impact shareholder wealth, where lower risk 
may benefit shareholders up to a certain point. Furthermore, the impact of divestitures on brand 
diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth may be non-linear, where the benefits or 
adverse effects may be vary.   
75 
 
Figure 2. Research Model  
 
Data Collection 
The financial and stock data for the study was acquired from the Wharton Research Data 
Services database, specifically the Center for Research in Security Prices and the Compustat-
Capital IQ databases were utilized. In addition, the divestiture and diversification data was 
acquired from Brinker International, Inc.’s Securities and Exchange Commission annual and 
quarterly filings for the study. The measures for the study’s variables were chosen from the 
literature and are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Study Measures 
Variable Measure Formula 
Brand Diversification Berry-Herfindahl Index 
(1 − ∑𝑆𝑖
2) 
Si is the number of properties a firm has 
within each brand it operates divided by 
the total properties for the firm 
Systematic Risk Rolling Window Beta  𝛽𝑖 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑚)
𝜎2(𝑅𝑚)
 
Shareholder Wealth 
Natural Log 
Ln (Brinker Stock Price) 
 
Brand diversification is a key dimension to a firm’s brand portfolio strategy and is 
defined as the number of separate brands a firm owns and markets (Morgan & Rego, 2009). The 
Berry-Herfindahl index was chosen as the measurement method for brand diversification, since 
this index has been popularly identified in the literature as an appropriate measure of 
diversification (Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2014; Kang & Lee, 2015). The Berry-Herfindahl 
index is calculated as (1 − ∑𝑆𝑖
2), where Si is the number of properties a firm has within each 
brand it operates divided by the total properties for the firm (Kang & Lee, 2015). Therefore, the 
Berry-Herfindahl index incorporates both the number of brands and the weight or relative 
importance of each brand. For the purposes of this study, brands were operationalized as the 
trademarks Brinker operates restaurants under as explicitly identified in its annual and quarter 
reports filed on forms 10-K and 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
Systematic risk is defined as a firm’s stock volatility due to changes in market factors or 
(Barber et al, 2008). Systematic risk has been designated as a stock’s beta, which measures its 
sensitivity to the market and captures its level of systematic risk (CFA Institute, 2012). In 
regards to a stock’s systematic risk, Sharpe (1964) endorsed the notion of a consistent 
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relationship with expected returns, such that the magnitude of a stock’s systematic risk is directly 
related to its expected return. Similarly, Litner’s (1965) work elaborated on the relationship 
between stock prices and the effects of risk. Building on prior studies, Mossin (1966) provided a 
more restrictive discussion of the properties of a market for risky stocks on the basis of a model 
of general equilibrium of exchange, where investors seek to maximize returns over expected 
returns and variance of yield on their portfolios. To measure systematic risk a rolling window 
beta estimation is calculated utilizing the most recent 36 months of returns for the Brinker stock 
and the market, which is represented by the returns on the S&P 500, as has been done in previous 
restaurant industry studies (Kim, Zhong, Chen, & Karadag, 2009).  
Shareholder wealth is defined as the discounted value of the expected future cash flows 
for shareholders and is exemplified by the market value of a firm’s common stock (Brigham & 
Daves, 2010). Hence, the worth of a company’s stock to a shareholder is influenced by the 
degree and certainty of the cash flow the stock will generate in the future (Brigham & Daves, 
2010). In order to measure shareholder wealth this study calculates the natural log of the Brinker 
stock price.  In addition, a divestiture is defined as the disposal of a product line, subsidiary, 
division, or business unit by Brinker and is measured as a binary variable in this study 
(Moschieri & Mair, 2008). 
Data Analysis 
The study utilizes the URCA, T-Series, and VARS packages in the R language platform 
to perform the data analysis (Pfaff, 2008; Trapletti & Hornik, 2016). The study utilizes the 
associations between the variables to test the proposed hypotheses. For each variable a summary 
will be provided for descriptive purposes. Linearity will be examined by using the correlation 
78 
between the variables when controlling for the serial correlation that results from the 
autoregressive process. The data analysis steps will follow the outline provided in Figure 3 
below. First any trend or non-stationary variables in the data will be tested for with the following 
diagnostic tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron test, and the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (Pfaff, 2008). Then the two-stage approach developed by Engle and 
Granger (1987) is utilized in the study. First, cointegration is tested for and then an error 
correction model is estimated, as proposed by Mukherjee, White, and Wuyts (1998). Finally, the 
Granger (1969) test is utilized to validate the direction of causality between the variables.  
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Figure 3. Outline of Data Analysis (adapted from Cromwell, Hannan, Labys, & Terraza [1994]) 
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Unit Root Tests 
Time series data analysis quantifies the main features of the data, the random variation in 
the data, and has improved computing power (Cowpertwait & Metcalfe, 2009). However, time 
series data is seen to consist of a deterministic trend and a stochastic component (Pfaff, 2008). 
The stochastic component can be further decomposed into a cyclical component or a mean-
stationary process and a stochastic trend (Pfaff, 2008). When utilizing time series data any trend 
or seasonal component must be extracted. In order to detect any trend or non-stationary variables 
in the series the following unit root diagnostic tests are utilized: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, 
the Phillips-Perron test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (Pfaff, 2008). The unit root 
tests are designed to indicate whether the data converge to stationarity and in what order. 
Utilizing the combination of these three unit root tests will ensure a confident conclusion on the 
existence and order of unit root for the variables in the study.  
Although many time series data are non-stationary due to seasonal effects or trends, the 
data can be transformed into a stationary series by differencing (Cowpertwait & Metcalfe, 2009). 
Differencing is seen to allow for the removal of a variety of trends, including stochastic as in a 
random walk or deterministic as in a linear trend (Cowpertwait & Metcalfe, 2009). Therefore, in 
the case of non-stationarity, the resolution in this study is first differencing or second 
differencing (Pfaff, 2008). The flowchart provided in Figure 4 displays the unit root process 
steps followed in this study.  
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Figure 4. Unit Root Process (adapted from Pfaff [2008]) 
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The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (“ADF”) test is a more general version of the Dickey-
Fuller test and is one of the most popularly utilized unit root tests (Cowpertwait & Metcalfe, 
2009).  The Dickey Fuller test assesses the null hypothesis “α = 1 against an alternative 
hypothesis that α < 1 for the model xt = αxt−1 + ut in which ut is white noise” (Cowpertwait & 
Metcalfe, 2009, p. 214).  Whereas, the ADF test approximates the stationary process with an AR 
model, thereby allowing the differenced series ut to be other stationary processes other than 
white noise (Cowpertwait & Metcalfe, 2009).  Therefore, the ADF test accommodates general 
ARMA (p,q) models. Under the ADF test, if the null hypothesis is not rejected then there is an 
implication that the times series data is non-stationary, which must be addressed through 
differencing to establish stationarity. Utilizing the ADF test, three regression equations will be 
tested for each variable. The first regression will be with a constant and a trend to test if the 
variable contains a unit root. The second regression will test whether the variable is a random 
walk with or without a drift. Finally the third regression tests whether stationarity will be 
achieved by differencing the series. Therefore, the following equations will be tested for 
shareholder wealth (ShW), brand diversification (BrndDiv), and Systematic Risk (SysRsk):  
∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝜋𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑢1𝑡 ,   
∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝜋𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑢2𝑡 ,   
∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡 = 𝜋𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑢3𝑡,   
∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝜋𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑢1𝑡,   
∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝜋𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑢2𝑡 ,   
∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝜋𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + ∑𝑗=1 
𝑘 𝛾𝑗∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝑢3𝑡 , 
∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝜋𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑢1𝑡,   
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∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝜋𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑢2𝑡 ,   
∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝜋𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑𝑗=1
𝑘 𝛾𝑗∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑢3𝑡 , 
The second unit root test that will be performed is the Phillips-Perron (“PP”) test, which 
is popularly utilized in the examination of financial time series data. The PP test has an 
advantage over the ADF since it utilizes non-parametric test statistics for the null hypothesis of a 
unit root and allows for weak dependence and heterogeneity of the error process (Pfaff, 2008). In 
the PP test the nuisance parameters present in the Dickey-Fuller statistic are eliminated (Pfaff, 
2008). Similar to the ADF test, under the PP test if the null hypothesis is not rejected then there 
is an implication that the time series is non-stationary and differencing must be done to establish 
stationarity. Under the PP test, two test regressions for each variable will be examined. The first 
regression includes a constant and the second includes a constant and trend or time effect. 
Therefore, the below equations will be tested for shareholder wealth (ShW), brand diversification 
(BrndDiv), and systematic risk (SysRsk): 
∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, 
∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡 = 𝜇 +  𝛽 (𝑡 −
1
2
𝑇) + 𝛼𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, 
∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, 
∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝜇 +  𝛽 (𝑡 −
1
2
𝑇) + 𝛼𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, 
∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, 
∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝜇 +  𝛽 (𝑡 −
1
2
𝑇) + 𝛼𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, 
The third unit root test to assess trend or level of stationarity that will be performed in 
this study is the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (“KPSS”) test. In comparison to the ADF or 
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PP tests, the KPSS test switches the null and alternative hypotheses and is therefore considered 
to be in accordance with a conservative testing strategy (Pfaff, 2008). In other words, under the 
KPSS test the null hypothesis is a stationary process instead of a unit root process as in the ADF 
and PP tests. Therefore, if the null hypothesis is rejected under the KPSS test the researcher can 
be confident that the series has a unit root (Pfaff, 2008). For the KPSS test, the following 
regression equations will be tested for shareholder wealth (Shw), brand diversification 
(BrndDiv), and systematic risk (SysRsk): 
∆𝑆ℎ𝑊𝑡 = 𝜉𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, in which, 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡, where rt is a random walk and the error 
process is assumed to be independently and identically distributed. 
∆𝐵𝑟𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝜉𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, in which, 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 , where rt is a random walk and the 
error process is assumed to be independently and identically distributed. 
∆𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑠𝑘𝑡 = 𝜉𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, in which, 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡, where rt is a random walk and the 
error process is assumed to be independently and identically distributed. 
Engle and Granger Two Step Procedure and Error Correction 
In the case of difference-stationary data the error term can be highly correlated and the t 
and F statistics can be distorted such that the null hypothesis is too often rejected, thereby 
running the risk of spurious regression (Pfaff, 2008). The concept of cointegration was 
introduced by Granger (1981) as a new approach to deal with trending variables in the context of 
regression analysis (Pfaff, 2008). Cointegration is defined as the “components of the vector xt are 
said to be cointegrated of order d, b, denoted xt ∼ CI(d, b), if (a) all components of xt are I(d) and 
(b) a vector α(≠ 0) exists so that 𝑧𝑡 = ?́?𝑥𝑡~𝐼(𝑑 − 𝑏), 𝑏 > 0. The vector α is called the 
cointegrating vector” (Pfaff, 2008, p. 75). In other words, the purpose of cointegration is to 
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uncover the presence of an equilibrium relationship between two variables through time. 
Therefore, cointegration is considered to be a solution to spurious regression found in time series 
analysis. 
Through cointegration researchers can distinguish stable long-run connections between 
non-stationary variables. Time series variables are seen to be cointegrated if they have the “same 
order of integration and the error process from the regression performed on the untransformed 
variables is stationary (Cromwell et al, 1994). The approach utilized in this study to test for 
cointegration or causality is the Engle and Granger (1987) two step estimation technique, which 
first involves running a regression of the study variables in the set of I(1) and then specifying an 
error-correction model. If two variables are cointegrated I(1)- variables, then Granger causality is 
seen to exist in at least one direction. In other words, at least one variable can forecast or predict 
the other variable. In addition, if two time series are cointegrated then an error-correction 
mechanism is seen to exist.  
In this study the analysis will involve multivariate equations and therefore a system of 
cointegrated variables, which demands the utilization of a vector error-correction model. Under 
this method cointegration is defined in more broad terms:  
An (n × 1) vector of variables yt is said to be cointegrated if at least one nonzero n-
element vector βi exists such that β’iyt is trend-stationary. βi is called a cointegrating 
vector. If r such linearly independent vectors βi(i = 1, . . . , r) exist, we say that {yt} is 
cointegrated with cointegrating rank r. We then define the (n × r) matrix of cointegrating 
vectors β = (β1, . . . , βr). The r elements of the vector β’yt are trend-stationary, and β is 
called the cointegrating matrix (Pfaff, 2008, p. 79). 
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In other words, under this approach each individual series is not required to be integrated of the 
same order, instead some of the series can be trend-stationary (Pfaff, 2008). If yt contains a 
trend-stationary variable then it is considered to be trivially cointegrated (Pfaff, 2008).  
In this study the following autoregression model will be investigated: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛱1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛱𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇 + 𝛷𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 1994, … , 2013, 𝑘 = 3 
Where  𝑦𝑡 is a 3 × 1 (ShW, BrndDiv, SysRisk) vector of series at period t, the matrices 𝛱𝑘 are 3 
× 3 coefficient matrices of the lagged (p) endogenous variables (ShW, BrndDiv, SysRisk), 𝜇 is a 
3 × 1 vector of constants, and Dt is the dummy control variable for divestitures. The error term 𝜀𝑡 
is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as 𝜀𝑡~𝒩 (0, ∑  ). From the 
autoregression model two versions of the vector error-correction model can be extracted, (1) 
long-term form and (2) transitory or short-term form:  
Long-term:  
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛤1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛤𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝛱𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇 + 𝛷𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝛤𝑖 = −(𝐼 − 𝛱1 − ⋯ − 𝛱𝑖),   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝 − 1, 
𝛱 = −(𝐼 − 𝛱1 − ⋯ − 𝛱𝑝) 
 Transitory form:  
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛤1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛤𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝛱𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜇 + 𝛷𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝛤𝑖 = −(𝛱𝑖+1 + ⋯ + 𝛱𝑝),   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝 − 1, 
𝛱 = −(𝐼 − 𝛱1 − ⋯ − 𝛱𝑝),  
In order to test the cointegration and find the optimum order of integration the Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) method will be utilized, which firsts determines the cointegration rank. In 
addition, the Structural Vector Autoregressive (“SVA”) model will be used to estimate 
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coefficients and identify shocks, which will be traced out by imposing restrictions on the 
matrices (Pfaff, 2008). Under the SVA model it is assumed that the structural errors are white 
noise and the “coefficient matrices are structural matrices that differ from their reduced-form 
counterparts” (Pfaff, 2008, p. 43). Finally, the Granger causality test will be carried out through 
the error correction mechanism to investigate all relationships in order to determine the most 
appropriate equation explaining the relationships. This will allow for the identification of the 
direction of causality and distinguish the short- and long-term causality differences.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of the results generated from the 
quantitative causal cointegration research design. Specifically, the findings from the unit root 
tests, cointegration, vector error correction, and causality tests for the proposed hypotheses are 
presented. The chapter begins with a statistical description of the study’s variables. Next, the 
results of the three unit root tests, Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt, are given. Then the findings for the optimal lag and diagnostic test analyses are 
presented followed by a discussion of the cointegration procedure results. The Granger causality 
findings are also presented for the proposed relationships. Finally, the results for the OLS 
regression models estimated in the study are given.  
Data Description 
A case study approach is utilized in order to develop a deeper and more holistic insight 
into the study’s proposed relationships that may not be achieved with other approaches (Rowley, 
2002). The limited sample allows for a more insightful understanding of the phenomenon under 
study in a real-world setting (Yin, 2012).  In addition, the case study research design promotes 
theoretical generation due to the careful analysis of a single case (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). Due to 
the distinctive characteristics of the restaurant industry and the proliferation of divestitures in the 
industry the focus for the study’s analysis is the restaurant industry, specifically Brinker 
International, Inc. Brinker was selected for the study due to it being a leading casual dining 
restaurant firm, its brand portfolio undergoing numerous divestitures over the years, and its 
continued brand diversification. 
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In order to evaluate the proposed short- and long-term relationships, the data employed in 
the study consists of quarterly time series data for the three variables, brand diversification, 
systematic risk, and shareholder wealth, from 1994 to 2013. Following an extensive literature 
review, the measures for each of the variables were chosen. Brand diversification is 
operationalized in this study as the number of separate brands Brinker owns and markets 
(Morgan & Rego, 2009). The Berry-Herfindahl index was chosen as the measure for brand 
diversification in this study, since it is widely considered an appropriate measure for 
diversification due to its incorporation of items and the weight of each item (Choi et al, 2011; 
Kang & Lee, 2014; Kang & Lee, 2015). In other words, the Berry-Herfindahl index incorporates 
both the number of brands and the weight or relative importance of each brand for Brinker. The 
calculation for the Berry-Herfindahl index utilized in this study is (1 − ∑𝑆𝑖
2), with Si 
representing the function of the number of properties Brinker has within each brand it operates 
divided by the total properties for Brinker (Kang & Lee, 2015). The range of the Berry-
Herfindahl index is from zero to one, with the value of one representing a single brand portfolio 
and lower values signifying brand portfolios with greater diversification. For the purposes of this 
study, brands are identified as the trademarks Brinker operates restaurants under as provided in 
its 10-K and 10-Q forms filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The trademarks for 
Brinker were utilized in the study since the concept of a trademark is interchangeable to the 
definition of a brand, which enhances the functional value of a product (Farquhar, 1989). 
Systematic risk is a firm’s stock volatility associated with changes in market factors and 
has been designated as a stock’s beta (CFA Institute, 2012). Stocks with a positive beta specify 
that the stock’s return trails the market, whereas a negative beta indicates the stock’s return are in 
contrast to the market (CFA Institute). In addition, a beta greater than one indicates the stock 
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moves in the same trend as the market but with greater magnitude, which suggests greater 
sensitivity (Bodie et al, 2009). Systematic risk for this study was measured utilizing a rolling 
window beta estimation calculated using the monthly returns of the Brinker stock and the 
market, represented by the S&P 500 index as has been done in previous restaurant industry 
studies (Kim et al, 2009). 
Shareholder wealth is considered to be the discounted value of the expected future cash 
flows for shareholders and is represented by the market value of a firm’s common stock 
(Brigham & Daves, 2010). Therefore, the shareholder value of a company’s stock is influenced 
by the certainty of the cash flow the stock will generate in the future (Brigham & Daves, 2010). 
The shareholder wealth variable for the study was measured by calculating the natural log of the 
monthly Brinker stock price. In addition, a divestiture is measured as a binary variable in this 
study and is defined as the disposal of a product line, subsidiary, division, or business unit by 
Brinker (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). 
In Table 5 below selected summary statistics are provided for the study’s variables. 
Based on the sample time period of 1994 to 2013, the average value for Brinker shareholder 
wealth was 2.575. This indicates that the Brinker’s stock on average experienced a positive 
return of 2.575% during the sample time period. The degree of brand diversification for Brinker 
during the sample time period ranged from a minimum Berry-Herfindahl index of 0.054 to a 
maximum of 0.553, with an average of 0.377. Therefore, over the sample time period on average 
the brand portfolio for Brinker displayed a greater degree of diversification. Furthermore, the 
average beta for Brinker during the study’s time period was 1.068, indicating the company’s 
stock was more risky than the market.  
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Table 5. Summary Statistics 
Difference Statistic ShW BrndDiv SysRisk 
Δ
(0
) 
Min.    1.466 0.054 0.218 
1st Qu. 2.180 0.305 0.547 
Median  2.708 0.422 0.963 
Mean    2.575 0.377 1.068 
3rd Qu. 2.942 0.526 1.566 
Max.    3.601 0.553 2.525 
Δ
(1
) 
Min.    -0.510 -0.163 -0.874 
1st Qu. -0.088 -0.002 -0.151 
Median  0.017 0.000 -0.013 
Mean    0.020 -0.004 -0.013 
3rd Qu. 0.122 0.007 0.090 
Max.    0.422 0.029 1.310 
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Divstr is divestiture; 
Δ stands for difference; Qu. Stands for quartile. 
 
After a visual inspection of the series for each variable, as shown in Figure 5, it was 
determined that shareholder wealth, systematic risk, and brand diversification appear to be non-
stationary time series. The divestiture variable is not a time series variable but rather an event or 
dummy variable. Therefore, the data for each of the study’s variables was transformed by taking 
a first difference in order to suitably transform the data to be stationary. As seen in Figure 6, the 
results of taking the first difference is to make all study variables stationary. As shown in Table 5 
above, after applying the first difference the minimum and maximum values for Brinker stock 
became -0.510 and 0.422, respectively. The maximum degree of brand diversification became 
0.029. In addition, the average beta for Brinker stock became -0.013, indicating a converse 
relationship with the market.  
92 
 
Figure 5. Variable Series before Transformation 
 
Figure 6. Variable Series after Transformation (First Difference) 
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Unit Root Tests 
The first step in the data analysis was to test the data to determine whether the data 
displayed stationary or non-stationary elements and if non-stationary whether a unit root or no 
unit root were exhibited. Time series data has been assumed to consist of a deterministic trend 
and a stochastic component (Pfaff, 2008). If all of the roots of an autoregressive polynomial are 
outside the unit circle then the time series is stationary around a deterministic trend or trend-
stationary (Pfaff, 2008). However, if one root is on the unit circle then the time series is 
considered to be stationary around a constant mean and the series is difference-stationary (Pfaff, 
2008). Therefore, a first difference filter must be applied to obtain a stationary process (Pfaff, 
2008). When the data displays a random walk, then it is considered a non-stationary time series 
due to its variance growing with time and can display a unit root or no unit root (Pfaff, 2008).  
Utilizing a combination of unit root tests to determine a variable’s unit root process is 
recommended in order to obtain robust results; since no individual test can provide a definite 
result. Therefore, the testing procedure for determining the presence of unit roots for this study 
included the three unit root tests of Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shinn.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is the most commonly utilized unit root test in 
econometrics and applied research (Pfaff, 2008). Under the ADF test the null hypothesis H0 is 
that a unit root is present (π = 0), the alternative hypothesis H1 is that the variable series has a 
stationary process (π < 0). The ADF test consists of an autoregressive process of order or several 
regression equations in order to determine the presence of a unit root (Croes, 2014). In this 
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process each of the study’s variables is tested for the two deterministic elements of trend and 
drift (Croes, 2014; Pfaff, 2008). Specifically, three variates are tested for trend and two variates 
are tested for drift. In addition, under each element different variates are tested to determine if 
the series is “stationary around a zero mean; stationary around a non-zero mean; stationary 
around a linear trend; containing a unit root with zero drift; or containing a unit root with non-
zero drift” (Pfaff, 2008, pg. 61). The lag order for the ADF test was empirically determined 
utilizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and is 4. Table 6 below shows the results of the 
ADF tests for each of the study’s variables. 
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Table 6. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Type Variate ADF lags Probability 
ShW trend τ3 -1.7261 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø2 2.1548 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø3 1.4897 4 ρ > 0.10 
 drift τ2 -0.9097 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø1 2.1262 4 ρ > 0.10 
 Δ(1) τ3 -3.5653 4 ρ < 0.05 
  ø2 4.3 4 ρ < 0.10 
    ø3 6.3828 4 ρ < 0.10 
BrndDiv trend τ3 -0.9585 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø2 2.3478 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø3 2.5663 4 ρ > 0.10 
 drift τ2 0.4136 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø1 0.9862 4 ρ > 0.10 
 Δ(1) τ3 -4.5493 4 ρ < 0.01 
  ø2 6.9444 4 ρ < 0.01 
    ø3 10.3827 4 ρ < 0.01 
SysRisk trend τ3 -1.6247 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø2 0.967 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø3 1.358 4 ρ > 0.10 
 drift τ2 -1.5556 4 ρ > 0.10 
  ø1 1.3034 4 ρ > 0.10 
 Δ(1) τ3 -3.9224 4 ρ < 0.05 
  ø2 5.1298 4 ρ < 0.05 
    ø3 7.6945 4 ρ < 0.05 
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Divstr is divestiture; 
Δ stands for difference. 
 
As shown in Table 6, for the shareholder wealth variable the ADF test results for trend at 
τ3 (ADF (τ3) = -1.7261, lag = 4, ρ > 0.10), indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected at any 
alpha level and the series does have a unit root process. The shareholder wealth ADF test results 
for drift at τ2 (ADF (τ2) = -0.9097, lag = 4, ρ > 0.10), also does not reject the null hypothesis. 
After taking the first difference for shareholder wealth, the ADF test results at τ3 (ADF (τ3) = -
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3.5653, lag = 4, ρ < 0.05), indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% alpha and the series 
does not have a unit root process. For the brand diversification variable, the ADF test results for 
trend at τ3 (ADF (τ3) = -0.9585, lag = 4, ρ > 0.10), indicates that the null hypothesis is not 
rejected at any alpha level and the series does have a unit root process. Similarly, the brand 
diversification ADF test results for drift at τ2 (ADF (τ2) = 0.4136, lag = 4, ρ > 0.10), shows the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. However, after taking the first difference for brand 
diversification, the ADF test results at τ3 (ADF (τ3) = -4.5493, lag = 4, ρ < 0.01), indicates the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% alpha and the series does not have a unit root process. For 
the systematic risk variable the ADF test results for trend at τ3 (ADF (τ3) = -1.6247, lag = 4, ρ > 
0.10), indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected at any alpha level and the series does have 
a unit root process. The ADF test results for drift at τ2 (ADF (τ2) = -1.5556, lag = 4, ρ > 0.10), 
also does not reject the null hypothesis. However, after taking the first difference for systematic 
risk, the ADF test results at τ3 (ADF (τ3) = -3.9224, lag = 4, ρ < 0.05), indicates the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% alpha and the series does not have a unit root process. The 
second unit root test performed is the Phillips-Perron (PP) test.  
Phillips-Perron 
The Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test utilizes a non-parametric method that explicitly 
allows for weak dependence and heterogeneity of the error process (Pfaff, 2008). In contrast to 
the ADF test the PP test eliminates the nuisance parameters if the error process does not satisfy 
the assumptions (Pfaff, 2008). Similar to the ADF test, under the PP test the null hypothesis H0 is 
that a unit root is present (π = 0), whereas the alternative hypothesis H1 is that the variable series 
has a stationary process (π < 0). In addition, for each of the study’s variables three different 
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variates are tested for trend and two variates are tested for constant. However, in the PP test the 
lags to be included in the computation of the long-run variance can be chosen automatically 
between short and long based on the integer value (Pfaff, 2008). For this study the results for the 
short and long lag calculations are very similar, therefore only the long lags are provided. Table 
7 below provides the PP unit root test results for each of the study’s variables.  
Table 7. Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Type Variate PP lags Probability 
ShW trend tα̂ -2.9871 long ρ > 0.10 
  tμ ̂ 1.5189 long  
  tβ̂ 2.9208 long  
 constant tα̂ -0.6059 long ρ > 0.10 
  tμ ̂ 0.8242 long  
 Δ(1) tα̂ -11.2961 long ρ < 0.01 
  tμ ̂ 1.5308 long  
    tβ̂ 0.5157 long   
BrndDiv trend tα̂ -1.3535 long ρ > 0.10 
  tμ ̂ 1.1574 long  
  tβ̂ -2.7482 long  
 constant tα̂ -0.0087 long ρ > 0.10 
  tμ ̂ -0.3648 long  
 Δ(1) tα̂ -8.8694 long ρ < 0.01 
  tμ ̂ -1.4358 long  
    tβ̂ -2.1198 long   
SysRisk trend tα̂ -2.1761 long ρ > 0.10 
  tμ ̂ 1.5860 long  
  tβ̂ 0.4128 long  
 constant tα̂ -2.2103 long ρ > 0.10 
  tμ ̂ 1.755 long  
 Δ(1) tα̂ -10.7452 long ρ < 0.01 
  tμ ̂ -0.5753 long  
    tβ̂ 0.5796 long   
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Divstr is divestiture; 
Δ stands for difference. 
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As shown in Table 7, for the shareholder wealth variable the PP test results for trend at tα̂ 
(PP (tα̂) = -2.9871, lag = long, ρ > 0.10), indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected at any 
alpha level and the series does have a unit root process. The shareholder wealth PP test results 
for constant at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) = -0.6059, lag = long, ρ > 0.10), also does not reject the null hypothesis. 
However, after taking the first difference for shareholder wealth, the PP test results at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) 
= -11.2961, lag = long, ρ < 0.01), indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% alpha and the 
series does not have a unit root process. For the brand diversification variable, the PP test results 
for trend at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) = -1.3535, lag = long, ρ > 0.10), indicates that the null hypothesis is not 
rejected at any alpha level and the series does have a unit root process. Similarly, the brand 
diversification PP test results for constant at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) = -0.0087, lag = long, ρ > 0.10), shows 
the null hypothesis is not rejected. However, after taking the first difference for brand 
diversification, the PP test results at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) = -8.8694, lag = long, ρ < 0.01), indicates the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% alpha and the series does not have a unit root process. For the 
systematic risk variable the PP test results for trend at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) = -2.1761, lag = long, ρ > 0.10), 
indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected at any alpha level and the series does have a unit 
root process. The systematic risk PP test results for constant at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) = -2.2103, lag = long, ρ 
> 0.10), also does not reject the null hypothesis. However, after taking the first difference for 
systematic risk, the PP test results at tα̂ (PP (tα̂) = -10.7452, lag = long, ρ < 0.01), indicates the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% alpha and the series does not have a unit root process. The 
third unit root test performed in this study is the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
test.  
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Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
The Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test is a lagrange multiplier test for 
determining the level of stationarity (Pfaff, 2008). The KPSS has been commonly utilized in the 
literature to complement the results of the ADF and PP tests (Ridderstaat, Croes, & Nijkamp, 
2016). The KPSS test is considered a more conservative unit root test in comparison to the ADF 
and PP tests, because it reverses the null and alternative hypothesis (Pfaff, 2008). In other words, 
under the KPSS test the null hypothesis, H0, is that the variable series has a stationary process (π 
< 0), whereas the alternative hypothesis, H1, is that a unit root is present (π = 0). Table 8 below 
displays the KPSS unit root test results for each of the study’s variables.  
Table 8. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Type Variate KPSS lags Probability 
ShW Level η̂μ 0.6104 long ρ < 0.05 
  Trend η̂τ 0.1186 long ρ > 0.10 
BrndDiv Level η̂μ 0.4309 long ρ < 0.10 
  Trend η̂τ 0.1891 long ρ < 0.05 
SysRisk Level η̂μ 0.1487 long ρ > 0.10 
  Trend η̂τ 0.1429 long ρ < 0.10 
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Divstr is divestiture. 
 
As shown in Table 8, for the shareholder wealth variable the KPSS test results at level η̂μ 
(KPSS (ημ̂) = 0.6104, lag = long, ρ < 0.05), indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% 
alpha level and the series does have a unit root process. However, the shareholder wealth KPSS 
test results for trend at ητ̂ (KPSS (ητ̂) = 0.1186, lag = long, ρ > 0.10), does not reject the null 
hypothesis thereby showing the series has a stationary process. For the brand diversification 
variable, the KPSS test results at level η̂μ (KPSS (η̂μ) = 0.4309, lag = long, ρ < 0.10), indicates 
that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% alpha level and the series does have a unit root 
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process. Similarly, the brand diversification KPSS test results for trend at η̂τ (KPSS (ητ̂) = 
0.1891, lag = long, ρ < 0.05), shows the null hypothesis is rejected. For the systematic risk 
variable the KPSS test results at level η̂μ (KPSS (ημ̂) = 0.1487, lag = long, ρ > 0.10), indicates 
that the null hypothesis is not rejected at any alpha and the series does not have a unit root 
process. The systematic risk KPSS test results for trend at ητ̂ (KPSS (ητ̂) = 0.1429, lag = long, ρ < 
0.10), does reject the null hypothesis. Table 9 below displays a comparison of the three unit root 
test results for each of the three variables.  
Table 9. Unit Root Test Results Comparison 
Variable ADF PP KPSS 
ShW Unit root present is 
not rejected 
Unit root present is 
not rejected 
Stationary process is 
rejected  
BrndDiv Unit root present is 
not rejected 
Unit root present is 
not rejected 
Stationary process is 
rejected 
SysRisk Unit root present is 
not rejected 
Unit root present is 
not rejected 
Stationary process is 
rejected  
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Δ stands for 
difference. 
 
As shown in Table 9, for shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic all the 
tests resulted in a unit root, which was resolved by taking the first difference. Therefore, based 
on the visual inspection and the above results of the three unit root tests utilized to examine the 
stationarity of the variables, the variables are non-stationary at level. However, stationarity is 
attained for all of the study’s variables after the first difference transformation. Consequently, 
this study utilized the first differenced time series for all of the variables. First differencing all of 
the variables also ensured the lag order for all the variables was equivalent. 
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Lag Order and Diagnostic Tests 
Before continuing the vector autoregressive analysis, an empirical determination of the 
appropriate lag order must be undertaken (Pfaff, 2008). Therefore, in order to determine the lag 
length this study utilizes the following lag length selection criteria: Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC), Hannan and Quinn (HQ), Schwarz (SC), and the Final Prediction Error (FPE). The 
optimal lag length results for each of these indices is provided in Table 10 below.  
Table 10. Lag Length Selection Criteria Results 
Lags AIC(n) HQ(n) SC(n) FPE(n) 
1 -13.449160 -13.253840 -12.955570 0.000001 
2 -13.309130 -12.996630 -12.519390 0.000002 
3 -13.190890 -12.761200 -12.105000 0.000002 
4 -13.227810 -12.680930 -11.845760 0.000002 
5 -13.050750 -12.386690 -11.372560 0.000002 
6 -13.422990 -12.641740 -11.448640 0.000002 
7 -13.244650 -12.346210 -10.974150 0.000002 
8 -13.277640 -12.262010 -10.710980 0.000002 
Optimal Lag 1 1 1 1 
Note: AIC is the Akaike Information Criteria; HQ is Hannan and Quinn; SC is Sschwarz; and FPE is Final 
Prediction Error.  
 
As shown in Table 10, the four selection criteria resulted in the same optimal lag length 
of 1. The optimal lag model was tested for a variety of assumption checks to include the absence 
of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and normal distribution of the error process (Pfaff, 
2008). In addition, non-linearity was tested for utilizing the NLS function in R. As Table 11 
below displays all non-linear relationships were found to be not significant, indicating none of 
the proposed relationships were non-linear.  
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Table 11. Non-Linearity Results 
Formula β Std. Error t-value Probability 
SysRisk→ SHW α0 -3.18333   α0 0.56133   
α1 0.02909 
α0  -5.671  
α1 1.309 
α0  p = 2.59  
α1  p = 0.195 α1 0.03808 
BrndDiv→ SHW α0 -2.8313   
α1 -0.8178 
α0 1.0359   
α1 2.7642 
α0 -2.733   
α1 -0.296 
α0 p = 0.008   
α1 p = 0.768 
SysRisk→ BrndDiv α0 -0.9712   
α1 -0.0051 
α0 0.0527   
α1 0.006 
α0 -18.429   
α1 -0.752 
α0 p < 0.001   
α1 p = 0.455 
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk. 
 
Furthermore, Table 12 below displays the results of the different diagnostic or 
assumption tests for the optimal lag model.  
Table 12. Lag Model Diagnostic Test Results 
Optimal Lag Test χ2 df Probability 
P = 1 Portmanteau (Asymp) 148.36 135 ρ = 0.2038 
 Portmanteau (Adjst) 167.86 135 ρ = 0.0289 
 ARCH VAR 150.47 180 ρ = 0.9468 
 JB VAR 359.58 6 ρ < 0.01 
 Kurtosis 279.05 3 ρ < 0.01 
 Skewness 80.534 3 ρ < 0.01 
Note: Portmanteau (Asymp) is the Portmanteau asymptotic statistic; Portmanteau (Adjst) is the Portmanteau 
adjusted statistic; ARCH VAR is the multivariate ARCH-LM test; JB VAR is the Jarque-Bera test for multivariate 
series. 
 
The Portmanteau test was utilized to test the lack of a serial correlation in the errors of 
the VAR(1) model (Pfaff, 2008). Specifically, two types of Portmanteau tests were utilized, the 
asymptotic and adjusted. The null hypothesis H0 for the Portmanteau tests is that there is a lack 
of serial correlation among the VAR(1) model residuals (Pfaff, 2008). As shown in Table 12, at 
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an optimal lag order of 1 the Portmanteau asymptotic (χ2 (135) = 148.36, ρ = 0.2038) does not 
reject the null hypothesis. In addition the Portmanteau adjusted (χ2 (135) = 167.86, ρ = 0.0289) 
does not reject the null hypotheses at the 0.01% level, therefore the test results indicate that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected and the VAR(1) model does not violate the assumption. 
 In order to test the assumption of heteroscedasticity of the error variances the 
multivariate ARCH-LM test was utilized (Pfaff, 2008). According to the results shown in Table 
12, at an optimal lag order of 1 the ARCH-LM (χ2 (180) = 150.47, ρ = 0.9468) indicates the 
assumption of heteroscedasticity is not violated. Therefore, in the case of each VAR(1) model, 
homoscedasticity is present. In other words, there is an equal variance of the dependent error 
terms across the range of the predictor variables.  
To test the normality of the residual distributions, the Jarque-Bera multivariate normality 
test was implemented and applied to the residuals of the VAR(1) model (Pfaff, 2008). In 
addition, separate tests for multivariate skewness and kurtosis were utilized. As shown in Table 
12, at an optimal lag order of 1 the JB VAR (χ2 (6) = 359.58, ρ < 0.01) indicates the null 
hypothesis is rejected and therefore the assumption of normality is violated. For the VAR(1) 
model the kurtosis (χ2 (3) = 279.05, ρ < 0.01) and the skewness (χ2 (3) = 80.534, ρ < 0.01) also 
indicate the lack of normality.  
Based on the assumption checks the VAR(1) model passed the assumptions of lack of 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, however it failed to meet the normality assumption. 
Therefore, structural stability and fluctuations of the VAR(1) model is investigated. The OLS-
CUSUM test was applied to the three VAR(1) model to investigate the structural stability of the 
series. The OLS-CUSUM graphical results for the VAR(1) model is provided in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. OLS-CUSUM Graphical Results for VAR(1) Model 
 
A visual inspection of the OLS-CUSUM results for the VAR(1) model in the above 
figure, suggests that the model displays stability and the process is stationary. The next step 
involves developing a cointegration model for the VAR(1) model in order to make a 
determination on the rank order of integration for the study.  
Cointegration 
The concept of cointegration was introduced in 1981 by Granger (1981), and proposes to 
“find a linear combination between two I(d) variables that yields a variable with a lower order of 
integration” (Pfaff, 2008, pg. 75). Therefore, the concept of cointegration allows for the detection 
of stable long-run relationships among non-stationary variables (Pfaff, 2008). In order to test the 
105 
study’s hypotheses the chosen VAR(1) model must be cointegrated. In order to test the 
cointegration of the series the Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration test was utilized. The null 
hypothesis for the Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration test is that the series is not cointegrated. 
According to Pfaff (2008) it is advised to employ the Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration test due to 
its irrelevancy to normalization. The result of the Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration test (Phillips-
Ouliaris demeaned = -90.739, ρ = 0.01) indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected and 
therefore the series are cointegrated. In addition, the Johansen and Juselius procedure based on 
trace and max-eigenvalue tests was conducted to investigate the cointegration. Table 13 below 
provides a comparison of results of the rank order for cointegration for the lag order of 1.  
Table 13. Cointegration Rank Order Results  
    P = 1 10% 5% 1% 
ei
g
en
 r <= 2  32.43 10.49 12.25 16.26 
r <= 1  50.48 16.85 18.96 23.65 
r = 0   57.96 23.11 25.54 30.34 
P = 1  Eigenvalues (λ) 0.54793 0.49920 0.35868 0.00000  
tr
a
ce
 r <= 2  32.43 10.49 12.25 16.26 
r <= 1  82.91 22.76 25.32 30.45 
r = 0   140.87 39.06 42.44 48.45 
P = 1  Eigenvalues (λ) 0.54793 0.49920 0.35868 0.00000  
 
As shown in Table 13, the results for the lag order of 1 is a cointegration rank of r =1. 
For both eigen and trace, the rank of r ≤ 1 is significant for P = 1 at the 1% α error. 
Consequently, considering the results of the assumption checks and the results of the 
cointegration rank order the study utilizes the VAR(1) model to test the hypotheses. As 
previously mentioned the VAR(1) model passed the assumptions of lack of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity and displays stability.  
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In Table 14 below the cointegration relation matrix (β matrix) and the weights or loading 
matrix (α matrix) are displayed for the VAR(1) model. A review of the table shows the variables 
are cointegrated. The error correction term displays a long-run relationship between shareholder 
wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk. Specifically, brand diversification achieves 
cointegration with shareholder wealth at (β = 5.8478). Whereas, brand diversification achieves 
cointegration with systematic risk at (β = -1.3767). Systematic risk and shareholder wealth are 
cointegrated at (β = 0.5544). Furthermore, systematic risk achieves cointegration with brand 
diversification at (β = 0.0559). The negative and large α in the error correction model for 
shareholder wealth implies that a change in shareholder wealth will be negative in time period t 
as a form of mean reversion in response to a disequilibria. The lower α for brand diversification 
suggests that brand diversification does not respond to an unusually large error correction term in 
time period t-1, since the decision to divest is complex and drives brand diversification. The 
negative α for systematic risk suggests that systematic risk falls in time period t if the error 
correction term is too large in time period t-1. This suggests that a high error correction term 
leads to lower risk, however the effect is small and may not be significant.  
Table 14. Cointegration Relation Matrix for VAR(1) 
  ShW.l1 BrndDiv.l1 SysRisk.l1 trend.l1 
β (Cointegration Relations Matrix) 
ShW.l1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BrndDiv.l1 5.8478 -4.4676 -1.3767 -3.1913 
SysRisk.l1 0.5544 0.0559 -2.2524 0.1524 
trend.l1 0.0017 -0.0018 0.0005 -0.0880 
α (Weights or Loading Matrix) 
ShW.d -0.7120 -0.6299 -0.1033 0.0000 
BrndDiv.d -0.0912 0.1316 -0.0146 0.0000 
SysRisk.d -0.1927 -0.4648 0.4640 0.0000 
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk. 
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Granger Causality 
The Granger causality test is most commonly utilized in time-series analysis to detect 
causalities between variables (Pfaff, 2008). Granger causality implies that two variables follow a 
similar temporal ordering or predictability such that one variable can be utilized to help predict 
the other variable (Pfaff, 2008). In other words, Granger causality is defined as “if knowledge of 
past (variable) x reduces the variance of the errors in forecasting the (variable) y beyond the 
variance of the errors which would be made from knowledge of past y alone” (Schwert, 1977, 
pg. 56). Under instantaneous causality the current and the past values of the variable x are 
utilized to predict the variable y. In this study both Granger and instantaneous types of causality 
are tested for (Pfaff, 2008). The null hypotheses for the tests are H0
Granger that the variables do not 
granger-cause each other and H0
Instantaneous the variables do not display instantaneous causality. 
Table 15 below provides the results for the Granger and instantaneous causality tests.  
Table 15. Granger and Instantaneous Causality Tests Results 
From   To Test F or χ2 df Probability 
BrndDiv → ShW, SysRisk Granger causality 0.70979 2, 198 ρ = 0.493 
   Instantaneous causality 16.176 2 ρ < 0.001 
SysRisk → ShW, BrndDiv Granger causality 0.36273 2, 198 ρ = 0.696 
   Instantaneous causality 11.841 2 ρ < 0.05 
ShW → SysRisk, BrndDiv Granger causality 0.21476 2, 198 ρ = 0.8069 
   Instantaneous causality 9.6403 2 ρ < 0.05 
SysRisk, BrndDiv → ShW Granger causality 0.70934 2, 198 ρ = 0.4932 
      Instantaneous causality 9.6403 2 ρ < 0.05 
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk. 
 
As shown in Table 15, for the proposed relationship in which brand diversification 
predicts shareholder wealth and systematic risk (BrndDiv → ShW, SysRisk), the results of the 
Granger causality test (F (2, 198) = 0.70979, ρ = 0.493) did not reject the null hypothesis and 
therefore shows no granger causality. However, the results for the instantaneous causality for this 
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relationship (χ2 (2) = 16.176, ρ < 0.001) did reject the null hypothesis at α error level of 1%, 
indicating there is instantaneous causality among the variables. For the relationship in which 
systematic risk predicts shareholder wealth and brand diversification (SysRisk → ShW, 
BrndDiv) the Granger causality results (F (2, 198) = 0.36273, ρ = 0.696) did not show granger 
causality. The results for the instantaneous causality for the (SysRisk → ShW, BrndDiv) 
relationship (χ2 (2) = 11.841, ρ < 0.05) did reject the null hypothesis at an α error level of 5%, 
which indicates there is instantaneous causality. For the relationship in which shareholder wealth 
predicts systematic risk and brand diversification (ShW → SysRisk, BrndDiv) the results for 
Granger causality (F (2, 198) = 0.21476, ρ = 0.8069) also did not show granger causality. In 
addition, the results for the instantaneous causality for this relationship (χ2 (2) = 9.6403, ρ < 0.05 
indicates there is instantaneous causality among the variables. For the relationship in which 
systematic risk and brand diversification predict shareholder wealth (SysRisk, BrndDiv → ShW) 
the results for Granger causality (F (2 198) = 0.70934, ρ = 0.4932) did not dismiss the null 
hypothesis, therefore showing no granger causality. However, the results for the instantaneous 
causality for this relation (χ2 (2) = 9.6403, ρ < 0.05) rejects the null hypothesis at α error level of 
5%, which indicates there is instantaneous causality among the variables. These results show 
there is no Granger causality among any of the study’s hypothesized relationships, implying the 
results are not significantly different from zero. The insignificance of the phi’s for the variables 
suggests that there are no short-run dynamic adjustments, which is in line with the efficient 
market hypothesis for shareholder wealth. In addition, this result corroborates the lack of 
autocorrelation among the decisions to commit a divestiture for Brinker.  Furthermore, the 
hypothesized relationships show instantaneous causality or short-term effects. The next step in 
the analysis is to further investigate the short-term effects.  
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OLS Regression 
In order to investigate the study’s hypothesized short-term relationships two VAR(1) 
models were estimated, one model with the divestiture event dummy variable and one without 
the variable. However, within both models a dummy variable was included for seasonal impacts 
due to the utilization of quarterly data, with the fourth season being the baseline. Each version of 
the VAR(1) model was run three times with each of the study’s variables, shareholder wealth, 
brand diversification, and systematic risk, as a dependent variable. Table 16 below outlines the 
results of the OLS regressions for each version of the VAR(1) model with systematic risk as the 
dependent variable. 
 
Table 16. OLS Regression Results for Systematic Risk as Dependent 
Dep: SysRisk β Std. Error t-value Probability β Std. Error t-value Probability 
ShW.l1 -0.1292 0.2020 -0.640 ρ = 0.525 -0.1545 0.1996 -0.774 ρ = 0.442 
BrndDiv.l1 0.3436 1.1816 0.291 ρ = 0.772 0.3798 1.1642 0.326 ρ = 0.745 
SysRisk.l1 -0.2309 0.1314 -1.756 ρ < 0.10 -0.1989 0.1308 -1.522 ρ = 0.133 
(Constant) -0.0529 0.0647 -0.817 ρ = 0.417 -0.0712 0.0646 -1.102 ρ = 0.275 
Trend 0.0010 0.0015 0.659 ρ = 0.512 0.0010 0.0015 0.675 ρ = 0.502 
sd1 0.0758 0.0893 0.848 ρ = 0.399 0.0566 0.0887 0.638 ρ = 0.526 
sd2 -0.0266 0.0879 -0.303 ρ = 0.763 -0.0462 0.0874 -0.529 ρ = 0.599 
sd3 0.0045 0.0892 0.051 ρ = 0.959 0.0094 0.0879 0.107 ρ = 0.915 
Dum (Divstr) - - - - 0.1749 0.1008 1.734 ρ < 0.10 
F (7, 66) 0.9694 ρ = 0.4608   F (8, 65) 1.25 ρ = 0.2851  
R2 0.0932       R2 0.1333     
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Divstr is divestiture, 
sd is the seasonal impact; l1 is the first lag; l2 is the second lag. 
 
As shown in Table 16, the model without considering divestitures is not significant (F (7, 
66) = 0.9694, ρ = 0.4608) and only explains 9.32% of the variations in systematic risk (R2 = 
0.0932). The only significant predictor is systematic risk (β = -0.2309, ρ < 0.10). The model with 
divestitures has a similar result (F (8, 65) = 1.25, ρ = 0.2851) but explains 13.33% of the 
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systematic risk variations. In this model the only significant predictor is divestitures (β = 0.1749, 
ρ < 0.10). Next, the two VAR(1) models were run with brand diversification as the dependent 
with the results shown in Table 17 below.  
 
Table 17. OLS Regression Results for Brand Diversification as Dependent 
Dep: BrndDiv β Std. Error t-value Probability β Std. Error t-value Probability 
ShW.l1 0.0036 0.0241 0.149 ρ = 0.882 0.0135 0.0176 0.767 ρ = 0.446 
BrndDiv.l1 -0.0011 0.1407 -0.008 ρ = 0.994 -0.0153 0.1026 -0.149 ρ = 0.882 
SysRisk.l1 0.0072 0.0157 0.460 ρ = 0.647 -0.0053 0.0115 -0.457 ρ = 0.649 
(Constant) 0.0091 0.0077 1.185 ρ = 0.240 0.0163 0.0057 2.864 ρ < 0.01 
Trend -0.0004 0.0002 -1.945 ρ < 0.10 -0.0004 0.0001 -2.698 ρ < 0.01 
sd1 -0.0156 0.0106 -1.462 ρ = 0.148 -0.0080 0.0078 -1.030 ρ = 0.307 
sd2 -0.0083 0.0105 -0.795 ρ = 0.429 -0.0007 0.0077 -0.086 ρ = 0.932 
sd3 -0.0108 0.0106 -1.018 ρ = 0.312 -0.0127 0.0077 -1.645 ρ = 0.105 
Dum (Divstr) - - - - -0.0684 0.0089 -7.700 ρ < 0.001 
F (7, 66) 0.9725 ρ = 0.459   F (8, 65) 9.014 ρ < 0.001  
R2 0.0935       R2 0.5259     
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Divstr is divestiture, 
sd is the seasonal impact; l1 is the first lag; l2 is the second lag. 
 
As seen in Table 17, the OLS regression model without divestitures is not significant (F 
(7, 66) = 0.9725, ρ = 0.459) and only explains 9.35% (R2 = 0.0935) of the variations in brand 
diversification. However, the OLS regression model with divestitures is significant F (8, 65) = 
9.014, ρ < 0.001) and explains 52.59% (R2 = 0.5259) of the variations in brand diversification. A 
significant predictor of brand diversification is divestitures (β = -0.0684, ρ < 0.001). In addition, 
for the model without divestitures trend (β = -0.0004, ρ < 0.10) is found to be significant. When 
considering divestitures trend (β = -0.0004, ρ < 0.01) is also significant. Therefore, brand 
diversification is negatively impacted by the completion of a divestiture and time. The last OLS 
regression model utilizes shareholder wealth as the dependent as shown in Table 18 below.  
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Table 18. OLS Regression Results for Shareholder Wealth as Dependent 
Dep: ShW β Std. Error t-value Probability β Std. Error t-value Probability 
ShW.l1 -0.2256 0.1221 -1.847 ρ < 0.10 -0.2017 0.1166 -1.731 ρ < 0.10 
BrndDiv.l1 -0.8502 0.7141 -1.191 ρ = 0.238 -0.8843 0.6799 -1.300 ρ = 0.198 
SysRisk.l1 -0.0385 0.0794 -0.485 ρ = 0.629 -0.0685 0.0764 -0.897 ρ = 0.373 
(Constant) 0.0191 0.0391 0.488 ρ = 0.627 0.0364 0.0377 0.964 ρ = 0.339 
Trend 0.0001 0.0009 0.137 ρ = 0.892 0.0001 0.0009 0.133 ρ = 0.894 
sd1 0.0512 0.0539 0.948 ρ = 0.347 0.0693 0.0518 1.337 ρ = 0.186 
sd2 0.1002 0.0531 1.885 ρ < 0.10 0.1186 0.0510 2.324 ρ < 0.05 
sd3 0.0227 0.0539 0.421 ρ = 0.675 0.0181 0.0513 0.352 ρ = 0.726 
Dum (Divstr) - - - - -0.1646 0.0589 -2.796 ρ < 0.01 
F (7, 66) 1.592 ρ = 0.153   F (8, 65) 2.514 ρ < 0.05  
R2 0.1445       R2 0.2363     
Note: ShW is shareholder wealth; BrndDiv is brand diversification; SysRisk is systematic risk; Divstr is divestiture, 
sd is the seasonal impact; l1 is the first lag; l2 is the second lag. 
 
As shown in Table 18, the model without considering divestitures is not significant (F (7, 
66) = 1.592, ρ = 0.153) and explains 14.45% of the variations in shareholder wealth (R2 = 
0.1445). One of the only significant predictors is shareholder wealth (β = -0.2256, ρ < 0.10). In 
addition, the seasonal impact for the second quarter is found to be significant (β = 0.1002, ρ < 
0.10). The model with divestitures is found to be significant (F (8, 65) = 2.514, ρ < 0.05) but 
explains 23.63% of the shareholder wealth variations. The significant predictors are shareholder 
wealth (β = -0.2017, ρ < 0.10), divestitures (β = -0.1646, ρ < 0.01), and the seasonal impact for 
the second quarter (β = 0.1186, ρ < 0.05). 
Overall, the results show partial support for some of the study’s hypotheses, as Table 19 
below indicates. The results of a cointegrating vector indicate that there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the variables of brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder 
wealth. In addition, a linear, uni-directional, short-term effect is present for all of the proposed 
relationships. Moreover, divestitures are shown to impact the level of brand diversification, 
systematic risk, and shareholder wealth as predicted. Furthermore, trend is found to have an 
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influence on brand diversification and shareholder wealth. In regards to shareholder wealth 
seasonality is also found to have an influence. A more elaborate discussion of the study’s results 
in terms of each of the proposed hypotheses is provided in Chapter Five.  
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Table 19. Hypotheses and Findings 
Hypothesis Findings 
H1: Brand diversification has a negative bi-directional 
relationship with shareholder wealth when controlling for 
divestiture completions in the short- and long-term. 
Not Supported 
H2: Brand diversification has a positive bi-directional 
relationship with systematic risk when controlling for 
divestiture completions in the short- and long-term. 
Not Supported 
H3: Systematic risk has a negative bi-directional 
relationship with shareholder wealth when controlling for 
divestiture completions in the short- and long-term. 
Not Supported 
H4: Divestiture completion has a positive bi-directional 
relationship with shareholder wealth in the short- and long-
term. 
Not Supported, a negative 
linear relationship in the short-
term was found 
H5: Divestiture completion has a negative bi-directional 
relationship with brand diversification in the short- and 
long-term. 
Partial Support, negative linear 
relationship in short-term was 
found 
H6: Divestiture completion has a positive bi-directional 
relationship with systematic risk in the short- and long-
term. 
Partial Support, positive 
linear relationship in short-term 
was found 
H7: Brand diversification has a non-linear relationship with 
shareholder wealth. 
Not Supported 
H8: Brand diversification has a non-linear relationship with 
systematic risk. 
Not Supported 
H9: Systematic risk has a non-linear relationship with 
shareholder wealth. 
Not Supported 
H10: Divestiture completion has a non-linear relationship 
with brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder 
wealth. 
Not Supported, linear relationship 
with all variables 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
In this chapter the study’s research objectives is recapped and a summary of the results is 
provided. Specifically, a detailed interpretation of the research objectives in terms of the study’s 
findings is presented. In addition, the theoretical and practical implications of the main findings 
on the study’s sample and restaurant industry as a whole are expounded. Then, future research 
suggestions are discussed. Finally, the study concludes with an acknowledgment of the 
limitations.  
Overview of the Study 
The main objective of this study was to assess the relationships of brand diversification 
and systematic risk on shareholder’s wealth subsequent to a divestiture completion. Brand 
diversification has become a prominent strategy in the restaurant industry in order to serve 
markets with a variety of brands, thereby diversifying business (Bahadir et al, 2008).  However, 
the proliferation of diversification strategies have been found in the literature to have varying 
effects on firm financial performance, risk, and shareholder wealth (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; 
Choi, Kang, Lee, & Lee, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2014; Thompson, 1984). In regards to systematic 
risk, the effect of diversification strategies has been suggested to depend on whether the potential 
positive or negative impacts are dominant (Krapl, 2015). The impact of diversification strategies 
on shareholder wealth has also been exposed to have either positive or negative effects from 
various market consequences (Bordley, 2003; Quelch & Kenny, 1994). Moreover, the impact of 
systematic risk on shareholder wealth has traditionally been seen to suggest that higher risk is 
associated with higher shareholder returns, however mismanaged risk can have the opposite 
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effect on shareholder wealth (Barber et al, 2008). In addition, studies in the finance and strategic 
management literature have generally exhibited that the announcement of a divestiture has a 
positive effect on the divesting firm’s stock price, however these results have not been found to 
hold for divestiture completions (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995; Moschieri & Mair, 2005; Owen & 
Yawson, 2008). Therefore, the lack of empirical or theoretical consensus in the literature for the 
proposed relationships between brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth 
and the lack of consideration of divestiture completions in terms of these relationships fueled the 
intention of this study.  
In examining the proposed relationships, the study draws on agency theory as a 
framework that elaborates on the consequences that emanate from the separation of ownership 
and control with shareholders as the unit of analysis. Consequently, the purpose of the study was 
to (1) examine the short- and long-term effect of brand diversification levels on shareholder 
wealth following a divestiture, (2) examine the short- and long-term effect of brand 
diversification levels on systematic risk following a divestiture, (3) investigate the short- and 
long-term effect of systematic risk on shareholder wealth subsequent to a divestiture completion, 
and (4) investigate the short- and long-term impacts of a restaurant firm’s divestiture completion 
on the firms’ level of brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth. The aim of 
the study was accomplished through the utilization of the case study approach that focused on a 
single firm within the restaurant industry. Specifically, utilizing Brinker International, Inc. 
(“Brinker”) as the study’s sample captured the idiosyncratic characteristics of the restaurant 
industry and the frequent occurrence of divestitures in the industry. In addition, the proposed 
relationships under investigation in the study were analyzed through the application of 
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quantitative causal cointegration research design. The following sections will present the study’s 
objectives, as previously listed, with the corresponding hypotheses.  
Objective One: Brand Diversification and Shareholder Wealth 
Examining the short- and long-term effect of brand diversification levels on shareholder 
wealth following a divestiture completion was the first objective for the study. Specifically the 
research question this study aimed to address included an examination into what relationship, 
including its form, may be present between a restaurant firm’s brand diversification and 
shareholder wealth when controlling for divestitures in the short- and long-term. Within the 
marketing literature, shareholder wealth has been found to be impacted by market-based 
marketing investments, such as brands, due to the influence on a firm’s cash flows (Gruca & 
Rego, 2005). In addition, shareholders are seen to recognize brands as assets with changes to a 
firm’s brand portfolio strategy being reflected in the firm’s stock price (Rego, Billett, & Morgan, 
2009). However, within the restaurant industry, brand diversification has been found to 
negatively impact a restaurant firms’ financial performance (Kang & Lee, 2015). Moreover, 
Wiles et al (2012) found lower abnormal stock returns for firms acquiring multiple brands due to 
shareholders’ negative views of a brand portfolio with greater complexity. Furthermore, the 
shares of more diversified firms are seen to sell at a discount, thereby equating diversification to 
the destruction of shareholder wealth (Franko, 2004; Martin & Sayrak, 2003). Consequently, the 
first hypothesis (H1) under the first objective stated that brand diversification has a negative bi-
directional relationship with shareholder wealth when controlling for divestiture completions in 
the short- and long-term.  
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Based on the study’s results the first hypothesis under the first objective (H1) is rejected. 
Due to the existence of a cointegrating vector a long-run equilibrium relationship is found, 
however there are no short-run dynamic adjustments as indicated through the lack of significance 
for Granger causality (F (2, 198) = 0.70979, ρ = 0.493). This result corroborates the market 
efficient hypothesis and suggests that the price of Brinker stock efficiently considers brand 
diversification for the company without a lag. Although the results indicate that a short-term 
relationship is present, as shown through the presence of instantaneous causality (χ2 (2) = 16.176, 
ρ < 0.001). After further examination of the short-term relationship between the variables it is 
discovered that brand diversification has a negative influence on shareholder wealth, indicating 
that greater brand diversification reduces shareholder wealth. However the association is not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, the short-term relationship between brand diversification 
and shareholder wealth is not impacted by the completion of a divestiture. In terms of the 
divestitures conducted by Brinker over the study’s sample period, divestiture completion was 
found to have a significant and negative impact on shareholder wealth, however it did not alter 
the insignificance of the brand diversification-shareholder wealth relationship for Brinker. These 
results imply that divestiture completions do not have the same positive impact on shareholder 
wealth as divestiture announcements have generally been found to have (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 
1995; Moschieri & Mair, 2005; Owen & Yawson, 2008).  
Therefore, the findings, in the case of Brinker, are inclined to support the results of 
previous studies and the traditional viewpoint that greater diversification equates to lower 
shareholder wealth and counters the literature that has concluded greater diversification has 
beneficial outcomes (Bordley, 2003; Franko, 2004; Martin & Sayrak, 2003; Park et al, 1986). 
During the sample time period Brinker on average had a high diversification level, as shown by 
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the average Berry-Herfindahl index of 0.377. The results of this study suggest that, in terms of 
Brinker’s shareholder wealth, a diverse brand portfolio and the proliferation of brands in the 
short-term could have a negative impact on the firm’s stock returns. The implication from this 
finding is that the brand oriented decisions executed by Brinker’s executives have not only 
business-wide implications, as suggested by Petromilli et al (2002), but also shareholder 
implications.  This finding corroborates the findings of Choi et al (2011) and Kang and Lee 
(2015), who found that greater brand diversification negatively impacts a restaurant firm’s 
financial performance. The focus in this study was on shareholder wealth, instead of firm 
financial performance, and furthers the literature by suggesting that greater diversification is 
viewed negatively in the short-term by the market equating to the potential losses of shareholder 
wealth.  
In addition, the findings of this study support an industry exclusive examination of brand 
diversification effects on shareholder wealth. As indicated in chapter two, Wiles et al’s (2012) 
study findings indicated that investors preferred more focused brand portfolios versus portfolios 
with greater diversification. This study’s results are inclined to support the negative impact of 
brand diversification for a restaurant firm, which may be attributed to the markets perception on 
the industry’s idiosyncratic prominence of brands or other unique characteristics. For instance, 
this study also found that seasonality has a significant impact on Brinker shareholder wealth. 
Specifically, Brinker’s second quarter consists of the time period of October 1 to December 31 
and is found to positively influence shareholder wealth. 
The second hypothesis under the first objective (H7) stated that brand diversification has 
a non-linear relationship with shareholder wealth. The hypothesis reasoning was based on the 
restaurant industry’s extensive brand customization for markets, increased brand proliferation, 
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and the conflicting results in the literature concerning a positive or negative impact of brand 
diversification (Martin & Sayrak, 2003). Therefore, a resolution to the conflicting results in the 
literature was hypothesized to be a non-linear relationship between brand diversification and 
shareholder wealth, where different levels of brand diversification have varying impacts on 
shareholder wealth. However, the results of the study indicate that a non-linear relationship 
between the variables is not present. Instead, there is only a linear relationship between brand 
diversification and shareholder wealth. Consequently, the second hypothesis under objective one 
(H7) was not supported and is rejected.  
Objective Two: Brand Diversification and Systematic Risk 
Investigating the short- and long-term effect of brand diversification levels on systematic 
risk following a divestiture completion was the second objective for this study. Specifically the 
research question this study sought to address was what relationship, including its form, is 
present between a restaurant firm’s brand diversification and systematic risk when controlling for 
divestitures in the short- and long-term. The level of diversification for a firm has been shown to 
impact the firm’s systematic risk (Manrai et al, 2014). It has been proposed that firms with 
greater diversification levels experience a reduction in their operating risk and systematic risk, 
however higher diversification levels have also been found to simultaneously increase leverage 
for firms thereby augmenting systematic risk (Manrai et al, 2014). A review of the literature 
examining the impact of diversification levels on systematic risk has provided inconclusive 
results on whether higher diversification has positive or negative influences on a firm’s 
systematic risk (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Choi et al, 2011; Kang & Lee, 2014; Thompson, 1984).  
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Earlier research indicated that higher degrees of diversification have the effect of 
lowering risk for firms (Hughes et al, 1975). However, later research has shown a risk increasing 
impact of higher levels of diversification on a firm’s systematic risk due to various repercussions 
of the diversification, including exposure to costly operating environments (Krapl, 2015; Michel 
& Shaked, 1986; Reeb et al, 1998; Thompson, 1984). In addition, under agency theory it is 
suggested that executives employ mergers and acquisitions to increase a firm’s diversification in 
order to decrease their employment risk, which may conflict with the shareholders’ interests 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981). Moreover, various characteristics that are unique to the restaurant 
industry, such as changes in consumer spending patterns, cost of food products, and 
governmental regulations, make the industry inherently risky (Barber et al, 2008). Consequently, 
the first hypothesis under the second objective (H2) stated that brand diversification has a 
positive bi-directional relationship with systematic risk when controlling for divestiture 
completions in the short- and long-term. 
Based on the study results the first hypothesis under the second objective (H2) is not 
supported. The result of a cointegrating vector displays a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the variables and the lack of significance for Granger causality (F (2, 198) = 0.70979, ρ 
= 0.493) suggests no short-term dynamic adjustments. Second, as previously stated the results 
indicate that an overall short-term relationship is present, as shown through the presence of 
instantaneous causality (χ2 (2) = 16.176, ρ < 0.001). However, after further investigation into the 
short-term relationships between the individual variables through OLS regressions it was 
discovered that brand diversification and systematic risk do not have a statistically significant 
short-term relationship. Although the association between the two variables is positive, 
indicating greater brand diversification increases systematic risk, it is not statistically significant. 
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Furthermore, the divestiture completions conducted by Brinker were found to have a positive and 
significant impact on systematic risk, however this did not alter the brand diversification-
systematic risk relationship.   
As previously noted, an empirical investigation of the direct effect of a firm’s level of 
brand diversification on its systematic risk is non-existent within the literature. Within the 
hospitality literature, various studies have shown that numerous firm specific characteristics, 
including liquidity, leverage, and firm size, have an impact on the firm’s systematic risk (Borde, 
1998). However, this study’s results indicate that, in the case of Brinker, the firm’s level of brand 
diversification does not significantly impact its systematic risk. There may be various potential 
explanations for this outcome, including a differentiation between brand diversification and 
corporate or market diversification, which has been shown in the literature to significantly 
impact a firm’s risk (Manrai et al, 2014). In particular, corporate or market diversification entails 
firms entering into unrelated lines of business or markets that would result in imperfectly 
correlated streams of income. However, within the restaurant industry brand diversification is a 
unique combination between related diversification into different segments and a strategy of 
brand proliferation to market several brands for comparable products (Choi et al, 2011). Thus, 
the results of this study suggest that due to lack of sufficient alteration between lines of business 
or markets, brand diversification does not significantly impact the restaurant firm’s stock 
volatility that is due to changes in market-level economic factors.  
Due to the conflicting results reported in the literature on whether a firm’s diversification 
levels have positive or negative impacts on its systematic risk, it was hypothesized that a non-
linear relationship may exist. Therefore, the second hypothesis under the second objective (H8) 
stated that brand diversification has a non-linear relationship with systematic risk. This 
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hypothesis was considered a potential resolution to the conflicting literature results, where 
different levels of brand diversification have varying impacts on systematic risk. However, the 
results of the study indicate that a non-linear relationship between brand diversification and 
systematic risk is not present. Instead, there is only a linear relationship between the variables. 
Consequently, the second hypothesis under objective two (H8) was not supported and is rejected. 
Objective Three: Systematic Risk and Shareholder Wealth 
Investigating the short- and long-term effect of a restaurant firm’s systematic risk on 
shareholder wealth following a divestiture completion was the third objective for this study. 
Specifically the research question pursued by the study was what relationship, including its form, 
is present between a restaurant firm’s systematic risk and shareholder wealth when controlling 
for divestitures in the short- and long-term. Traditionally, the literature has linked systematic risk 
with a reduction in shareholder wealth (Barber et al, 2008). Therefore, corporate executives are 
advised to execute strategies that reduce firm risk in order to maximize shareholder wealth 
(Brenner & Smidt, 1978). Moreover, a disproportionateness in available information between 
firm executives and shareholders is seen, under agency theory, to occasion increased managerial 
risk-taking (Kim & Mathur, 2008). This is considered problematic due to mismanaged risk 
resulting in a greater chance of financial distress for firms and a reduction in shareholder returns 
(Borde, 1998). Furthermore, the restaurant industry has numerous characteristic risks that 
influence the operations and financial stability of firms, such as variations in consumer spending 
patterns and governmental regulations (Barber et al, 2008). Consequently, the first hypothesis 
under the third objective of the study (H3) stated that systematic risk has a negative bi-
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directional relationship with shareholder wealth when controlling for divestiture completions in 
the short- and long-term. 
Based on the study’s results the first hypothesis under the third objective (H3) is not 
supported. Again, a long-run equilibrium relationship was found with no short-run dynamic 
adjustments due to the existence of a cointegrating vector and through the lack of significance 
for Granger causality (F (2, 198) = 0.36273, ρ = 0.696). In regards to systematic risk predicting 
shareholder wealth a short-term relationship is present, as shown through the presence of 
instantaneous causality (χ2 (2) = 11.841, ρ < 0.05).  Although further investigation into the short-
term relationship through the OLS regressions performed demonstrate the lack of a significant 
short-term relationship between systematic risk and shareholder wealth. Furthermore, the Brinker 
divestiture completions performed during the sample time period, although significantly 
impacting shareholder wealth, were found to not have an impact on the proposed systematic risk-
shareholder wealth relationship.   
Within the hospitality literature a firm’s systematic risk has been found to be negatively 
correlated with the firm’s asset turnover, profitability, and liquidity ((Barber et al, 2008; Gu & 
Kim, 2002; Kim et al, 2007). The results of this study, in terms of Brinker, show that the 
restaurant firm’s systematic risk does have a negative association with shareholder wealth during 
the sample time period, however it is not statistically significant. Therefore, the results are 
inclined to support the literature and suggests that higher levels of systematic risk are linked to a 
reduction in shareholder wealth (Barber et al, 2008). Over the sample time period Brinker had an 
average systematic risk that was more risky than the market, as indicated through the average 
beta of 1.068. This suggests that the Brinker stock during the time period moved with the market 
but with greater sensitivity. Since corporate executives are advised to execute policies and 
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strategies to reduce firm risk (Brenner & Smidt, 1978), the results suggest that during the sample 
time period some of the corporate decisions increased risk rather than alleviated it.  
A non-linear relationship was rationalized and investigated in the study due to the 
potential impact of systematic risk influencing shareholder wealth up to a certain point. A non-
linear relationship was examined since modern financial theory posits that greater risk is linked 
to greater shareholder returns, however it’s been suggested that a firm’s mismanaged risk can 
lead to a reduction in shareholder returns (Barber et al, 2008). Therefore, the second hypothesis 
under the third objective (H9) stated that systematic risk has a non-linear relationship with 
shareholder wealth. However, the results of the study indicate that a non-linear relationship 
between systematic risk and shareholder wealth does not exist. Consequently, the second 
hypothesis under objective three (H9) was not supported and is rejected. 
Objective Four: Divestiture Completions 
An investigation into the impact of divestitures on shareholder wealth, brand 
diversification, and systematic risk in the short- and long-term was the fourth study objective. 
Specifically the research question under this objective was aimed at determining what impact a 
divestiture completion has on a restaurant firm’s shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and 
systematic risk in the short- and long-term. Some studies within finance and strategic 
management literature have shown the announcement of a divestiture can have a positive effect 
on the divesting firm’s stock price on the announcement date, as well as before and after the date 
(Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995; Moschieri & Mair, 2005; Owen & Yawson, 2008). In addition, under 
agency theory the rationalization for the value effects of divestitures is that a decrease in the 
diversification of the parent firm realigns the interests of the executives and shareholders (Afshar 
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et al, 1992; John & Ofek, 1995; Moschieri, 2011; Moschieri & Mair, 2005). However, it has 
been suggested that firm executives do not pursue a divestiture until they anticipate a threat of an 
acquisition or are compelled by shareholders of the firm to divest (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). 
Therefore, the first hypothesis under the fourth objective (H4) stated that divestiture completion 
has a positive bi-directional relationship with shareholder wealth in the short- and long-term. 
Agency theory posits that corporate executives participate in managerial opportunism by 
seeking greater diversification in order to accomplish their self-interests, including securing their 
positions with the firm by making investments that require their particular skills (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1989). The streamline of corporate brand portfolios from the elimination of non-strategic 
brands is suggested to benefit the firm by providing an opportunity for augmented efficiency in 
the allocation of financial and infrastructure resources (Varadarajan et al, 2006), reducing the 
cannibalization of sales and cash flows (Bahadir et al, 2008), and lower transaction and 
advertising costs (Morgan & Rego, 2009; Schwandt, 2009). Consequently, the second hypothesis 
under the fourth objective (H5) stated that divestiture completion has a negative bi-directional 
relationship with brand diversification in the short- and long-term. 
In regards to the direct relationship between divestitures and risk the literature is scarce in 
the finance and strategic management fields and non-existent in the hospitality field. The studies 
that have been conducted in the literature suggest that lower diversification subsequent to a 
divestiture results in an increase to the firm’s systematic risk. For instance, Madura and Murdock 
(2012) found that generally subsequent to a divestiture the divesting parent firm suffered from an 
increase in its shareholder risk. Lubatkin and O’Neill’s (1987) study suggested that firms 
undertake mergers and acquisitions in order to reduce the firm’s risk. Specifically, mergers of 
firms related to the acquiring parent’s core business had the result of increasing the firm’s 
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diversification and reducing its levels of systematic risk (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). Therefore, 
the third hypothesis under the fourth objective (H6) stated divestiture completion has a positive 
bi-directional relationship with systematic risk in the short- and long-term. 
In terms of the divestitures conducted by Brinker over the study’s sample period, 
divestiture completion was not found to potentially be a resolution to management and owner 
inconsistencies in corporate strategy, as suggested under agency theory. Instead, divestitures 
were found to negatively and significantly impact shareholder wealth (β = -0.1646, ρ < 0.01). 
Moreover, although the Brinker stock experienced an average positive return of 2.575% over the 
sample time period, the short-term effect of divestiture completions was found to be negative in 
terms of shareholder wealth. These results imply that divestiture completions do not have the 
same impact on shareholder wealth as divestiture announcements have generally been found to 
have (Kaiser & Stouraitis, 1995; Moschieri & Mair, 2005; Owen & Yawson, 2008). Instead 
divestiture completions negatively impact shareholder wealth, whereas announcements have 
been found to have a positive impact (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). In addition, this result suggests 
that divestiture completion does not realign the interests of corporate executives and shareholders 
as proposed under agency theory.  The results of this study counter the findings of Afshar et al 
(1992) and finds that restaurant firm divestiture completion has a negative impact on a firm’s 
stock in the short-term, thereby rejecting hypothesis four (H4).  
Moreover, the study’s results indicate that divestiture completion has a negative and 
significant impact on brand diversification. Specifically, the findings displayed a negative and 
significant short-term relationship between divestiture completion and brand diversification (β = 
-0.0684, ρ < 0.001). Therefore, hypothesis five (H5) is partially supported by the study’s 
findings. Moreover, the OLS regression model with brand diversification and divestitures 
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resulted in a significant and negative trend (β = -0.0004, ρ <0.01). These results show that for 
Brinker, brand diversification is negatively impacted by divestitures and time.  
Moreover, divestitures were found to have a positive and significant relationship with 
systematic risk (β = 0.1749, ρ < 0.10), suggesting that systematic risk increases after divestiture 
completion. These results corroborate the findings of Mandura and Murdock (2012) that 
following a divestiture the divesting parent firm experiences an increase in its shareholder risk. 
In addition, the results of this study found that an equity beta measure of systematic risk does 
have a statistically significant impact, whereas Madura and Murdock (2012) found that only the 
asset beta measure of systematic risk had a statistically significant increase following a 
divestiture (Madura & Murdock, 2012). In regards to Brinker, this study displays that spin-off, 
carve-out, and sell-off types of divestitures have a negative impact on the restaurant firm’s 
systematic risk. The results suggest that greater diversification does have beneficial 
consequences for a firm and subsequently systematic risk, such as the reduction in a firm’s cash 
flow volatility as suggested by Amihud and Lev (1981). Consequently, hypothesis six (H6) is 
partially supported by the study’s results.   
In addition, there has been conflicting reports in the literature in regards to the impact of 
divestitures on a firm’s shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk. For 
instance, Woo et al (1992) found that divestitures result in a neutral or no significant 
improvement in the performance outcomes of firms. Moreover, the inconclusive results in the 
literature in regards to divestitures and brand diversification have shown that divestitures of 
brands can have multiple implications, with some studies indicating positive outcomes (Pandey 
et al, 2010; Rao et al, 2004) and others displaying negative results (Dung, 2012; Morgan & 
Rego, 2009) from the deletion of brands.  Furthermore, in the literature there has been a lack of 
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consideration in regards to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the restaurant industry, including 
its highly competitive market with multiple segments. Due to these conflicting findings in the 
literature, it was hypothesized that a non-linear relationship may exist between divestiture 
completion and shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk. Therefore, the last 
hypothesis under the fourth objective (H10) stated that divestiture completion has a non-linear 
relationship with shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk. This hypothesis 
was considered a potential resolution to the conflicting literature results. However, the results of 
the study indicate that there is no non-linear relationship between divestiture completion and the 
other variables of shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk. Consequently, 
the last hypothesis under objective four (H10) was not supported and is rejected. 
Overall Model 
This study sought to address a gap in the literature, specifically the hospitality literature, 
by developing an understanding of the effect of a firm’s resulting brand diversification levels and 
systematic risk on shareholder wealth when controlling for a divestiture completion. The 
restaurant industry has pervasively utilized brand diversification strategies due to persistent 
growth in the industry (Choi et al, 2011); however existing literature lacks a theoretical or 
empirical consensus on effects of diversification strategies on firm financial performance, risk, 
and shareholder wealth (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Choi, Kang, Lee, & Lee, 2011; Kang & Lee, 
2014; Thompson, 1984). Figure 10 below provides the results of the short-term relationships 
between brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth.  
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Figure 8. Research Model 
 
This study sought to establish whether within the restaurant industry divestitures operate 
as a realignment tool for executive and shareholders’ interests, as suggested under agency theory. 
The results of the study, as mentioned in Chapter Four, justify a greater investigation into the 
impact of divestiture completion on restaurant firm’s brand diversification, systematic risk, and 
shareholder wealth. A long-run equilibrium relationship between brand diversification, 
systematic risk, and shareholder wealth with no short-run dynamic adjustments is found as 
shown through the cointegrating vector and lack of significance for Granger causality. The 
overall short-term model, as shown in figure 10, with shareholder wealth as the dependent and 
controlling for divestiture completion, was found to be significant and explained 23.63% of the 
variance in Brinker’s shareholder wealth. Specifically, divestiture completion was found to have 
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a negative impact on brand diversification and shareholder wealth and a positive relationship 
with systematic risk in the short-term.  
As previously mentioned in Chapter Two, in the literature a divestiture announcement 
has been found to effect shareholder’s wealth positively and significantly greater than zero (Cao 
et al, 2008). The results of this study, however, suggest that within the restaurant industry the 
market views divestiture completion as harmful to shareholders. In other words, divestiture 
completion impacts the worth of a company’s stock to a shareholder. Since shareholder wealth is 
seen to be determined by the degree and certainty of the cash flow the stock will generate for the 
shareholder in the future (Brigham & Daves, 2010), a divestiture completion for a firm is seen to 
reflect a lesser degree of cash flow generation. Therefore, divestiture completion was found in 
this study to be damaging for the stock of the casual dining restaurant firm, Brinker.  
Furthermore, divestiture completion was found to have a negative and significant 
relationship with Brinker’s brand diversification in the short-term, which demonstrates that the 
occurrence of a divestiture reduced the firm’s level of diversification. However, divestiture 
completion was found to have a positive relationship with Brinker’s systematic risk in the short-
term. Therefore, after a divestiture completion in the short-term Brinker’s systematic risk levels 
increased, meaning the firm was more sensitive to changes in the market. This corroborates the 
notion that divestitures affect the corporate strategies that executives implement and the scope of 
operations, which in turn impacts the firm’s level of risk (Madura & Murdock, 2012). Moreover 
the subsequent reduction in brand diversification may result in increased cash flow volatility, 
thereby increasing the firm’s risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
The proposed brand diversification relationship with shareholder wealth was found to be 
negative but not significant. This finding suggests that increased brand diversification will 
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negatively impact shareholder wealth, similar to the negative impact that has been found for 
restaurant firm financial performance (Choi et al, 2011). Therefore, as Wiles et al (2012) 
suggested, shareholders for Brinker may also negatively view a larger brand portfolio. Another 
potential explanation for this result is that shareholders view higher levels of diversification to 
result in greater agency problems from higher discretionary power and less oversight, as 
suggested by Farooqi et al (2014). In regards to the proposed relationship between brand 
diversification and systematic risk, this study found the association to be positive but not 
significant. Consequently, this study found no statistically significant relationship between 
Brinker’s level of brand diversification and systematic risk. On average Brinker had a higher 
systematic risk level of 1.068 during the study’s sample time period, indicating that Brinker’s 
stock moved in the same direction as the market but with more risk.  However, the study results 
do not indicate that the systematic risk levels for Brinker were impacted by its brand 
diversification, unlike the findings of prior studies with other forms of diversification (Manrai et 
al, 2014). Although the association between the two variables is found to be negative, indicating 
greater diversification is not a means of risk reduction for Brinker. Moreover, the relationship 
proposed in the study between systematic risk and shareholder wealth was also rejected. 
Although systematic risk was found to have a negative association with shareholder wealth in the 
short-term, the findings were not statistically significant. This finding is inclined to support the 
notion that mismanaged risk increases the firm’s chance for financial distress. This can have 
greater repercussions for restaurant firms due to the unique industry characteristics, including the 
numerous external risks that impact firms’ stability.  
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Theoretical Implications 
Through the utilization of a case study approach this study provided an in-depth 
examination of the proposed relationships between brand diversification, systematic risk, and 
shareholder wealth when considering divestiture completions for a restaurant firm. The insights 
provided by the study’s findings contribute to the theoretical body of knowledge within the 
hospitality field in several aspects. First, this study has provided a catalyst for future studies to 
further develop an understanding of the significant impact divestitures have on firms and 
shareholder wealth within the restaurant industry and overall hospitality industry. This study’s 
analytical framework delivers a greater understanding of the consequences to a restaurant firm’s 
shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic in terms of the effects of divestiture 
completions. The findings show that a divestiture completion has a negative influence on a 
restaurant firm’s brand diversification and shareholder wealth, as well as, a positive influence on 
the firm’s systematic risk. However, the study results display that the impact of divestitures is 
solely within the short-term. Moreover, the relationships between divestiture completion and 
shareholder wealth, brand diversification, and systematic risk are linear and not bi-directional.   
Second, this study simultaneously examined the effect of brand diversification and 
systematic risk following a divestiture from the shareholders perspective. Whereas the studies 
that have been performed in the hospitality industry regarding diversification have focused on 
the effects towards firm financial performance and not shareholder wealth (Kang & Lee, 2014; 
Kang et al, 2011). The results of this study demonstrate that due to the existence of a 
cointegrating vector a long-run equilibrium relationship is found between brand diversification, 
systematic risk, and shareholder wealth, however there are no short-run dynamic adjustments as 
indicated through the lack of significance for Granger causality. In the short-term, there are no 
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statistically significant relationships between the variables. The findings for these relationships 
hold even when considering a divestiture completion. However the study results display a 
negative association between brand diversification and shareholder wealth, as well as, between 
systematic risk and shareholder wealth in the short-term. A positive association is displayed 
between brand diversification and systematic risk. Furthermore, the study results reveal that no 
non-linear nor bi-directional relationship exists between the variables.  
Managerial Implications 
This study recognized the idiosyncratic features of the restaurant industry and the 
inadequate state of current research in regards to the proposed relationships between brand 
diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth when considering divestiture 
completions. The use of a single restaurant firm that has completed numerous divestitures over 
the years provided for a greater in-depth analyses. The study’s results provide restaurant firm 
corporate executives with an expanded understanding of the effects from divestiture completions. 
First, divestiture completions are shown to negatively impact shareholder wealth in the short-
term, which indicates the utilization of divestitures will not align executive and shareholder 
interests as suggested under agency theory. Instead, the market views the completion of 
divestitures to result in the diminution of shareholder wealth, similar to the criticism Darden 
Restaurants, Inc. experienced when divesting its Red Lobster® brand. Therefore, a divestiture 
completion is not viewed as a means to correct inefficient diversification strategies undertaken 
by corporate executives, as suggested under agency theory.  
Moreover, the completion of a divestiture increases the firm’s systematic risk in the 
short-term, meaning the firm is more sensitive to the risks inherent in the market. Therefore, the 
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results indicate that following a divestiture completion investors of the firm anticipate the total 
return relative to the market to be more volatile. Consequently, this study’s findings are 
beneficial for restaurant firm corporate executives to observe when strategically deciding 
whether a divestiture completion will be beneficial for the firm and its shareholders, due to the 
subsequent effects to brand diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth. 
Limitations 
Although this study has provided useful insights into the effects of the resulting levels of 
brand diversification and degree of systematic risk on shareholder wealth following a divestiture 
completion within the restaurant industry, there are certain limitations that should be addressed 
in future research. For instance, the utilization of an individual case study has allowed for an in-
depth investigation, however the results that were found in this study for Brinker cannot be 
generalized to other restaurant firms. Brinker is classified as a casual dining restaurant 
corporation which operates within the casual dining segment of the restaurant industry. The 
casual dining segment includes national and regional chains that provide food services in a 
casual environment to patrons who are seated and served by wait staff and pay after eating 
(Hoovers, n.d.). The results of the study should not be generalized to restaurant firms in the other 
industry segments, such as the quick service or fast casual segments.  
 In addition, the study’s findings on the lack of significance of the resulting brand 
diversification on Brinker’s shareholder wealth, lack of significance of brand diversification on 
Brinker’s systematic risk levels, and lack of significance of Brinker’s systematic risk on its 
shareholder wealth following a divestiture may vary based on the unique characteristics of the 
economies in different countries. As previously noted in Chapter Three, the restaurant industry in 
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the United States has a significant importance on the country’s economy. However the industry 
is exposed to a variety of external risks including discretionary spending patterns, volatile 
commodity costs, health epidemics, the economic environment, and governmental regulations 
(Barber et al, 2008). These risks may impact the study’s results if conducted on restaurant firms 
operating in other countries. Moreover, the deployment of time series data in this study also 
poses some limitations involving the lack of mutually independent observations given that a 
future data point may be impacted by a previous data point. 
Future Research 
This study has provided a catalyst for future studies to further develop an even more in-
depth understanding of the associations between a restaurant firm’s brand diversification, 
systematic risk, and shareholder wealth, as well as, the impact of divestitures within the industry. 
Based on the study’s findings and limitations, future studies should utilize a sample that involves 
restaurant firms within the various industry segments to determine if the operations or risks 
associated with each segment alters the findings. In addition, future studies should examine the 
personal characteristics of the restaurant firms, such as size, to determine whether the results 
vary. For instance, firm size has been found to impact the relationship between a restaurant 
firm’s level of brand diversification and financial performance (Kang & Lee, 2015). Such that 
firms of a smaller size were not able to fully exploit the benefits of greater diversification and 
subsequently the negative effects of diversification outweighed the benefits (Kang & Lee, 2015). 
It would be beneficial for the restaurant industry to determine whether a firm’s size will 
determine whether the brand diversification-shareholder wealth relationship is significant or not.  
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Moreover, future studies should examine any potential relationships between brand 
diversification, systematic risk, and shareholder wealth when utilizing an asset beta measure 
instead of an equity or market based measure, as utilized in this study. As the study of Madura 
and Murdock (2012) demonstrates the measure utilized to quantify systematic risk has an impact 
on the statistical relationships found between systematic risk levels and divestitures. Therefore, 
this study should be replicated with an asset based systematic risk measure to examine any 
alterations in the findings. Furthermore, future studies should examine the study’s analytical 
framework in terms of the lodging industry. The restaurant and lodging industries face unique 
external and internal operational conditions and risks which may alter the findings.  
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